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By and large, most analyses of international organisations emphasises the role and 
impact of structural conditions without much acknowledgement of leaders and their 
propensity to shape the institutional agenda. This is especially evident in the peace and 
security context. Despite much being written on the deteriorating security situation in 
Africa, little is done to locate the role of political leadership in creating and attaining peace. 
More pointedly, the peace and security sector primarily is populated by men; men as 
decision-makers, strategic advisors, peacekeepers and peacemakers. International 
organisations such as the African Union (AU) play a vital role in delivering a peace 
mandate, which brings into sharper focus the need to examine whether organisational 
heads are empowered to produce outcomes of peace. This study brings together 
assessments of women’s leadership in peace and security in Africa, by examining the 
political leadership of the first female AU Commission Chair, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. 
Using a qualitative approach and case study analysis, Dlamini-Zuma’s tenure is assessed 
to determine the extent to which political leadership results in outcomes of positive peace. 
To this end, the political leadership assessment focuses on the following variables: a 
leader’s political career history and political beliefs; the recruitment process; the context 
in which leadership is occurring; and the nature of leader-follower relations. Noting that 
the recruitment process was controversial and destructive to African unity, the findings 
indicate that Dlamini-Zuma’s political history and ideological beliefs affected her 
prioritisation of and response to threats to peace and security. The research ultimately 
finds that her political beliefs informed her practical and policy action, leading her to 
pursue outcomes of positive peace. As a result of the political leadership assessment, 
analysis of her political values revealed the dominance of liberation, human rights, and 
women’s rights in particular. In assessing Dlamini-Zuma’s contribution to peace, it is 
evident that she addressed positive peace issues.  
Key words: political leadership, international organisations, positive peace, African 
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BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
1.0 Background  
Africa needs peace. It is no secret that both the lives and livelihoods of Africans across 
the contours of the continent have suffered from the effects of war, complex humanitarian 
emergencies, terrorism and the repression of civil and political freedoms. Although the 
prevention of violent conflict and seeking of peace depend on partnership with global 
actors such as the United Nations (UN), the primary responsibility of ensuring a peaceful 
and secure Africa should rest with African states, their governments and 
intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) (Gebrehiwot and De Waal, 2016:26). 
The African Union (AU), an intergovernmental platform, was established in May 2002 to 
accelerate and promote regional integration, good governance, and peace, and to be the 
mouthpiece of Africa in the international system. Unlike its predecessor, the Organisation 
of African Unity (OAU), the AU was created in a manner which welcomed interventionist 
mechanisms. However, since its inception, the AU's goals and objectives have failed to 
bridge the gap between policy prescription and policy implementation (Nagar and Nganje, 
2016:3). 
Current research obsesses over the question of peace in Africa, yet the analysis often 
stops at problem diagnosis. Most of the literature on peace and violence on the continent 
centres on the devastating impact of armed conflict in African states without an extensive 
review of the role of political leadership in driving peace via the platform of international 
organisations. Considering Africa’s problematic history with peace, the more poignant 
questions are why? and what can be done about it? Although it is widely accepted and 
acknowledged that the primary responsibility for the protection of human rights rests with 
states themselves, multilateralism soon became a tool which enabled states to 
collectively address challenges to peace and security (Akokpari, 2016a:29).  
The favouritism of multilateral arrangements is largely informed by the influx of non-
territorial security threats owing to increasing interconnectedness and interdependence 




Nations (LON), the world’s first collective security arrangement which was later disbanded 
in favour of the creation of the UN in 1945 (Jordaan, 2016:161). African states followed 
suit in 1963 when summitry diplomacy gave rise to the OAU. In 2002, African states 
anticipated changes in the international environment and adopted new interventionist 
mechanisms under the AU (Vogt, 2009:256). Although the formation of the above-
mentioned international organisations serve to address the most pressing problems in 
terms of global governance, peace and security and gender development, there is not 
much literature on the role of political leadership in driving outcomes of peace. What 
troubled the researcher was that the executives of international organisations (IOs) are 
seldom held accountable for their actions in terms of organisational outcomes.  
The greatest test to the efficacy of the AU remains the prevalence and persistence of 
conflict in Africa (Akokpari, 2016b:4). Most prominently, the frequency of and increasing 
intensity of conflicts in Africa exhaust the AU's diplomatic resources.  Africa's diplomatic 
efforts are tried when faced with regional or international issues of peace and security 
where IOs are expected to control, mitigate or terminate enduring threats. However, one 
must be mindful of the amalgamation of factors which inhibit an organisation’s ability and 
capacity to sufficiently address issues through diplomatic engagement. Much of the AU's 
organisational ineffectiveness lies in conflict resolution and the mitigation of threats to 
peace and security in Africa. In short, the prevalence of conflicts in Africa has resulted in 
conflict resolution emerging as an indicator of the success of diplomatic practice and 
effective leadership on the continent. Normally, mediators belonging to the AU have been 
involved as a preliminary measure in the resolution of conflict. Further, the AU's 
Constitutive Act of 2002 reinforces the importance of the need to promote peace, security 
and stability as a prerequisite for African development and integration. Agenda 2063, the 
brainchild of former Commission Chair, Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma identifies peace and 
security as a key pillar if Africa is to reach its potential and reclaim its place in the 
international system. 
At present, Africa continues to be confronted by multivariate challenges to security which 
emanate from the domestic and global environment (Akokpari, 2016b:7). These issues 




as an essential feature of effective organisations able to address these pressing 
challenges. In terms of AU policy frameworks and existing commitments to peace and 
security, both are thorough and comprehensive; however, there is now a demand for the 
successful and consistent implementation of existing norms and principles via effective 
political leadership. 
Nye (2008) posits that to assess political leadership, the focus must be directed towards 
analysing beliefs, values, characters, power relations, ethical/unethical values, attitudes 
and actions of leaders and followers, the historical circumstance and cultural institutional 
context. Further, one must interrogate the relationship between politics and leadership to 
establish possible causality. Tucker (1995:9) states that "politics as leadership does 
occur", meaning that leaders need followers who support and accept their policies and 
verdict concerning the nature or seriousness of a situation and prescriptions for collective 
crises. This probes whether the inattention given to political leadership within 
organisational settings such as the AU is partially responsible for organisational 
ineffectiveness, especially around issues concerning peace and security on the continent. 
Simply put, leaders are essential to organisational success (Araujo-Cabrera, Suarez-
Acosta and Aguiar-Quintana 2016; Muchiri et al. 2012); thus, they must be effective.  
Rukato (2018:113) states that the AU is symbolic of new beginnings for Africa and further 
demonstrates the commitment of leaders of the day to ensure that Africans are no longer 
bystanders but active participants in their own affairs. It is  a widely held perception that 
African leaders have dropped the baton as the initial euphoria concerning the Pan-African 
integration project subsided despite the often overlooked and modest endeavour to live 
up to its populated mandate. 
Africa’s security environment is dominated by negative peace solutions. Simply put, 
negative peace makes reference to addressing armed conflict. The AU assumes an 
important role in continental affairs. Since inception, the AU has suffered because of 
implementation capacity accompanied by financial and technical challenges. Issues 
referred to above have compromised the organisation’s efforts in the attainment of all its 
goals, especially in the peace and security sector. Persistent violence and death in Africa 




to peace and security. Murithi (2006b:28) states that there needs to be a greater urgency 
towards the notion of positive peace; which means a peace that promotes reconciliation 
and coexistence on the basis of human rights, social, economic and political justice. 
 Despite much being written on the deteriorating security situation in Africa, little is done 
to locate the role of leadership in creating and attaining peace. Ledbetter (2012:16) 
positions the view that leadership studies rarely include a chapter on advancing peace or 
an attempt to make a correlation between the two variables. Both leadership and peace 
are contested terms in the discipline of political science. For instance, leadership is 
interpreted differently depending on the context of application. Therefore, leadership 
takes on different meanings whether in communal, traditional, national and organisational 
contexts. Traditionally, "peace" has been viewed outside the realm of organisational 
scholarship (Spreitzer, 2007:1079). Minister, Dlamini-Zuma was elected by the AUC as 
its Chairperson on 15 July 2012, making her the first woman to lead the organisation 
(including its predecessor, the OAU). She was in office from 15 October 2012 until 30 
January 2017. In order to assess the most recent progress on peace and security in 
Africa, this study proposes to examine political leadership in the AU context by 
considering the term of the last African Union Commission (AUC) Chair, Nkosazana 
Dlamini-Zuma, a celebrated female politician from a leading African power. 
1.1 Research question 
Main research question: To what extent did Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’s political 
leadership at the AUC have outcomes of positive peace for Africa?  
1.2 Secondary research questions 
1.  To what degree was Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as AUC Chair, able to shape the peace 
and security landscape of the AU? 
2. Was Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, in her capacity as AUC Chair, empowered to not only 
make peace but ensure the implementation of AU objectives of peace and security? 
3. What impact did gender have on the political leadership assessment of Nkosazana 





1.3 Research objectives 
To measure outcomes of positive peace as a result of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’s AUC 
leadership. 
To investigate the extent to which a political leadership assessment informs Dlamini-
Zuma’s response to peace and security challenges on the continent. 
To determine whether Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was the most suitable candidate to 
assume the AUC Chair position. 
1.4 Significance of the study  
This study will endeavour to contribute to existing scholarly works by exploring the nature 
of the relationship between peace and political leadership and intends to provide useful 
insights into how political leadership could be studied to inform how a leader responds to 
peace- and security-related challenges. Uniquely, the research at hand specialises in 
outcomes of positive peace and will further seek to offer clarity as to whether effective 
political leadership indeed provides manifestations of positive peace. Little is reported on 
political leadership in Africa or on women leaders involved in the peace and security 
sphere. The tenure of Dlamini-Zuma as the continent’s first female Chairperson of the 
AUC is understudied and therefore presents the opportunity to assess her leadership and 
contribution to peace on the continent. Research findings can assist international 
organisations to find candidates who are equipped visionaries; able to drive peace at all 
levels via effective political leadership. 
2.0 Literature review 
This section proffers an analytical overview of existing literature on the lack of scholarship, 
and the role of political leadership in driving peace on the African continent. It highlights 
the popular argument made by scholars that the AU requires effective political leadership 
to ensure that the continent’s premier body is relevant, operational and that its policies 
yield tangible results.  
The body of literature on Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's term will be interrogated to 
understand her contribution or lack thereof to the AU's continental aspirations of being a 




it becomes evident that her political legacy and contribution to world politics remain largely 
understudied. There are very few publications on her political life and before 2017 there 
was little to no conclusive analytical work to bear testimony to her political credentials. 
She pioneered the inclusion and integration of women in foreign policy in Africa and has 
assumed the role of AU Chair (Landsberg and Orderson, 2017:7). This study will explore 
the role of women’s leadership in pursuing positive peace in Africa by studying Dlamini-
Zuma's term as the head of the AUC which is the main research question.  
 De Waal (2016:33) is of the view that "the African Union was at its strongest in the early 
phase when a small group of leaders invested strongly and led politically from the front". 
This perspective highlights the importance of political leadership as a prerequisite to 
organisational effectiveness. Scholars such as De Waal (2016:30) and Deya (2016:27) 
share the belief that above all, the AU needs a leader who will keep the continent’s 
political leadership focused while galvanising the African people in their multitudes around 
the AU. In support of this view, Cilliers and Okeke (2012) agree that strong leadership 
aimed at ensuring a more effective AU is needed. Surprisingly, discourse on political 
leadership remains underdeveloped and enjoys limited scholarly attention. Notably, Africa 
is at a critical juncture where the continent's leadership must assume responsibility for its 
challenges. Political leadership must be accompanied by articulating norms and principles 
in the realms of policy and practical political action, and in ensuring that political goals 
and strategies remain clearly in focus (Mbeki and Brahimi, 2016:11). In short, the 
establishment of the AU and adoption of its Constitutive Act represents good political 
leadership. Considering the complex international environment Africa is exposed to, 
reaffirmation and recommitment to good leadership are now needed.   
According to Shannon (1949:12), "a fish is not likely to be the first to discover water" 
thereby alluding to the fact that political scientists and scholars will fail to discover the 
importance of political leadership because of their proximity to the subject. Political 
leadership refers to the behaviour of persons in positions of political authority, their 
competitors and their interaction with other members of society as manifested in the past, 
present and probable future throughout the world. This discourse is also inclusive of those 




problems and political leadership is no exception to this. Masciulli and Richard (2006:863) 
maintain the belief that leadership remains an indispensable component of all government 
and governance structures. Most commonly, poorly executed leadership contributes 
towards and results in failures in government, governance, organisational ineffectiveness 
as well as lack of policy implementation. Conversely, strong leadership stands out as an 
essential feature if governments and IOs are to thrive and fulfil their institutional mandate. 
It is necessary to determine who Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma is as a leader and whether 
her previously held leadership positions prepared her to assume the highest office at 
Addis Ababa. 
Notably, Dlamini-Zuma was actively involved in conflict resolution in her capacity as 
foreign affairs minister from 1999 to 2009 (Magadla and Cornell, 2019:36). She also 
worked closely with President Mbeki who relentlessly and intentionally pursued an 
African-oriented foreign policy with an unquestionable commitment to multilateralism. Her 
diplomatic involvement extends to include Zimbabwe and the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC). Much criticism surrounding her involvement in peace processes fails to 
credit Dlamini-Zuma's efforts as Mbeki was seen to lead the mediation process in the 
DRC as well as in the case of Zimbabwe. According to Adebajo (2018:para.4) in his 
review of Du Plesssis’s book, Woman in the Wings, the author wrongfully criticises the 
former Chairperson’s action as it relates to the promotion of quiet diplomacy during the 
"Mbeki-led ANC government policy". 
In Adebajo's critique of Woman in the Wings, he highlights that the book is unsuccessful 
in its attempt to understand the institutional dynamics and politics which exist within the 
confines of the AU. To illustrate this point, Du Plessis attributes blame to former 
Commission Chair, Jean Ping, for diplomatic failures in Libya and Egypt without 
considering how local, regional and global power politics collide; which makes it 
increasingly difficult for collaborative platforms such as the AU Commission to address 
issues transcending national borders (Adebajo, 2018:para.6). More pointedly, Du 
Plessis's persistent critique of Dlamini-Zuma's so-called paranoia concerning the French 




understand the "pyromaniac firearm" role the French assumed in Chad and the Central 
African Republic (CAR), for instance.  
Alden and Le Pere (2003) advance the argument that Mbeki and Dlamini-Zuma shared 
the belief that for South Africa and Africa at large to be successful, the international 
structure would have to change so new norms could take effect. Dlamini-Zuma's tenure 
as foreign minister witnessed South Africa play an active participatory role in the "re-
imagining of continental and global multilateral institutions". This includes the dissolution 
of the OAU and establishment of the AU in 2002 (Magadla and Cornell, 2018:40). The 
reconfiguration of Africa's premier continental body had significant implications for the 
institution's ability to respond to conflict and interstate war, for instance, thereby making 
the AU more relevant to the lives and plight of African people. Included in the key features 
of her tenure as foreign policy leader are her investments in peace processes, as she 
sent peacekeepers to Burundi in 2001, Sudan in 2008 and to the DRC in 2004 (Magadla 
and Cornell, 2018:40). In short, Mbeki and Dlamini-Zuma were aware that for the African 
Renaissance project to be taken seriously by AU member states, the vision had to be 
complemented by a material investment to ending war and reducing conflict on the 
continent. Although this dissertation will provide a brief summary of Dlamini-Zuma’s prior 
leadership roles in the peace and security sector in chapter five, the focus remains on 
analysing her actions as AUC Chair. This dissertation will consult her previous 
engagements in peace and security processes as foreign minister to determine potential 
continuity in her continental role as AUC Chairperson.  
Deya (2016:36) attempts to profile the leadership structure of the AUC for it to be effective 
and capable of implementing decisions at all levels. One of the defining features of 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma's term at the AU is her relentless commitment to human rights 
but more significantly the rights of women. Furthermore, the AU has the highest number 
of women in peacekeeping forces and the highest number of women in political decision-
making positions. However, areas which need improvement include peacemaking, 
peacebuilding and mediation. Another consequence of her exemplary leadership was her 
determination to transform summit diplomacy within the AU. Together with the assistance 




to make summit meetings more effective and efficient. This bears testimony to the 
Chairperson’s proficiency in functional leadership which emphasises the importance of 
results-based performance in institutions. Among these measures was the decision to 
exclude partners from attending mid-year summits as foreign diplomats have habitually 
entertained side meetings which later gave rise to conflict and bred mistrust among 
African statesmen. It is important to note that mid-year summits were tasked with tracking 
implementation of AU decisions at various levels, so a greater propensity for external 
interference in AU affairs. Moreover, the AU Foundation (AUF) stands out as another of 
her achievements. This initiative allows for the continent’s high net worth individuals to 
donate additional financial resources to the organisation. 
In its entirety, the AU is representative of the hope of so many Africans on the continent 
and in the diaspora. To be named the Chairperson of such a body continues to hold 
prestige and is the dream of international civil servants and politicians alike. The 
Chairperson of the AUC is a complex job to say the least. Despite the esteem which 
accompanies the title, the job itself demands proficiency in multitasking and keeping 
various stakeholders with competing interests satisfied (Deya, 2016:37). In concurrence 
with Deya, De Vaal maintains that the AU Secretariat be someone with "political and 
managerial acumen", known in both continental and international circles and able to 
mobilise African peoples and their resources while being an unquestionable Pan-African 
in word and deed (Deya, 2016:36). 
Cilliers and Okeke (2012) postulate that the challenges facing the incoming Chairperson 
of the AU are both "exciting and challenging". Under the chairmanship of Dr Dlamini-
Zuma, the AUC should prioritise the inculcation of transparency, financial accountability, 
commitment to the development of Africa and respect for cultural diversity. In terms of 
holding Commission leadership to account, the abovementioned policy brief developed a 
clear election manifesto against which to measure their success. This includes: 
consolidating the institution of the AU as a premier, Pan-African institution; reiterating that 
the New Partnership for Africa’s Development’s (NEPAD) infrastructural development 
projects remain an important programme to the AU; and lastly, to ensure that Africa's 




conflict resolution (Cilliers and Okeke, 2012). The proceeding analysis will elaborate on 
Dr Dlamini-Zuma's record in terms of advancing AU goals and objectives pertaining to 
peace and security. This study is intent on exploring how effective leadership can play a 
role in ensuring that peace is an achievable goal.  
The 2007 High Level Report Panel on the audit of the AU revealed that the AUC is 
handicapped in three areas. The report states that a lack of clarity exists concerning the 
set-up of its leadership (AU Audit Report, 2007:27). Additionally, the AUC's activities are 
too expansive and far-reaching for it to be effective and live up to its promised expectation. 
Finally, management requires improvement. Concurrently, member states have lagged 
in terms of staying committed by financially contributing to the activities of the Union and 
Commission more specifically. It is clear then that the Commission is heavily reliant upon 
the support of its constituents to successfully deliver on its mission. What is really keeping 
African states together and committed to the AU project and agenda? Just over half a 
century has passed and the AU has made little progress in terms of regional integration 
and the eventual unification of African states as articulated by the organisation's 
commitment to Pan-Africanism. If lack of buy-in to AU mission, vision and principles 
characterises member states’ behaviour, it is necessary to re-evaluate why African states 
preach unity, solidarity and integration rhetorically but make feeble attempts at seeing 
these values realised. This study specifically considers how the institutional environment 
could inhibit or restrict the exercise of leadership and/or determine capacity to effect 
change within a given leadership position. This study takes into consideration the 
institutional environment of the AU and potential restrictions regarding the exercise of 
leadership as AUC Chair as it relates to peace and security.  
The recurring theme of political leadership stands out as the missing ingredient to AU 
effectiveness. It follows then to establish what exactly makes great leadership. It cannot 
be ignored that leadership remains a key interest in the field of social science. Bell 
(2011:1020) articulates that conceptualisation issues arise when considering its 
multidisciplinary nature and ability to draw on a myriad of fields including the likes of 
psychology, history, philosophy. If scholars can attribute lack of development, progress, 




scholarly work should be devoted to this underrated discourse. It is thus of paramount 
importance to distinguish between true leadership (behavioural leadership) as opposed 
to those simply occupying leadership positions (positional leadership).  
According to Rukato (2018:117), the effectiveness of the AUC hinges on reviewing the 
Constitutive Act to reduce the number of priority areas it prescribes to. It is evident that 
the immensely congested mandate stifles the chairperson and the organ’s ability to 
successfully deliver on its objectives. Further, an additional constraint on the organ is that 
no clear line of authority exists between the AUC and other organs. As such, the AUC is 
curtailed in terms of coordinating the work of other organs which often bypass the AUC 
and report directly to the Assembly. The AUC is then increasingly under scrutiny for not 
delivering on its mandate when harmony and collegiality cease to exist between the 
respective AU organs. One is then prompted to locate the factors responsible for inciting 
division and threaten the so-called unquestionable commitment of "African solutions to 
African problems". South Africa's decision to promote Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as the 
first female chair and the extent to which her candidacy created friction and birthed 
disunity will be explored. Rukato (2028:118) goes on to add that regardless of the jam-
packed functions associated with the organ, there is "limited scope of leadership provided 
by the member states including in resource mobilisation". A so-called clash of leadership 
also exists within the AUC when member states assume control of some of the body’s 
functions or when the Commission wants to take the lead role where the member states 
are capable of providing leadership (Rukato, 2018:118). 
Rakuto (2018:123) identifies lack of continuity in both leadership and substance as a 
pressing problem which stunts the AUC's ability to celebrate more success in seeing its 
policies implemented and bearing fruit. To date, each chairperson has only served one 
term thereby forfeiting the chance to build on their momentum in terms of gaining support 
for their mandate and strategic direction. Second, to this, individual agendas affect the 
organisational effectiveness of the AUC. By analysing the terms of previous chairpersons, 
it remains evident that the AU's agenda is dictated by the chairperson of that time. 
Perception would have one to believe that the revered position is used to gain political 




the highest office of the country. Louw-Vaudren (2017:para.4) concludes that the chief 
critique of Dlamini-Zuma's term is that she habitually left Addis Ababa and abandoned 
her duties as chair to attend to matters concerning the South African ruling party. In 
retrospect, this statement merits truth in relation to both Jean Ping of Gabon and Dlamini-
Zuma of South Africa. This pattern informs that the AU is then deprived of the leadership 
it needs to be fruitful and effective.  
Generally, political leadership within Africa remains deprived of scholarly work, attention 
and insights. Versi (2016:26) states that AU summits rarely achieve much as African 
delegates attend for ceremonial purposes and thus positions the argument that 
"exceptional leadership and governance are key in achieving the AU's aims". 2016 
witnessed the AU placing major emphasis on the theme of human rights, more pointedly 
the rights of women. Consequently, the theme demands leadership which can utilise all 
of a country's resources both natural and human to serve the people. Moreover, the AUC 
needs leadership which can reconcile opposing interests, especially concerning Africa 
and its multiplicity of ethnicities and classes; and is thus challenged to weave them into a 
collaborative unit. 
Hendricks (2015:365) considers that under the former stewardship of Dlamini-Zuma who 
was appointed as Chairperson of the AU Commission in 2012, there is a more concerted 
effort by the AU on mainstreaming gender into peace and security. To illustrate this, the 
AU appointed Bineta Diop as Special Envoy on Women Peace and Security (WPS), 
launched a five-year gender, peace and security programme, and is developing a 
‘Continental Results Framework' for women, peace and security (African Union 
Commission, 2016:3). Moreover, the AU has themed the Heads of State Summits for 
2015 around women's empowerment. Unlike Hendricks, Louw-Vaudren (2017:para.6) 
states that although Dlamini-Zuma was praised for promoting human rights but more 
specifically women's rights, she also received much reproach for the inaction or perhaps 
lack of speedy response to crises in both South Sudan and Burundi before vacating the 
AU offices.  Granting that gender inclusion in peace processes is identified as a feature 
of Dlamini-Zuma's tenure, the role of leadership in these peace processes is scant at 




term and is unable to provide the reasoning behind decision-making within the confines 
of the AUC, especially in terms of pursuing peace and security on the continent.  
Scholars such as Rukato contend that there is an urgent need to transform the strategic 
approach of the Commission (Rukato, 2018:127). Justification for such a statement is 
grounded on the belief that the AU's predecessor the OAU had already dealt with all 
politics thereby leaving the AU to attend to matters concerning economic development. 
Notably, the statement neglects to consider coloniality and the enduring legacies of 
dependency on European and Western counterparts. Further, Africa has made less than 
modest progress when it comes to integration of people, their free movement across 
borders, initiating cultural compatibility and uniting all African people under one common 
Pan-Africanist vision. More importantly, certain AU objectives must be left to the care of 
member states and regional economic communities (RECs), so the Commission is able 
to direct all its effort towards the attainment of the AU’s vision of: "an integrated, 
prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its citizens and representing a dynamic force 
in the global arena" (Rakuto, 2018:127). 
Landsberg and Orderson (2017:3) assert that Dlamini-Zuma was depicted as a paragon 
of excellence and champion of the AU, the leader who would single-handedly move into 
AU headquarters and inspire a new strategic direction. Moreover, she was deemed 
capable of defending and promoting Africa's interests against the external influence of 
France and the United States (US) which relentlessly pursue their interests in and against 
Africa. Landsberg and Orderson (2017:5) contends that her promotion was contingent 
upon an ideo-philosophical and institutional basis. Despite the gender dimension being 
behind the decision to field Dlamini-Zuma as candidate, the report released in the 
Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), The Diplomat, Vol 2 of 
2012, suggests that her candidacy was not chiefly driven by Africa's need to concretise 
resolutions as it pertains to proclaiming the period between 2010 and 2020 the "Decade 
of Women".  
The Diplomat positioned the view that her experience as a former minister of foreign 
affairs would be particularly useful in ensuring the AUC Chair is utilised as an extension 




on Pan-African values of unity, solidarity and “African solutions to African problems” 
points towards inconsistencies when reviewing South Africa’s decision to promote the 
candidacy of Dlamini-Zuma. Although not a stipulated rule, the unwritten code among the 
larger more pivotal African states was to refrain from contesting high-level positions within 
the AU so as to give other member states a sense of inclusion in terms of decision-making 
concerning continental affairs. More pointedly, 17 August 2012 witnessed Dlamini-Zuma 
stating that she would take up this mantle with her focus firmly fixed on ensuring that the 
AU becomes an active and powerful continental actor in world affairs. She then went on 
to express that her candidacy was less about herself or her affiliation to South Africa but 
should be treated as a victory for the continent. Furthermore, the claim that her successful 
candidacy should be perceived as an achievement for Africa as a whole, supports 
previous statements affirming her pledge to continental loyalty and the need to ensure 
that the continent assumes its "rightful place" in international politics. The preceding 
analysis focused on the reasons behind the candidacy of Dlamini-Zuma whereas the 
analysis to follow will be oriented towards how her leadership as AUC chair was 
capacitated to ensure the promotion of peace and security on the continent 
notwithstanding the limitation of exercising leadership within the complex internal 
environment of the AU. 
Multiple AU documents, protocols and most importantly the AU Constitutive Act identify 
peace and security as a key component before development can be pursued. Not much 
is reported on the role of leadership in championing the cause of peace on the continent. 
Dlamini-Zuma's close ties with the AU as it relates to its establishment at the Durban 
summit in July 2002, makes for a rich study as she witnessed the rebirth of Africa's 
premier continental body as well as the normative transition from non-indifference to non-
interference which holds different implications for the bodies involved in conflict. 
From the literature consulted above, a comprehensive and conclusive analysis of Dlamini- 
Zuma's term is needed as her term as the first female chair of Africa's premier continental 
body remains unassessed. For this study, it is necessary to determine who Dlamini-Zuma 





3.0 Research methodology 
A qualitative approach is adopted, as discussed below.  
The qualitative research approach is used for this particular study as it offers the 
necessary tools needed to answer the stated research objectives. Basically, research 
design makes reference to the chosen research methods used in the successful 
completion of this study. Specifically, case study research was selected as it has proven 
to be particularly helpful in the generation of new insights pertaining to the furtherance of 
leadership studies. 
Unlike quantitative data, qualitative data allows for a "why" behind a response, therefore, 
affording the researcher the opportunity to be informed of respondents’ experiences, 
opinions, thoughts, this in turn allows for a more holistic comprehension of the research 
question (Cassim, 2015:113). Notably, qualitative research is by no means void of any 
flaws of which some will be discussed briefly. The disadvantages to this research method 
include but are not limited to: its inherently subjective nature; the process of analysing 
data can prove to be complicated and inclined to be subjective; statistical analysis is not 
applicable for validity purposes; and it is significantly more resource-intensive in 
comparison to quantitative data. Given the abovementioned weaknesses of the 
qualitative research design, the method is still best suited to achieve the intended 
research outcomes of this study. The reasons which favour this method will be listed 
below.  
According to Robson (2002:178) and Saunders et al. (2012), case study research serves 
as an investigative tool used to analyse a specific phenomenon within its real-life context 
validated by using several sources. Notably, the abovementioned research method is 
normally regarded as the preferred approach when engaging in an explanatory study. 
The study is predicated on uncovering in-depth findings pertaining to the field of political 
leadership within the context of IOs. Generally, a case study represents a detailed 
investigation of a certain phenomenon. This phenomenon or unit of analysis could be an 
individual, organisation or state. Most commonly, the sample size is reasonably small and 
therefore the researcher can explore and examine certain variables and contextual 




sample size, restricts the researcher’s ability to draw generalisations concerning research 
findings as the context and situations are limited. In spite of these minor shortcomings, 
this method continues to be successful in extracting important ideas especially in the 
discourse of political leadership. 
Case study analysis has been a crucial element to the furtherance of leadership studies 
(Elgie, 2015:37). Perry (1998) goes on to add that case study research enables a credible 
investigation of a contemporary phenomenon in different topical areas which has already 
been acknowledged by other researchers.  A single case study was chosen because it is 
a unique case as Dlamini-Zuma is the first female Chair of Africa's continental body, the 
AU. Moreover, this type of study allows for the observation of a phenomenon which has 
received little to no rigorous scholarly inquiry.  
Hermann and Pagé (2016:127) ask prominent questions as to whether leadership matters 
within civil society organisations or more generally in organisational settings which vary 
in magnitude, scope and mandate. This research will aid understanding about the impact 
of AUC leadership on the successful implementation of AU goals and objectives intent on 
producing sustainable peace in Africa. The study is predicated on uncovering in-depth 
findings pertaining to the field of leadership and peace to determine how effective 
leadership can be used to drive the AU's peace and security agenda. 
To achieve this goal, an embedded case study strategy has been employed, where 
multiple units are analysed within the same context. As opposed to the holistic case study 
strategy which analyses data as a single unit of analysis, the embedded case study relies 
on the division of data into multiple categories for it to be analysed from a myriad of 
perspectives in the same context (Yin, 2013:55).The embedded approach applies to this 
study as it allows for political leadership as a phenomenon to be studied within the 
institutional environment of the AUC followed by an individual-level analysis of Dlamini-
Zuma's term as Chair using leadership as a conceptual framework.  
Semi-structured interviews are among the most popular means to gather data in social 
science research. What differentiates semi-structured interviews from its rival 
counterpart, structured and unstructured interviews, is that the interviewer has a core list 




pointedly, one is able to exercise freedom in terms of asking follow-up questions, 
depending on what the interviewee has said. Further to this, this method of conducting 
interviews allows one to probe and inquire issues not addressed in one’s scope (Cassim, 
2015:119). According to Schmidt (2004:253), interviews are extremely beneficial in that 
they allow for the extraction of detailed information, also, semi-structured interviews allow 
flexibility as follow-up questions can be asked as long as these remain questions within 
the previous line of questioning. In terms of analysing the data retrieved from interviews 
of this nature, the process is time-consuming and leading interviewees to certain 
responses is prone to bias (Schmidt, 2014:256).   
Semi-structured interviews will be conducted with relevant authorities including scholars 
and practitioners in the field of leadership and security studies, to answer the stated 
research objectives. Therefore, snowball sampling will be used as the sampling technique 
for this study. Vogt (1999) writes that snowball sampling represents a technique for finding 
research subjects. This involves a process whereby one subject gives the researcher the 
name of another subject, who in turn provides the name of a third, and so on. Moreover, 
snowball sampling can be placed within a wider set of link-tracing methodologies (Spreen, 
1992) which seek to take advantage of the social networks of identified respondents to 
provide a researcher with an ever-expanding set of potential contacts (Thompson, 1997). 
Depending on the preference of interviewees, the interviews will be conducted 
telephonically at a suitable time, according to prior arrangements. Written informed 
consent will be obtained from the list of interviewees prior to interviews taking place. Data 
retrieved from the interviews will be analysed using discourse analysis as the preferred 
analytical tool, as described by Van Dijk (1997). 
As stated previously, this study will utilise both primary and secondary data. First, primary 
data will be retrieved from semi-structured interviews. This is particularly useful as there 
is not much published literature on the role of leadership in pursuing peace on the African 
continent and even less on the involvement of women in peace processes. Second to 
this, the term of Africa's first female Commission Chairperson remains largely 
unassessed. Previous research scarcely looks at political leadership as a conceptual lens 




secondary data will also be used to constitute the findings of this research study. 
Secondary data helps to locate the topical issue in a specific subject area which has 
already been subject to rigorous scholarly inquiry. As such, it provides the researcher with 
a foundational understanding of existing literature and helps to expose the areas which 
merit further study. In short, it allows for a sufficient base upon which to facilitate 
knowledge production. 
The qualitative research approach will be used together with political discourse analysis 
as an analytical technique. The findings of this research are informed by the political life 
history, solicited documents and literature; the in-depth semi-structured interviews will be 
interpreted in an effort to explain Dlamini-Zuma’s response to the identified positive peace 
challenges. Both primary and secondary sources, personal documents (speeches and 
pronouncements), and official documents (government websites, AU documents, and 
newspaper reports), reports from the Institute for Security Studies (ISS) and other 
relevant think tanks will be analysed to examine Dlamini- Zuma's action and/or inaction 
to conflict resolution. 
Ethical protocol was observed in conducting this study. In light of Covid-19 Lockdown 
regulations, the researcher was unable to conduct in-person interviews and thus had to 
use digital platforms such as Zoom, Google Hangout and G-mail. 
Interviewees 
 Professor Adekeye Adebajo, Institute for Pan-African Thought and Conversation (IPTAC) 
 Professor Anthoni van Nieuwkerk, University of the Witswatersrasnd (WITS) 
 Ms Sanusha Naidu, Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD) 
 Dr Dawn Nagar, University of Johannesburg (UJ) 
 Dr Hesphina Rukato, Africa Governance Institute (AGI) 
 Dr Siphokazi Magadla, Rhodes University  
 Dr Odubajo Adetola, Institute for Global Dialogue (IGD) 
4.0 Structure of study 
Chapter one: Introduction. This chapter introduces the subject matter, explicitly states 




Further, it outlines the research methodology used to guide this particular dissertation 
before presenting the chapters to follow. 
Chapter two: Conceptual Framework: Political Leadership, Gender, Peace and 
Security. This chapter provides an accessible introduction to political leadership, the 
origin, nature and evolution of scholarship in the discipline.  Then this section proceeds 
to interrogate the relationship between gender and leadership and how the addition of 
gender as a lens is able to offer explanatory content to political leadership, especially 
within the context of peace and security. Women's leadership in peace and security within 
the African context will spearhead the discussion to follow. The chapter will conclude with 
an analysis of peace leadership. 
Chapter three: AU Peace and Security Architecture. This chapter considers the 
transition from the OAU to AU and its implication for peace and security in Africa. It 
analyses the role of the AU as a security actor and further discusses the mandate of other 
AU organs and normative prescriptions in pursuing peace on the continent. The AUC’s 
mandate in terms of implementing goals and objectives as it relates to peace is of chief 
importance to this chapter. More pointedly, the Chair’s role in advancing the AU’s peace 
and security agenda is studied together with a display of all the policy tools to empower 
the AU to take action in relation to conflict on the continent.   
Chapter four: Contemporary Challenges to Peace and Security in Africa. The main 
purpose of this chapter is to provide context to the study and in this way illustrate and 
analyse Africa's security environment. This section identifies the main challenges to 
peace and security under Dlamini-Zuma's term as Chair. The selected challenges that 
are focused on are informed by the doctrine of positive peace in Africa. These challenges 
were chosen in an effort to determine how Dlamini-Zuma would respond and what 
doctrine and/or philosophy informed her approach to resolving and managing conflict on 
the continent. 
Chapter five: Political Leadership Analysis of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’s 
Performance as AUC Chair and Assessment of her Approaches to Conflict 
Resolution. The chapter starts with a biographical sketch of Dlamini-Zuma which 




informed her leadership and approach to peace. Also, the factors which led South Africa 
to push for the prized AUC position are briefly expounded on. Then, it presents an 
overview of Dlamini-Zuma's responses to the peace and security challenges identified in 
chapter four and provides an assessment of her leadership in pursuing peace. Her 
achievements and shortcomings as AUC Chair will be analysed in light of political 
leadership assessment. Of importance to this chapter is understanding Dlamini-Zuma’s 
prioritisation of and response to positive peace issues.  
Chapter six: Findings and Conclusion. This chapter provides an analysis of major 
findings of the research study. Identifying Dlamini-Zuma’s contribution to peace in Africa 
is of significance to the completion of this chapter. The chapter sums up her achievements 
and shortcomings as it relates to her leadership as Commission Chairperson in the peace 
and security sector.  Recommendations for future areas of study are elaborated on in the 





















CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: POLITICAL LEADERSHIP, GENDER, PEACE AND 
SECURITY 
 
Building upon phenomena revealed in the introduction, this chapter provides an 
accessible introduction to leadership theory with specific reference to political leadership. 
Focus will be directed towards the origin, nature and evolution of scholarship on political 
leadership as an overlooked discourse. Further, gender will lend itself as a lens through 
which to interrogate gendered understandings of leadership and how this manifests itself 
in the acquisition of prominent leadership positions most commonly held my men. Section 
two also goes on to cover women and political leadership in Africa. The third section deals 
with peace and security as separate concepts before attempting to establish correlation 
between the two terms. Key concepts relating to both peace and security are introduced 
before assessing the impact of gender on matters pertaining to peace and security. It then 
follows that section three focuses on peace studies, specifically outcomes of positive 
peace, before attempting to assess whether Dlamini-Zuma was able to pursue peace in 
the following chapters. By extension, section three also sets out to conceptualise peace 
in an effort to determine the interconnectedness which exists between peace and 
leadership. Section four considers security and interrogates its relationship with peace in 
an effort to establish a correlation between the twin goals pursued by IOs in global politics 
today. Section four also deals with women’s leadership in peace and security in an effort 
to determine how gender norms play a role in the exclusion of women from participating 
in conflict resolution and their potential involvement in peace processes.  
Section one  
This section deals specifically with the conceptual underpinnings of leadership before 





2.0 Leadership as a concept 
When studying the available literature on leadership it becomes increasingly clear that 
theories have been clarified and delineated across time and therefore strands of 
relevance remain; thus, rendering the dismissal of certain theories a fruitless endeavour. 
What is key to remember is that theoretical relevance is dependent on the context of 
application. Dess and Picken (2002) present the claim that the mode of leadership applied 
in functions where confidence, precision and technical expertise are required are distinctly 
different than in simple management-orientated portfolios, for instance. This view is 
supported by Amabile, Schatzekl, Moneta and Kramer (2004) who advance the argument 
that organisational complexities, new laws and regulations, culture and psycho-social 
developments impact leadership and make it amenable to comply with changing 
organisational dynamics.  
Before delving into political leadership as an offspring of leadership studies, it is important 
to establish an understanding of what leadership means. Because leadership is 
understood to mean different things by practitioners and academics across different 
disciplines, this chapter will provide an in-depth analysis of the phenomenon to establish 
a working definition applicable to this research project. For the purpose of this study, 
leadership is not a “mystical or ethereal concept”, rather, leadership is an observable, 
learnable set of practices. Certainly, leaders make a difference; there is no question about 
it (Bass and Bass, 2008:10).  
The definitions presented below represent the dominant understandings conceptualised 
by key theorists concerning leadership and will be discussed with the intention of 
broadening traditional understanding of the concept:  
• Tannenbaum, Weschler and Massarik (1961:24) reached the conclusion that 
leadership is “interpersonal influence, exercised in a situation, and directed, through 
the communication process, toward the attainment of goals”. 
• Tannenbaum, Weschler and Massarik (1961:24) contend that leadership is “an 
interaction between persons in which one presents information of a sort and in such a 
manner that the other becomes convinced that his outcome will be improved if he 




• According to Stogdill (1974:411) leadership is the “initiation and maintenance of 
structure in expectation and interaction”.  
• Katz and Kahn (1978:528) note that leadership is “the influential increment over and 
above mechanical compliance with the routine directives of the organisation”.  
• “Leadership is the process of defining current situations and articulating goals for the 
future; making the decisions necessary to resolve the situation or achieve the goals; 
and gaining the commitment from those who have to implement these decisions” 
(Brache, 1983:120). 
According to Underdal (1994:178), leadership is understood as an “asymmetrical 
relationship of influence in which one actor guides or directs the behavior of others in 
pursuit of a specified goal”, however, this articulation is ambiguous in that it fails to state 
which actor qualifies as a leader. Popular conceptions of leadership make mention of the 
“actions of individuals who endeavor to solve or circumvent the collective action problems 
that plague efforts of parties seeking to reap joint gains” (Young, 1991:285).  Nye (2008: 
18) on the other hand, contends that leadership represents the ability and/or power to 
orient and mobilise others for a purpose and in turn the leader is perceived to guide and/or 
be in charge of others. When evaluating the aforementioned conceptions of leadership, it 
is clear that certain commonalities can be extracted. After careful investigation, the four 
recurring elements central to leadership include: the leader; the followers; the mode of 
leadership; and the objective/goal of leadership. The recognition of each of these 
components will form a crucial part of the analysis to follow.   
 Next, the popular conceptualisations of political leadership will be studied with the intent 
of extracting commonalities to eventually arrive at a consolidated articulation of the 
concept. Seeing as most definitions place emphasis on individual traits and 
characteristics, this study will look to introduce leadership theories which consider 
alternative arguments. Understanding political leadership helps facilitate operational 
understanding of political systems, public policy decision- making as well as how 
multilateral institutions function. This study positions the view that political leadership 
could be used as a conceptual lens to understand the inner workings and complex 




study of leadership is diverse in terms of both its ontological and epistemological origins. 
Basically, political leadership is practised by both individuals and groups who maintain 
considerable levels of influence, operating in a variety of leadership zones to impact  
policy formation and decision-making (Bennister, ‘t Hart and Worthy, 2014:1). 
Much of the existing literature touches on alternate approaches to leadership studies, the 
normative democratic leader as well as the assessment of both presidents and prime 
ministers. Political leadership has been theoretically scrutinised in an attempt to explain 
both the success and failures of party leaders, heads of government and so forth.  Minimal 
research is conducted in an effort to uncover the role of political leadership within the 
context of IOs of which its constituents are member states. Seeing as political leadership 
is often used to explain policy failure in uncertain times, it is important to investigate to 
what extent political leadership can be held accountable for the successful 
implementation of decisions as it relates to the AUC and its role in ensuring that Africa is 
a peaceful, prosperous and secure continent.  
2.1 Conceptualisation of political leadership 
It is important to clarify that understanding pertaining to what political leadership is varies 
depending on the context of application. Although much contestation surrounds the term, 
for the purposes of this study, political leadership will be explained and assessed in terms 
of its features.  
Hermann (1986:169) makes the case that a foundational understanding of political 
leadership must be preceded by five crucial components. These are inclusive of: 
1. “An informed understanding of the recruitment process responsible for making an 
individual a leader, including knowledge of their personality and background 
2. A detailed profile of the members within the given leadership context  
3. The nature of the leader-follower relationship 
4. The setting and or context in which leadership is occurring 




These indispensable components will prove to be extremely helpful when assessing 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as the AUC Chairperson. 
2.1.1Theoretical considerations  
 Teles (2013:77) confirms that current scholarly works on political leadership are 
unsuccessful in their attempt to provide the necessary tools able to enhance further and 
relevant understanding on the phenomenon, especially considering democratic trends 
such as the “personalisation of politics”. The term leadership in general has become so 
elastic, almost to the point of irrelevance and subsequently reduced to subjective 
qualities. Political leadership is a layered concept simply because of the uncertainty it 
often breeds. Whether it represents the party, state, region or continent it is an important 
factor which is not commonly explicitly stated. In this way, one is also able to explore 
successful party leadership versus successful national leadership. Importantly, premise 
must be given to nuance and strategic partnership when assessing political leadership 
within the context of IOs to avoid policy positions which result in divisions and disunity 
among group members. It is important to clarify what should be understood as political 
leadership when attempting to understand the importance of this research.  
The effect of cultural values on leadership behaviours in multicultural organisational 
contexts has become an issue of importance and controversy (Ailon, 2008; Byrne and 
Bradley, 2007; Kark and Van Dijk, 2007). Political leadership within a multicultural setting 
such as the AU poses a threat to leadership because of the need to maintain the strength 
of social bonds tasked with keeping people together within the AU. It is necessary to 
understand the institutional dilemmas and diversity within such a grouping of states, their 
interests and individual values; as it impacts member states’ commitment to the AU and 
its agenda. Consideration must be apportioned to the type of cultural values of the 
followers being member states and not individuals. Further, how these values transcend 
national boundaries is of key importance to effective political leadership within the AUC 
and the AU at large. This study will thus contribute to the existing body of knowledge on 
political leadership and the need for scholarship to help deconstruct the complexities and 




It is necessary to study the various theoretical considerations of leadership as the 
discipline itself remains a multifaceted avenue of study. Factors such as context, nature 
of leader and follower relationship, mode of leadership, among many other variables 
indicate that different leadership styles exist and can be employed for the pursuit of 
common goals and achievement of tasks in a specific context. Much work has been 
invested to classify and clarify dimensions of leadership thus, generating considerable 
organisational and social research of leadership styles and behaviours. Both practitioners 
and scholars alike have agreed that the progression of thinking over the years concerning 
leadership confirms the idea that it is a flexible developmental process where new 
research insights simply build on the existing knowledge base without discarding research 
which preceded it (Khan et al, 2016:3). 
 Notably, of high priority to any theory is the importance of being able to identify the intent 
of the theory in terms of what it explains, describes or predicts. This section offers the 
reader a holistic view of the different types of leadership theories as well as each theory’s 
prescriptions for leadership behaviour and effectiveness. Among the most familiar 
theories of leadership are the:  Great Man theories; Behavioural theories; Contingency 
theories; Relational theories; and Influence theories. Although there are many paradigms 
of study available relating to political leadership, the focus areas for the purpose of this 
chapter include: functional leadership; transactional leadership; transformational 
leadership; visionary leadership; and peace leadership. The abovementioned theories will 
be subject to study with the aim of profiling Dlamini-Zuma and analysing her performance 
as AUC Chairperson. 
Early scholars of leadership developed the Great Man theory as a set of explainable 
phenomena to make sense of which factors distinguished non-leaders from leaders. The 
historian Thomas Charlyle was the pioneer of the Great Man theory (Allio, 2013:5). 
Further, foundational ideas behind this theory focus heavily on inherited traits and 
qualities of leadership which include characteristics such as intelligence and optimism, 
for instance. According to Geddes and Grosset (1998), one can define a trait as an 
“inherent characteristic of a person while a competency can be defined as capability of a 




with an inherent set of social skills.  By possessing certain traits, early scholars attributed 
successful and effective leadership to individuals who exemplified such characteristics. 
Interestingly, newer theories of leadership dwell on leadership competencies and 
capabilities instead of inherited traits; as the former aspects can change and be 
developed over time whereas inherited characteristics are less amenable to change. 
Notably, this theory completely excluded women and thus indirectly assumed an 
“autonomous conception of human decision-making” by neglecting to study the 
relationship between gender and political leadership. When looking at the shortcomings 
of the Great Man theory it is clear that it involves gender-based prejudice (Sprector, 
2016:250). Later, the theory fell prey to much scrutiny as traits alone were deemed invalid 
for measuring leadership effectiveness.  
Behavioural theories soon emerged in the 1950s and shifted the focus to what the leader 
does and not who the leader is. This theory apportions value to the study of activities, 
roles and responsibilities of the leader as a means to distinguish effective from ineffective 
leaders. Furthermore, it also studies the nature of the leader-follower relationship as a 
metric of leadership success.  According to researchers Feidler and House (1994), before 
being able to determine leadership effectiveness consideration must be given to the well-
being of people and relationship behaviours accompanied by concern for production and 
task behaviours. In this case, consideration is understood as the amount of confidence a 
leader stimulates among subordinates. On the part of initiating structure, premise must 
be given to how the leader both organises and directs their subordinates’ roles as they 
play a participatory role in terms of organisational performance, profit and 
accomplishment of the mission (Fiedler and House, 1994). From this perspective 
emerged three styles of leaders, namely: autocratic, democratic and laissez faire 
leadership styles. Further, an assumption was made that all leaders subscribe to the 
abovementioned categories of leadership styles.  
Next, Contingency theories will be subject to analysis. Unlike the theories mentioned 
before, contingency theories study the significance of contextual and situational variables 
which influence successful leadership behaviours. In accordance with Fiedler’s 




(trait-theory) as well as behaviour (behavioural-theory-orientated), and that leadership 
styles are basically constant (House and Aditya, 1997). Therefore, the contingency 
leadership model is used to determine whether an individual’s leadership style is 
relationship- or task-oriented, and whether the situation is compatible with the leader’s 
style to maximise performance. Additionally, it contends that leaders are able to analyse 
situations and tailor their behaviour to improve leadership effectiveness. In short, 
advocates of this theory argue that leadership must be understood by incorporating many 
variables such as context and internal and external elements. Thus, all variables in a 
specific setting determine which style of leadership is best suited for that situation. 
Therefore, the theory maintains the view that one leadership style is not applicable to all 
situations. According to Hodgson and White, leadership is symbolic of the intricate 
balance between behaviours, needs and context. The theory of situational leadership 
proposes that style of leadership should be accorded with the maturity of the 
subordinates. Bass (1997) makes the argument that “the situational leadership model, 
first introduced in 1969, theorized that there was no unsurpassed way to lead and those 
leaders, to be effective, must be able to adapt to the situation and transform their 
leadership style between task-oriented and relationship-oriented”. 
Influence theories examine influence processes between leaders and followers. For 
example, the charismatic personality of the leader increases the leader’s influence and 
effectiveness in the accomplishment of tasks, not their actual position of authority. 
Relational theory then views leadership as a relational process which seeks to understand 
how the leader influences the follower and likewise how the follower influences the leader. 
Moreover, it engages all participants and enables collective contribution to the vision. 
Prominent depictions of the relational school of thought include: transformational and 
servant leadership. 
2.2 Depictions of political leadership style 
2.2.1 Visionary leadership 
In the explanation to follow, Dhammika (2016) makes the claim that visionary leadership 
centres on both the practice of creating and communicating an inspiring vision among 




al. (2014) contend that leaders are focused on inspiring others to prioritise organisational 
interest as opposed to acting in self-interest. DuBrin (1998) goes on to add that visionary 
leadership also positively affects commitment to the leader, increased levels of 
performance among followers, and organisational performance. 
2.2.2 Burns’s theory of transformational leadership  
This theory states that transformational leadership can be likened to a process where 
both leaders and followers “raise one another to higher levels of morality and motivation” 
(Burns, 1978:20). In this way, one can argue that transformational leaders appeal to the 
moral values of followers, for instance, peace and equality are among the esteemed 
variables. To make it plain, transformational leadership may be demonstrated by any 
individual in an organisation despite their position and/or rank within the institution (Burns, 
1978). Transactional leadership on the other hand incentivises followers by appealing to 
their self-interest, so influence is based on bureaucratic authority where rules and tradition 
are revered, unlike transformational leadership where influence is as a result of inspiration 
or exchange. Transformational leaders are attentive to the performance of group 
members, but also want each person to fulfill their potential. These leaders often have 
high ethical and moral standards. 
2.2.3 Transactional leadership 
Transactional leadership is traditionally understood as being utilitarian, motivated by 
needs and the provision of goods based on the arrangement between the leader and 
follower. Burns and West (2003:118) maintains the view that the relationship between 
political leaders and their follower base, or balance thereof, remains essential to the study 
of transactional leadership. One may say that transactional leadership is best represented 
under the banner of “influence theories”, where the exchange between leaders and 
followers is a key determinant of leadership effectiveness. Importantly, the “exchange” 
referred to between leaders and followers is based on a series of agreements set up 
between the two parties (Shamir, Arthur and House, 1994:28). Bass and Avolio (1994) 
observed transactional leadership “as a type of contingent-reward leadership that had 
active and positive exchange between leaders and followers whereby followers were 




this chapter, I will be studying depictions of political leadership style as a determinant of 
catalysing organisational effectiveness in the realm of peace and security. Although the 
paragraphs mentioned above introduce various leadership theories, they also expose 
how theories manifest as leadership style and its potential impact on determining the 
specific policy behaviours of political leaders operating within the parameters of IOs. For 
instance, there exists a body of literature on the Secretary-General which argues that 
personality coupled with character traits can play an important role in determining the 
specific policies and behaviours that will be pursued while in office. 
Section two 
Focal areas in section two are designed to facilitate discussion around gender and 
political leadership. This research suggests that by using gender as a supporting lens to 
study political leadership, one is more equipped to understand women’s leadership for 
instance.  
2.3 Gender and political leadership  
Gender will be used as the analytical lens to make sense of women’s marginalisation and 
the role it plays in relegating women as resident bystanders in matters pertaining to the 
peace and security domain. According to Sjoberg (2014:1), the term ‘sex’ is used to 
denote biological identity whereas ‘gender’ is referred to as socially constructed 
understandings and behaviours associated with these identities.  
Sykes (2014:1) positions the view that gender as a concept has scarcely been used in 
leadership analysis despite its ability to provide refreshing insights in relation to both men 
and women. By exploring whether gender offers useful explanatory content to the practice 
and study of political leadership and leaders, the intent is to discover innovative ways to 
question the phenomenon.  
According to Sjoberg (2014:3), traditional studies on leadership most commonly assume 
an “autonomous concept of human decision-making”, unlike feminists who advocate for 
a relational-driven approach to understanding both power and leadership. An 
understudied aspect of leadership studies as it relates to men is the manner in which 




masculine norms and expectations. In terms of creating categorised understandings to 
the multifaceted nature of leadership, from gender studies emerged the concept 
“masculinism” to describe the esteem and superiority which accompanied masculine 
attributes. In terms of its application to political leadership, masculinism holds qualities 
such as conviction, confrontation and combativeness in high regard. Duerst-Lahti and 
Kelley (1995:6) suggests that masculinism and its expectations adversely affect female 
leaders and their perceived competencies to hold certain positions. Similarly, femininity 
is guilty of associating female leaders with supposed “non-negotiable” traits such as 
consensus building, peaceful, and conciliatory, for instance.  
As a socially constructed term, masculinity and how it manifests as gender norms bears 
serious weight in terms of shaping not only public opinion but how people of all genders 
live their lives. Evidence suggests that gender norms in particular are at the root of issues 
pertaining to gender inequality, can act as catalysts for violence and conflict especially 
where militarised notions of masculinity are prevalent (Breines et al, 2000:44). Femininity 
on the other hand, portrays women as being in need of help, protection; whereas notions 
of masculinity prompt men to be power-wielders and to use violence in defense of those 
who need protection. Despite the recognition that multiple factors drive conflict and 
insecurity, gender norms specifically need to be analysed and addressed.  
In contrast, McElroy (1996) contends that gender feminism is perhaps the most 
destructive strand of postmodern feminist thought. Although it is acknowledged that 
feminism has helped to address political, economic and political injustice, it is not a 
sufficient framework to explain human behavior. In this instance, the critique is lodged 
against feminism as an intellectual movement. Saad (2004: 603) argues that gender 
feminism, as is true of Freudianism and postmodernism, abdicates biology as a relevant 
force in understanding the world. Captivating about McElroy’s critique of gender feminism 
is that she notes that “DNA is no longer viewed as biological reality, rather it is a 
manifestation of male dominance via its master molecule implications”. Because of this 
understanding it then follows that “all men become rapists”, irrespective of whether they 
have actually committed rape or not, likewise can be said that “all men are oppressive”. 




political constructivism. The gender feminist’s dismissal of sexual differences, is largely 
due to falsely equating the recognition of sex differences with the maintaining of social 
and economic inequalities. 
By using gender as a lens, the conventional means of assessing and predicting outcomes 
of political leadership will be subject to change. Seeing as gender-based norms find 
themselves entrenched in the conception of ideas as well as in the institutional fabric of 
our societies, gender as a conceptual lens can provide a tool that surveys leadership 
traits and determines their value (Sykes, 2014:8). By drawing attention to the 
abovementioned concept, one is able to address the gendered nature of leadership styles 
which modified perceptions of leaders by regarding them as weak, effective, empathetic 
or withdrawn. Burns (1978) contends that the most important relationships exist between 
leaders and their followers, therefore owing to the centrality of gender to both state and 
society it will continue to affect political leadership as well.  
If gender is solely treated as a social construct and not a scientific fact, feminist findings 
and claims about women and political leadership will be in violation of the integrity of the 
scientific method. Feminist critique of political leadership then reflects the tension 
between the socialization process of women versus their biological realities to determine 
which best explains their decision-making behavior. For this reason, the dissertation 
considered the effect of gender as an additional lens to explain not the behavior of women 
in political office but instead to evaluate whether their election, treatment or priorities are 
in any way impacted by gender. Saad (2004:598) states that the removal of biological 
principles from the study of human behavior is prevalent in feminist and other postmodern 
discourse. In elaboration of this view Saad (2004:598) explains that misapplication of 
Darwinian theories of evolutionary psychology does not invalidate their scientific realities 
and or findings. Traditionally Darwinian theories were employed to advance racist ends, 
so in an effort to ensure that is averted, liberal scholars conceptualized a new worldview 
which disregards the effects of biology completely. This explains why feminism 
understands individuals’ behaviors are fully shaped by their distinct cultures and 




Saad (2004: 598) articulates that “evolutionary psychology is explicitly nonracist in that it 
typically identifies human universals, that is, phenomena that are cross-culturally 
invariant”. Simply put, evolutionary psychology suggests that the forces of natural 
selection have shaped our behaviors, cognitions, and emotions.  Moreover, it goes further 
to state the innate Darwinian modules interact with environmental cues and life 
experiences to yield the uniqueness of each individual (Saad, 2004: 599). To study the 
effect of gender on political leadership, one must consider both biological and sociological 
factors.  
2.3.1 Women and political leadership in Africa  
Feminist scholars argue that the traditional scholarship on political leadership has 
resulted in the characteristics we value in global politics, favouring masculine traits and 
in turn undervaluing feminine ones (Sjoberg, 2014:1). Consequently, women are 
disqualified from contesting positions because of their dangerously close association with 
these devalued feminine characteristics.  Peterson (2019) confirms this reality from a 
psychological and personality standpoint, by proving that women are largely more 
agreeable than males. Furthermore, this section will go on to interrogate the notion that 
standards of good and effective leadership are gendered and present alternative 
arguments pertaining to the study of leaders and leadership.  
Notably, both women and femininity are understudied and under-represented in 
leadership studies. Evidently, this manifests itself in that leadership discussions rarely 
include women who do hold esteemed leadership positions or who are even prone to 
different treatment and/or assessment from men who hold similar positions. Ticker (2001) 
notes that throughout the campaign and during governing, the personal lives of female 
leaders receive more attention than that of males. This sentiment is reaffirmed by Duerst-
Lahti and Kelley (1995) who agree that even if female and male leaders make a similar 
decision, the leadership capabilities and capacities of the female leader are more likely 
to be questioned. Interestingly, a study done by Ford, LaTour, Honeycutt, and Joseph 
(1994) found that women from New Zealand were more critical of their portrayals as 
compared to their Thai counterparts. This suggests that women’s representation is 




often depicted as sex objects, and men were depicted as heavier and not quite as 
attractive. Taking account of men and women having evolved different mating strategies, 
which translate into ubiquitous differences in behaviors, does not imply the superiority of 
one sex over the other (Saad, 2004: 608). 
In advertising for instance where women are portrayed as young, attractive and models 
has nothing to do with a concerted effort to humiliate, derogate, or oppress women. Buss 
(1994:214) elaborates that “Feminist theory sometimes portrays men as being united with 
all other men in their common purpose of oppressing women”. This notion is contradicted 
by the evolution of human mating which suggests that this scenario is void of truth, 
because men and women compete primarily against members of their own sex. As a 
result, advertisers are ultimately interested in profits, and not in the systematic oppression 
of any particular group. Evolutionary psychology proves useful in debunking certain 
truthfully sounding feminist claims which are unsupported by scientific evidence. 
Saad and Gill (2001:177) explain that in the two-person ultimatum game, an allocator is 
required to split a given sum of money with a recipient. Later the recipient can choose to 
either accept or reject the offer. On condition of acceptance, both players receive their 
respective splits, while if it is rejected neither of them get anything. By relying on 
evolutionary psychology as the theoretical lens, the study found that males made more 
generous offers when pitted against a female as opposed to a male. Females on the other 
hand made equal offers independently of the sex of the recipient. Saad and Gill (2001: 
177) note that “male allocators are altruistic towards female recipients and competitive 
with male recipients is construed as a manifestation of social rules, which evolve from the 
male pre-disposition to use resources for attracting mates”. Because females have not 
evolved such a pre-disposition, female allocators are more concerned about fairness 
when making offers to recipients. The above perspective indicates that sexual difference 
indeed affects human behavior and decision-making. Fukuyama (1998:30) shares the 
sentiment that humans are hard-wired to act in certain predictable ways.  
Scholars of feminism urge scholars and the larger political communities to confront 
gendered understanding of political leadership and leaders. As stated previously, the 




constitutes these terms. Generally, sex is understood as the biological identity whereas 
gender speaks to the “social world we build around these ideas”. Enloe (2004:20) goes 
on to add that gender identities are coupled with behaviour expectations, stereotypes and 
a set of social rules applicable to people on the basis of their sex. Prugl and Meyer 
(1999:6) articulate that gender is a social construction and therefore not a natural 
phenomenon.Fukuyama (1998:30) points out that while some gender roles are informed 
by social constructs, evolutionary biologists recognise profound differences between the 
sexes which stem from a genetic rather than a cultural root. One is able to see the 
increased tension concerning how to best understand and interpret gender. 
Perception plays a role when considering the eligibility of females for prominent 
leadership roles both within business and political spheres. General associations which 
couple females with traits such as timidity, meekness and lack of assertiveness have side-
lined women and discouraged their contention for national and global leadership positions 
(Sjoberg, 2009). Peterson (2019) points out that the multivariate analysis of the gender 
pay gap shows that prejudice is only one small factor in the pay gap, one that is much 
less than “feminists claim”. Instead he suggests that a range of other elements such as 
women’s likelihood to experience stress, depression and unpredictability – and their high 
level of agreeableness, to be compassionate affects their competivieness in the 
workplace. Studies show that females who exemplify typical masculine characteristics 
such as assertiveness and competitiveness are more likely to be elected into leadership 
positions than those who embody “soft power traits” which are supposedly undeserving 
of value within organisational settings (Alexander and Anderson, 1993:529).  
According to the feminist critique of leadership, gendered understandings of leadership 
in terms of what constitutes good leadership and in gendered stereotypes which 
monopolise theories of leadership in academia (Sjoberg, 2014:4). Moreover, feminist 
claims contend that by linking good leadership with traits which are common to 
masculinity, authors synonymise what it means to be a good leader with what it takes to 
be a good man. As a consequence, women who seek political office stress their masculine 
characteristics with the intent of identifying themselves as women who “go against the 




This study will be focused on political leadership in Africa. 2005 witnessed Liberia elect 
the first female head of state on the continent. This signaled a change in the status quo 
on the continent of Africa. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf contends that leadership can be learnt, 
and that experience assists the acquisition of certain skills theory is otherwise unable to 
provide (Mikell, 2009:17).  Malawi soon followed suit when Joyce Banda assumed the 
highest office of the country.  
The call to office for Africa’s formidable female leaders prompts the need to evaluate the 
status and scale of female leadership in Africa. Moreover, should consideration be given 
to numerical values and statistics or should premise be given to finding out which factors 
keep women from ascending to power in Africa? Among these disqualifying elements are 
lack of education; child marriages; early pregnancy; cultural belief and practice; all which 
if they remain substandard will continue the cycle of mediocrity (Mikell, 2009:17). Even 
though these factors are not within the scope of the study, it is vital to understand the 
state of women’s leadership in Africa so the identified barriers can be attended to with 
resources and policy prescriptions. Although Rwanda, Senegal and South Africa succeed 
in having females in parliament, the fight for gender inclusion should surpass merely 
having a seat at the table (African Union Commission, 2016:16). This study will be 
instrumental in providing an integrated approach to unpacking Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-
Zuma's term as the first female AUC Chairperson. Now, more than ever South Africa and 
Africa at large need to be reminded of their commitment to the critical appraisal of women 
in leadership and power-wielding positions. 
Section three 
The concepts peace and security are interrogated with the purpose of understanding their 
meaning and application in global politics today. Furthermore, peace studies will be 
assessed with the purpose of identifying the contestation of what constitutes peace itself 
as well as both positive and negative peace in literature today. Security is explained with 
the intent of clarifying its meaning and the various approaches to addressing what is 
described as a security threat.  




Discourse on peace studies emerged in the 1950s at a time when scholars from around 
the world endeavoured to establish the fields of peace studies and conflict research. 
Reasons behind the establishment of these distinct fields is the development of 
interdisciplinary studies of conflict and war within the positivist paradigm of social science. 
Much of the work on peace studies is accredited to Johan Galtung, whose seminal work 
offers useful insights as to the evolutionary nature of peace studies and conflict research. 
This involved a process which saw the redefinition of violence and peace, the broadening 
scope on peace studies and an eventual move away from the traditional foundational 
commitment to positivism (Lawler, 2014:73). Peace studies primarily advocate for a 
normative commitment to non-violence. Most importantly, whether enlarging the scope of 
peace studies has affected its ability to deal with new forms of armed conflict will be 
subject to inquiry. Lawler (2014:74) states that the twin goals of peace studies are the 
reduction and eventual eradication of war which extends to include the control and 
resolution of violent conflict by peaceful means. Interestingly, peace studies did not 
pioneer the calling for the peaceful resolution of conflict as such concerns were previously 
shared by other international relations (IR) scholars who were deemed to be idealists.  
Brunk (2012:10) argues that “surely one of the most important tasks for humanity in the 
new millennium is to learn how to handle individual, social and national or international 
strife in more constructive and peaceful ways”. Perhaps another significant aspect of 
peace studies, is the contestation of the concept of peace itself. What separated peace 
studies from its other theoretical counterparts is its normative prescriptions and 
commitment to endorse peace which distinguished if from IR and related fields such as 
strategic studies (Barash and Webel, 2014:22). Whereas IR theories concentrated on war 
and armed conflict as perennial by-products of the anarchic nature of the international 
system of sovereign states, peace studies always identified war as a problem in need of 
eradication. Notably, within peace studies, different approaches to the origins of violence 
and war as well as disagreements regarding what embodies conditions of peace exist. 
Whether peace itself can be understood as the absence of something (perhaps of war), 
which is referred to as negative peace or positive peace which calls for something more 
than just the absence of a threat; remains a key element of deliberation in peace research. 




with things such as conflict resolution (at all spheres), human rights and international 
social justice; for example (Lawler, 2014:75).  Galtung (1996) notes peace studies include 
the statement “the realization of peace by peaceful means”. In short, peace studies 
provide an intellectual space for scholars whose dedicated commitment revolves around 
non-violence.  Barash and Webel (2014:26) share the perspective that peace and conflict 
studies, where possible are intent on developing new avenues for cooperative behaviour 
as well as to reduce (eventually eliminate) violence, most prominently systematic and 
organised state-led violence. In furtherance of this position, Barash and Webel maintain 
the view that violence is responsible for tainting history and that it is the threat of such 
violence and the often termed “idealistic” hope of peace (both negative and positive) that 
makes peace and conflict studies frustrating and essential. 
Negative peace is silent on how to contend with psychological and structural violence, 
which Assefa (1993:3) defined as the “social and personal violence arising from unjust, 
repressive, and oppressive national or international political and social structures”. The 
concept of positive peace has its own problems. One is that it tends to define peace from 
the perspective of the values of certain societies rather than ‘global society’ (Fogarty, 
2000:26). To the Catholics, for example, peace is a logical outcome of truth, justice, 
freedom and love. The Muslims, Hindus and people of other faiths are bound to define 
peace differently based on the dominant values in their religions. This is because what 
ensures and assures basic human survival differs from one society to the other. For this 
study, peace means working towards goals in the absence of conflict and thus includes 
justice, freedom, economic and political participation, to mention a few. 
2.4.1 A brief historical overview of peace studies 
The pervasiveness of violent conflict which can be traced throughout human history has 
given rise to new thinking as well as lenses of analysis to use when evaluating the causes 
of wars on the possibility of perpetual peace. Earlier studies on peace were more 
preoccupied with a systematic analysis of war than the focus of peace itself. Galtung’s 
influence on the development of peace research and subsequent transition to peace 
studies soon gained traction globally. In light of this, Galtung’s scholarly contributions 




studies. Further, he introduced new and specific terminology such as positive and 
negative peace which provided fresh insights to peace studies (Lawler, 2014:79). 
Together with the above concepts, emerged structural and cultural violence. One is able 
to deduce that Galtung’s seminal works greatly accelerated the pace at which peace 
research developed and expanded its knowledge base. Galtung (1996:7) writes that both 
peace and violence must be viewed and studied in their totality, at all levels of 
organisation of life… “in place of stopping after the diagnosis has been pronounced, 
consideration should be given to the promotion of peace, peace studies and an 
unquestionable non-positivistic epistemology which explicitly inform values and 
therapies”. 
2.4.2 Key concepts according to Galtung 
According to Whitehead (2013: 1-8), peace studies was established in the post-1945 
period with a normative reconceptualisation of violence, attempting to concentrate on 
conflict resolution and peacebuilding. Galtung (1996:9) thus goes on to recognise two 
compatible articulations of peace which include: the notion of peace as the 
absence/reduction of violence of all kinds; and peace as being essentially non-violent and 
involving innovative conflict transformation. Central to both definitions remains that peace 
work focuses on reducing violence by peaceful means and therefore rendering peace 
studies the study of the conditions of peace work. Lawler (2014:81) claims that Galtung’s 
perspective identified that traditional IR scholarship was heavily dependent on realist 
pronouncements, for instance, which stated that “if you want peace prepare for war” which 
over time had been accepted beyond dispute. Galtung goes on to add that this 
“unjustifiably state-centric approach” was based on insufficiently tested assumptions 
about principles such as the premise of balance of power.   
2.4.3 Positive and negative peace 
Notably, the dual definition of peace featured in Galtung’s first edition of the Journal of 
Peace Research which greatly impacted the expansion of peace studies. Galtung 
(1964:1-4) conceptualised peace as having two aspects: negative peace which at the 
most basic level entails the absence of war and actual physical violence; and positive 




Galtung’s dualistic descriptions of peace arise from the identification of the dominant 
narrative of the anarchic nature of world order condemned to a perpetual condition of 
anticipating war (Lawler, 2014:82). In this way, the extrapolation capacity to restrict 
recourse to violence would merely result in negative peace; whereas the extrapolation of 
the human capacity to cooperate will result in a condition of positive peace.  
Together, these conditions produce a complete peace. Unlike other IR theories, peace 
studies, is distinctly unique in that it commits to the promotion of both positive and 
negative peace. Importantly, positive peace stands out as Galtung’s contribution to peace 
studies, however, later it was prone to much conceptual scrutiny as he failed to provide a 
detailed understanding of his dualistic definitions of peace. Positive peace forms an 
integral part of this research in that it extends beyond peacekeeping and peacemaking 
activities to instead focus on peacebuilding; specifically, how political leadership can be 
used to drive positive peace in Africa. Therefore, it is important to understand how peace 
and leadership interconnect and overlap in an effort to establish a causal relationship 
between effective political leadership and the manifestation of positive peace in Africa.  
2.4.4 Structural violence 
Key to a nuanced and complete understanding of peace studies is the concept of 
structural violence also coined and conceptualised by Galtung. Many scholars critiqued 
Galtung’s original conception of positive peace as largely “vapid” (Webel and Galtung, 
2007:7). Galtung later responded to these criticisms by reframing some of the conceptual 
fundamentals of peace research which now incorporated some features from the radical 
position while maintaining his view on violence. The peace research conducted by 
Galtung steered clear of addressing questions regarding the relationship between peace 
research and policymaking which was the main point of contention brought to the surface 
by radical critics. Now, his peace research considered the “social origins of conflict and 
address the questions of invisible conflict, that radicals claimed emerged from political, 
economic and social inequalities” (Lawler, 1995:84). As a result, peace research would 
now encompass the analysis of visible large-scale armed conflict and wars but would 
concentrate on issues of inequality and injustice (deemed as the breeding ground for 




Notwithstanding Galtung’s theoretical leanings, he shared the Marxist sentiments that 
peace research should attend to matters such as the structural issues which also 
contribute to conflict. A catalyst for redefining peace research is a more nuanced 
understanding of violence. In light of the conventional definition of peace being the 
absence of violence, it follows then to ask what exactly constitutes violence. According to 
Galtung (1969:168), violence happens or is evident when human beings are swayed so 
that their actual mental realisations are significantly below their potential realisations. The 
word potential holds much gravitas in this regard as it is intended to be understood as a 
contingency category which alludes to “given insight and resources”.  Because of this, 
peace research needed to widen its scope to include both direct and indirect forms of 
violence, in part since any impediments to human development are treated as forms of 
violence. Galtung (1969:171) analysed structural violence as being embedded into the 
structure and manifests as unequal power and consequently as unequal life chances. In 
general, peace studies, is not limited to the analysis of violence and its varied 
manifestations but is also allied to the realisation of peace. Peace studies, is useful as it 
shows that through understanding the nature of human conflicts and the reasons behind 
them,  academics attempt to address not only peaceful resolutions to these crises, but 
also to redefine and determine a positive conception of peace as a condition which can 
be worked towards, as both a process and a goal (Richmond, 2012:66). 
Section four 
2.5 Security explained  
Security is an important component within IR discourse as it helps make sense of world 
politics and the causes of disputes, wars and complex emergencies. This prompts the 
questions: what is security and how should it be studied in the context of global relations? 
Most basically, definitions of security tend to emphasise the potential alleviation of threats 
to cherished values. Lasswell (1936) argues that security is political by nature; and in this 
way acts as a determinant of “who gets what, when, and how in world politics”. In 
concurrence with Lasswell, Buzan (1991:370) states that security can be weaponised as 
a political tool in capturing the attention for prioritised items in competition for government 




It must be noted that a correlation exists between who decides what security means as 
this affects which issues make it onto security agendas. Regarding the evolutionary 
nature of security studies, security has been understood quite differently owing to 
variables such as time and place in history (Rothschild, 1999).  Earlier studies in the field 
of security centred around political realism and by extension concentrated on the four S’s: 
state, science, strategy and status quo (Williams, 2013:3). In contrast, Buzan and his 
research played an instrumental role in widening the scope of security to extend beyond 
the state and to include human collectivities. Unlike traditional studies, Buzan’s work 
rejected traditional conceptions of security which obsessively considered the state as the 
primary actor affected by security and offered an alternative which positioned the view 
that humans are affected in five major sectors. According to Buzan (1983) the five sectors 
include: 
• Military: Buzan (1987) contends that the military sector involves the interplay between 
armed offensive and defensive capabilities of states and their perceived perceptions of their 
respective intentions. In this way, the study of military security is but one facet of the broader 
field of security studies, more commonly referred to as strategic studies. 
• Political: the political division on the other hand emphasises the importance of the 
organisational stability of states, systems of government and their ideological preferences 
which serve to legitimise or delegitimise states.  
• Economic: with regard to the economic sector, consideration was apportioned on the basis 
of access to resources, finance and markets needed to maintain “acceptable levels of 
welfare and state power”. 
• Societal: on a societal level, security involves sustainability and the changing of traditional 
patterns of language, culture, and religious and national identity and customs. 
• Environmental: when assessing environmental security, it is necessary to consider the 
maintenance of both local and planetary biosphere as being the cornerstone on which all 




2.5.1 The Copenhagen School 
Fundamentally, this school of thought is concerned with the operationalisation of security 
in world politics (Browning and Mcdonald, 2013:237). This particular discourse centres 
on the context of the Cold War and serves to shift focus towards neglected issues which 
do not conventionally feature on the security agenda. Reflected in this school of thought 
are issues relating to the environment, poverty and human rights, for instance. In addition 
to advocating for widening the scope of what security is, the Copenhagen school 
attempted to analytically delimit the topical areas affected. The abovementioned 
delimitations build upon the works of Barry Buzan which defines sectors as areas entailing 
particular types of security interaction (Buzan et al. 1998:7-8).  As stated earlier, these 
areas include: military, political, economic, societal and environmental fields; the 
Copenhagen school is of the view that these sectors enable different forms of 
relationships between relevant actors to develop and generally encourage alternate 
conceptions of the referent object. At the core of this school of thought remains the birth 
of the concept, securitisation. 
It must be noted that Buzan’s work neglects to include how gender impacts security 
studies. It is somewhat flawed in that it assumes a relatively autonomous view of security 
and its impact on different genders and sexes. Despite this, Buzan’s work helped change 
the dominant narrative about security after the Cold War by challenging rethinking 
regarding how different sectors of society incite insecurity, for instance. Williams (2013:4) 
postulates that states are not the only significant factors in IR nor are they the only referent 
objects for security. From a philosophical viewpoint, two narratives spearhead current 
understandings of security. From the first vantage point, security is treated as a 
commodity. In addition to being commodified, security is equated with the accumulation 
of power. Consequently, to be secure entails having property, money and weapons, for 
instance. The first philosophy goes on to add that power is the “route to security” meaning 
that the more power actors are able to accumulate the more secure they will be. In 
contrast, the second philosophy opposes the idea proposed by the first which states that 
security flows from power. This view aligns security with emancipation; this entails 
consideration of justice and the provision of human rights. Security is thus conceived as 




as in the case with peace studies, security can be understood in terms of positive and 
negative binary categories.  
When security is described as involving the absence of something threatening it is 
understood in the negative sense whereas positive terms include “phenomena that are 
enabling and make things possible”. What makes this distinction clear is the idea of 
freedom from and freedom to. As stated previously, the second philosophy of security 
bases the notions of stable security on cooperation between actors to achieve security 
without depriving others of it. This trend of thought can be traced to the Cold War, more 
specifically Olaf Palme’s call for “collective security” which entails that security can be 
achieved in partnership with the adversary. By extension, he argued that collective 
security should rest on “a commitment to joint survival rather than on the threat of mutual 
destruction” (Holm, 1985:25). In short, collective security calls for the endorsement of 
emancipatory politics which advocates for issues relating to human rights and justice. 
Once there exists an agreed upon definition of what security is and whose security is 
being focused on, steps can be taken to determine what constitutes a security issue for 
a particular referent. According to Booth (1991:319), generally, security means the 
absence of threats. Emancipation on the other hand includes the freeing of people (as 
both individuals and groups) from physical and or human constraints which inhibit them 
from doing what they would freely choose to do. Of these threats, war and the threat of 
war are among these pressing problems together with poverty, poor education and so 
forth. Booth (1991:314) writes that security and emancipation are “two sides of the same 
coin” and in this way emancipation is singled out as the producer of true security in place 
of order and power.  
2.5.2 Clarifying the difference between peace and security in IR 
According to Galtung (1972:111), “you can get security through peace but you can never 
get peace through security”. This chapter is anchored on the distinction that peace and 
security are not interchangeable terms although an intricate relationship exists between 
them. When considering peace studies, for instance, it is important to understand the 
complicated reasons for imploring violence as well as to know which strategies to 




advocates of peace studies are premised on the notion “peace by peaceful means”. In a 
lecture given at the 2010 Institute of Cultural Diplomacy, Johan Galtung, the founder of 
Peace and Conflict studies, recalled that he travelled to Africa to understand true notions 
of peace and that the African civilisation remains an underestimated and understudied 
people and land when it comes to what conceptually and practically constitutes peace. 
Peace studies makes the prognosis that violence persists because of an unresolved 
conflict which can generally be attributed to incompatibility of goals and means. To 
successfully break the cycle of violent conflict, peace studies holds unwaveringly to the 
claim that peace must be pursued by peaceful means.  
A more in-depth look into violence and its manifestations as direct or indirect, leads to the 
simple point that if you despise violence, solve the conflict. The peace perspective calls 
for the removal of violence within and between states and is intent on solving insecurity 
by eliminating its causes.  Buzan (1984:111) goes on to add that concepts as peace and 
security play an understated role in research simply because they stress a specific view 
of reality which highlights certain issues and devalues others, thus providing both 
agendas and priorities for empirical work. It is clear that the quest for peace is often 
combined with the quest for security despite the fundamental difference of meaning and 
implementation of these concepts. This can be seen in both The Charter of the United 
Nations (1945), of which its primary purpose is the “maintenance of international peace 
and security” and the AU’s Constitutive Act which calls for “a peaceful and secure Africa”. 
Kikkawa (2009:290) elaborates that where peace considers the state of IR, security is 
preoccupied with the condition of the actors in international politics. 
Section five 
Now that the foundation is laid concerning how gender impacts political leadership the 
following section highlights women’s representation and leadership within international 
security. It borrows useful insights from feminist thought regarding the ostracising of 




2.6 Women and political leadership as a dimension of feminist perspectives on 
international security  
This section deals with feminist questions pertaining to international security. Included in 
the later part of this section is the impact of armed conflict on women, the way women 
are actors during armed conflict and further touches on the gendered associations of both 
foreign policymaking and war-planning. The major claim is that despite the strand of 
feminism chosen to make sense of international security, a deepened understanding of 
gender enhances comprehension and expectations associated with international security. 
Initially, feminist critiques of international security were met with much hostility and 
uncertainty as to what a gendered lens of analysis could offer to the furtherance of 
security studies (Whitworth, 2014:103). As such, potential feminist contributions to the 
field of international security fell prey to much scrutiny and skepticism as scholars debated 
how  feminism, as narrowly understood to only focus on women’s activism, could possibly 
be able to explain the inner workings of global politics, national militaries or the decision-
making of superpowers. Whitworth (2014:104) presents the argument that feminists in 
general, despite their preferred theoretical associations, concur that scholarly works on 
security appear “gender-neutral” when international security is in fact underpinned by 
gender assumptions and representations. The stark effects of presenting international 
security as a supposedly gender-neutral area in part masks gender-differentiated 
understandings and further influences the effects of security on women and men and the 
ways in which gender could enable better understanding of security. Now, more than 
ever, traditional theories of IR which previously neglected to include a gendered 
dimension are under scrutiny. 
2.6.1 Gender and international security  
In October 2000, the international community, United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
took decisive action in adopting Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security. 
Whitworth (2014:104) points out that this resolution was significant in that it considers the 
differential impact of armed conflict on women and girls as opposed to men and boys. 
Therefore, one may see that the resolution echoes the necessity of a gender perspective 
into peace processes and operations. Resolution 1325 can then be described as the 




in all facets of international peace and security. However, the specific role gender plays 
in the security space depends entirely on the selected strand of feminism which 
interrogates its multifaceted manifestations. Peterson and Runyan (1999:1) postulate that 
theoretical lenses serve the purpose of “focusing our attention in particular ways”, which 
results in a frame of reference enabling us to make sense of our world. In this way, 
theories allow for the prioritisation of certain variables as opposed to others for the 
purpose of conceptual and/or causal enquiry. This is evident when observing both IR, 
feminist, as well as leadership theories. From a traditional IR perspective, states are the 
main actors as opposed to individuals in the peace and security sector; feminist thought 
on the other hand focuses more on the gendered nature of international peace and 
security. 
The most appropriate strand of feminist theory useful in understanding this particular 
study is the liberal strand. Whitworth (2014:15) declares that liberal feminists favour 
notions of equality regarding the representation of women in the public sphere. The body 
of works associated with the abovementioned theory collects empirical data about the 
roles assumed by women and examines whether women are present as decision-makers 
in areas of international security. This goes beyond their presence in national militaries to 
include when they are present, what their potential impact is, and in instances when they 
are not, what challenges are preventing their participation (Whitworth, 2014:105). 
Predominantly, liberal feminists highlight issues pertaining to how within governments and 
international institutions, women are often highly under-represented. Further, women 
rarely occupy power-wielding positions and struggle to feature in the middle- and upper-
management levels of institutions. This study is thus occupied with women’s decision-
making behaviour from the perspective of political leadership; specifically, in the realm of 
international peace and security on the African continent.  In sum, liberal feminists help 
facilitate understanding of going beyond rhetorical representation of women in various 
leadership positions to actually evaluate whether they have decision-making power. 
Therefore, this research study plays a prominent role in bringing to light the impact of 




According to Cohn (2004:1), gender should be expanded to include not only individual 
identity or societal norms and/or expectations of gender-specific behaviour. An important 
aspect to consider is how gender in itself is a means of structuring relations of power. For 
instance, when looking at the familial structure, where the men are mostly perceived and 
regarded as the “head of the household”, or in societies at large, men are associated with 
political, economic and other forms of cultural power. Both individual identity and 
structures of power are interwoven concepts. For this reason, it is the meanings and 
characteristics culturally coupled with masculinity which allow it to seem more natural for 
men to exercise power and govern their families and societies (Cohn, 2004:1). These 
power relations often materialize in different ways which in reference to security, are able 
to shape how one makes sense of what constitutes security and how insecurity is 
experienced by men and women.  
2.6.2 Women, gender and security − the impacts of armed conflict  
What receives the most recognition within gendered analyses of security studies are war 
and armed conflict, otherwise referred to as direct violence (Peterson and Runyan, 1999: 
115). A substantial amount of existing scholarship examining the role of gender in armed 
conflict favours the liberal feminist standpoint and its prescriptions. The downfall of 
“gender-neutral” approaches to the analysis of armed conflict refuses to acknowledge 
people. Instead, conflict is understood within the paradigm of state-to-state relations and 
that between armed groups, the specific impact on people’s lives and livelihoods is 
minimal when evaluating the larger and seemingly more important issues being territory 
and resources (gained or lost). Remarkably, in scholarly works where people occupied 
the focus of analysis, the tendency to focus on the impact of armed conflict on men, in 
particular, warranted further study. Whitworth (2014:108) contends that women do not 
only play a supporting role during times of armed conflict but instead are regularly and 
directly affected by the violence of armed conflict itself. The post-Cold War era made this 
reality increasingly apparent as women were targeted, and “in specifically gendered 
ways”. Then, the mandate gained traction among academics, human rights organisations 
and international institutions who started shifting focus towards the impact of armed 
conflict on women. Although not the thematic occupation of this specific study, it is 




levels of sexual violence women and girls in particular were subject to during time of war”. 
Adding to this, enforced prostitution, sexual torture and sexual slavery were among the 
identified challenges to the security of women and girls in particular (UN Secretary 
General Study, 2002: 17). It is important to situate women within the peace and security 
context, especially in the case of Africa.  
In the face of feminist accounts of armed conflict, which mostly offered insights as to the 
impacts of war on women and men, they also delve into the ways in which women are 
actors in armed conflict. While it remains true that both women and men can be victims 
of political violence and conflict, simultaneously both can be “active agents” in armed 
conflict (Whitworth, 2014: 104). According to Jacobs et al. (2000) women’s roles in conflict 
go beyond just combatants as they have been documented as spies who provide 
intelligence and help to smuggle weapons. Even though it is important to be made aware 
of the various roles that women play during times of armed conflict, there remains limited 
literature on women on the other side of the spectrum. In response to this deficit, this 
study is intent on looking at women leaders who possess decision-making power and 
how they choose to use this power and exercise leadership to deal with peace- and 
security-related issues in Africa. Despite much feminist scholarship in relation to security 
being dedicated to the involvement and impact of women and men in armed conflict, 
considerably more research has been done relating to international security.  
Prior to advancing other focal areas addressed by feminist scholars, it must be mentioned 
how gender is constructed through security and how gendered understandings of 
femininity and masculinity impact perceptions of how armed conflict affects both women 
and men. In line with this present study is the work conducted by other feminist scholars 
who have actually assessed the practices of national security think tanks, of nuclear 
strategy, of foreign policy decision-making to discover the manner in which preconceived 
ideas concerning gender impact and are impacted by these processes (Whitworth, 2014: 
112). The question this research seeks to answer, however, is how women exercise 
leadership within the confines of IOs and the impact of their leadership in pursuing peace 
in Africa. Cohn (1987) presented the argument that the supposed gender-neutral and 




ideological curtain to naturalise the deployment and possible use of nuclear weapons, for 
instance. Scholars such as Enloe (2000:1) go on to ask pertinent questions pertaining to 
the field of foreign policy specifically, such as: “are any of the key actors inspired by a 
desire to appear manly in the eyes of their own principal allies or adversaries and if so 
what are the consequences?” 
Section six 
This section presents an overview of peace leadership, bringing together the concepts 
explained above. It aims to establish a relationship between effective political leadership 
and how this tool can be used to pursue peace on the continent. The research which 
follows focuses on linking the concepts of peace and leadership with the goal of 
highlighting factors which determine whether an individual is a peace leader or not. 
2.7 Peace leadership  
Given the rapidly changing global context of IR, it is necessary to enhance our 
understanding of peace and leadership as interrelated concepts (Fox, 2014:66). The 
terms peace and leadership will be subject to scrutiny to determine their conceptual 
content. Conventional scholarship on peace focuses on the propensity of the individual, 
group or organisational outcomes to produce peace. There is little reported on the role 
leadership plays in enhancing peace in different settings, much less on a leader’s 
involvement in reducing conflict. As such, political leadership will be used as the 
conceptual framework for this study. 
Much scholarly work is concentrated on the manifestations of negative peace as 
articulated by Galtung. In his seminal works on peace studies, he articulates that negative 
peace is simply the absence of war and as such, has enjoyed diplomatic emphasis in the 
form of peacekeeping and peace restoring strategies (Galtung, 1996). Notably, both 
peacekeeping and peace restoring are applicable when war has already broken out. 
Unlike positive peace, negative peace remains a reasonably conservative goal which 
unintentionally maintains realist notions of IR and state conduct within the international 
system. Galtung (1996) contends that positive peace includes the activity of 




is clearly a need for future research to focus on scenarios of positive peace and the 
identification of alternate ways of promoting it. Ledbetter (2012:17) states that positive 
peace can be attributed to leaders and effective leadership. 
 Ledbetter (2012:19) refers to the need of social movements such as the Arab Spring and 
the Occupy Movement to seriously consider the connection between peace and 
leadership in order to address the challenges of peace we are facing today. Van Zyl and 
Campbell’s (2019:33) definition of leadership proves useful in this regard: “Leadership 
focuses on the ability to influence people and resources in a manner that will result in the 
achievement of identified goals”.  
2.8 Women’s leadership in peace and security in Africa 
Afegbua and Adejuwon (2012:141) claim that leadership is one of the most observed and 
least understood phenomena on earth. A call for a focus on leadership is timely, important 
and no doubt topical, reflecting the worldwide thrust towards political and economic 
liberalisation. Most notably, this is more pertinent for the study of women leaders 
especially within IOs. This section will investigate the historic involvement of women in 
conflict resolution and peace and security in Africa. It also seeks to trace the initial 
inclusion of women and their capacity to effect change in peace processes. Before delving 
into this section, it is important to grasp the crisis of political leadership in Africa which 
often manifests as challenges to peace and security. Both feminist scholars and gender 
activists were extremely vocal in exposing the gendered nature of war and the exclusion 
of women from peace and security structures and processes (Enloe, 1998; Tickner, 1995; 
Ward and Hudson, 1998; Moser and Clark, 2001; Meintjies et al, 2002). It is no surprise 
that women and men are groomed to assume different roles in violent conflicts as well as 
in the prevention and resolution thereof. As an understudied phenomenon, this topical 
issue will spearhead the analysis to follow. The main intent of this section is to develop a 
foundational understanding of the nature of the relationship between conflict dynamics 
and gender identities. According to the research produced by Crisis Group, it is clear that 
the inclusion of women’s opinions and voices in security and post-conflict reconstruction 





The current UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, in an address earlier this year was 
bold in reminding the international community that our world is largely still privy to male-
domination (Leijenaar and Kumalo, 2019: para. 2). He then goes on to add that until 
women’s rights become a collectively pursued agenda, no serious inroads will be made 
in shifting the balance. Regardless of gender mainstreaming programmes being put into 
place, peace processes and operations scarcely include women. The importance of 
women’s inclusion in building sustainable peace in Africa is affirmed in the testimony of 
Hester Paneras, a former police commissioner of the AU-UN Hybrid Operations in Darfur 
who, in an interview with the ISS, stated that “the physical presence of female 
peacekeepers on the ground allows women’s voices and experiences in conflict to be 
heard and understand, stimulating their role in establishing sustainable peace”. Although 
this focus highlights the marginalisation of women in matters pertaining to peace and 
security, this section is premised on identifying how women in leadership positions are 
able to leverage these positions as a platform to advocate for peace and the peaceful 
resolution of conflict in Africa specifically.  
2.9 Conclusion  
The principal question chapter two set out to answer was: how does gender and political 
leadership impact women leader’s involvement in peace and security, by considering the 
term of the AUCs first female Chairperson, Dlamini-Zuma. Before proceeding with the 
abovementioned analysis, section one focused on the conceptual content of political 
leadership and went on to elaborate on its dominant features. Also, the origin, evolution 
and contemporary nature of political leadership was subject to extensive review. 
Moreover, section one also elaborated on depictions of political leadership. Section two, 
on the other hand was revelatory in the sense that the author interrogated gendered 
understandings of leadership with specific reference to the discipline of political science 
and IR as well as discussed how gender could be employed as a conceptual lens to 
provide a richer, more nuanced understanding of women’s leadership. Section three 
discussed peace and security as well as contestation regarding what constitutes these 
phenomena. Detailed overviews of peace and security studies were provided so as to 
unpack how the inclusion of a gender dimension, for instance, generates new insights. 




however, it also highlighted the necessity of both variables to the AUs vision of a peaceful 
and secure Africa. Next, women’s leadership in the context of Africa was discussed with 
the purpose of determining the role it plays in the peace and security sector. This section 
actually set out to identify and briefly elaborate on the dominant arguments advanced by 
feminist scholars with specific reference to international security. The chapter also 
touched on how armed conflict has varying impacts on both women and men in addition 
to the pertinence of naturalised assumptions of their behaviour and actions, and the way 
these are informed by notions of masculinity and femininity which in turn influence conflict 
and decision-making. In sum, gender enriches the study of international security and 
provides new insights as compared to traditional theoretical traditions which hold on to 
the belief that international security is comprised of a “gender-neutral set of activities and 
practices”. In conclusion, the chapter provided peace leadership as a framework to 
assess the leadership style and performance of Dlamini-Zuma, as AUC Chair in relation 


















THE AFRICAN UNION’S PEACE AND SECURITY ARCHITECTURE 
3.0 Introduction  
The previous chapter conceptualised the term political leadership, discussed its origin, 
evolution of scholarship as well as identified its key proponents. Chapter two then went 
on to discuss women’s leadership in the African context before exploring insights as to 
how effective political leadership can be used as a catalyst for peace on the continent. 
This chapter on the other hand is aimed at providing a detailed sketch regarding the peace 
and security architecture of the AU. This chapter will be divided into four sections to 
answer secondary research question two which states: Was Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, 
in her capacity as AUC Chair, empowered to not only make peace but ensure the 
implementation of AU objectives of peace and security?  First, section one discusses the 
background of the AU by focusing on the transition from the OAU to the AU and its 
implication for security in Africa. Second, section two conceptualises the AU as an IO with 
the intent to determine its mandate and responsibilities as an actor in the contemporary 
international society. The chapter identifies and studies the AU documents, principles and 
protocols used to guide decision-making and action as it relates to peace on the continent. 
The composition of the multilateral platform is also defined with the purpose of 
determining the permanent organs involved in Africa’s peace and security architecture. 
Much focus will be on the Commission and its roles and responsibilities in the 
maintenance of peace and security.  Attention will be given towards the AUC 
Chairperson’s functions as it relates to peace on the continent. The final section of the 
chapter provides concluding information regarding the key performance indices against 
which to assess Dlamini-Zuma’s success rate in implementing peace and security 
objectives and protocol. 
Section one 
The transition from the OAU to the AU is the focus of this section. Attention is given to the 
organs and protocol involved which now enables the AU, as a collective security 




3.1 Overview  
The institutional make-up of the AU and its various organs is normatively aligned to the 
structure of the revered world body, the UN. More specifically, the UNSC, which is tasked 
with the complex and burdensome role of maintaining international peace and security. It 
is mainly on this logic that the AU modelled the Peace and Security Council (PSC) 
mandated to defend continental peace and security on the African continent. The protocol 
relating to the establishment of the PSC is but one important step in a collaborative effort 
undertaken by AU member states to actively participate in conflict resolution, mitigation 
of security threats and the establishment of durable peace on the continent (Arieff and 
Hudsted, 2016:7). The start of Africa’s newly developed security regime was but one 
expression and execution of effective political leadership whereby agency was assumed 
in pursuit of common goals. The establishment of the AU according to the Constitutive 
Act of 2002 hailed a new dawn for Africa’s premier continental organisation whose newly 
constructed policies undermined the credibility of its predecessor, the OAU which due to 
its institutional and policy constraints was handicapped and thus unable to respond to 
challenges related to peace and security. It is of importance to the findings of this study 
to identify key role players behind the rationale and establishment of the AU, more 
pointedly the leadership of the time who thought it fit to revisit policies and programmes 
which rendered the OAU helpless and unable to intervene in the internal affairs of member 
states in times of war and humanitarian crises, for instance. Notably, the introduction of 
Article 4 (h) is explicit in stating that the AU may intervene in the internal affairs of member 
states only in the case of war crimes; genocide; humanitarian emergencies (African Union 
Constitutive Act, 2000). 
3.1.1 Transition from the OAU to the AU and its implication for security and peace 
and in Africa 
The OAU was formed in support of the multilateral idea that African states should 
congregate in a joint effort to address common problems plaguing them. Mathews 
(2005:143) points out that colonisation and imperialism are what prompted African 
leaders to form the OAU. The founding ideal which encouraged African states to 
collaborate with other states on the continent was driven by Pan-Africanism. However, 




contention among state groupings formally recognised as the Monrovia and Casablanca 
groups. Both groups have a deeply entrenched reverence and commitment to the social, 
political and economic unification of African states through the institutionalisation of Pan-
Africanism; however, the major point of departure was a disagreement regarding how 
exactly this philosophy was to be pursued. For instance, according to the Monrovia group, 
otherwise referred to as the conservative states; political unity among African states 
should be approached incrementally, meaning economic integration before political 
integration (Munya, 1999:542). The caution exercised by the Monrovia group can be 
attributed to African states’ worship of sovereignty and thus their refusal to forfeit this 
newly inherent right to self-determination. Some critics refer to the OAU as a shallow and 
watered-down reality of a greatly reduced Pan-Africanist orientation which defies its initial 
prescriptions for political and economic unity based on African needs and realities. 
Mathews (2005:143) claims that the OAU was established to prioritise political goals 
instead of economic goals as political independence and the end of apartheid were its 
immediate goals. So, on the issue of decolonisation, it is safe to conclude that the OAU 
was both relevant and effective. 
It is evident that the OAU was unsuccessful in its attempt to attain its Pan-Africanist 
orientation and institutionalisation as informed by Nkrumah’s vision. To put it plainly, the 
OAU, simply resembles an alliance of governments whose functions are directed by the 
principle of non-interference (OAU 1963: art. III). Munya (1999:542) argues that one must 
consult the historical context which gave rise to the formation of the OAU to fully 
appreciate its explicit protection of state sovereignty. Shortly after the establishment of 
the OAU, its members paid more attention towards galvanising support and unity among 
African peoples instead of cultivating a culture of unity among African governments. 
Because the OAU fell short of embodying all its Pan-Africanist prescriptions for unity and 
solidarity, the organisation played a much-needed role in assisting resistance movements 
in Africa. Among these resistance groups which were beneficiaries of OAU assistance 
and resources were groups from North-West Africa and South Africa. One of the chief 
goals guiding the OAU in its early years was assisting liberation movements who were 
fighting oppressive regimes. The OAU’s greatest achievements include the establishment 




that the OAU played a significant role in assisting resistance movements in South Africa, 
such as the African National Congress (ANC) in the fight for a free, equal, peaceful, and 
democratic Republic. The stance taken by the OAU shows its proactive keenness to 
actively participate in matters of peace and security on the continent, especially in the 
context of conflict resolution. Landsberg and Ray (2013:28) presented the claim that the 
OAU and its push for self-determination “represented the highest institutional expression 
of Pan Africanism in the 1960s”. As Okhonmina (2009:86) observes, “the transformed 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into the African Union (AU) is a clear institutional 
manifestation of Africa’s quest for unity”.   
3.1.2 The OAU and its impact on conflict resolution 
It is important to identify and deal with the preferred method of African states to address 
conflict resolution on the continent shortly after forming the OAU. Initially, military 
intervention was not the OAUs first response because America and Russia fought most 
of its wars (Adebayo, 1999:13). Second, the OAUs reliance on non-interference in the 
internal affairs of member states prevented the organisation from employing military 
intervention in diplomatic engagements. It soon became apparent that Western countries 
were not willing to offer soldiers as peacekeepers to address African conflicts (Adebajo 
and Landsberg, 2009:131) which prompted OAU member states to make provisions 
which would equip it to address peace and security. As a consequence of the international 
system and its security dilemma, African states had to incorporate military intervention 
into its peace and security framework. In response to this observation, the AU embraced 
the principle of non-indifference which unlike its predecessor allows for intervention in the 
internal affairs of member states.  In short, non-indifference had significant implications 
for the AUs ability to respond to all manner of conflict. It is really in Article 4 (h) of the AU 
where non-indifference finds expression and applicability in cases where war crimes, 
genocide and human rights violations have occurred (Gomes, 2008:115). This was further 
supported by the international community and UN in particular, which later instituted the 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle to aid states in humanitarian crises and complex 
emergencies. African thought leadership was thus progressive enough to learn from the 




equipping its peace and security architecture with the necessary normative and policy 
frameworks. 
3.1.3 The OAU’s peacekeeping framework 
Gomes (2008:116) maintains the perspective that the OAU’s peacekeeping structure was 
largely defined by preventative diplomacy together with peacemaking strategies. Here, 
peacemaking strategies emphasise negotiation and mediation as non-violent and 
preferred tools to address the persistence of conflict following newly independent African 
states. To adequately provide clarity to the peace-related strategies mentioned above, 
the Agenda for Peace as articulated by S Boutras-Ghali in his capacity as UN Secretary 
General will be utilised as the primary conceptual material. Preventative diplomacy is thus 
“any action taken with the aim of preventing disputes from arising between parties, 
preventing these disputes from worsening and reducing the spreading thereof”. Nanjira 
(2010:54) states that peacemaking relies on political and diplomatic means to get 
opposing parties to a conflict to negotiate a peaceful settlement. Also, the OAU’s Charter 
explicitly stipulates that conditions for peace and security must be maintained where the 
settlements of disputes are encouraged using the following prescribed avenues: 
negotiation, arbitration and mediation. This duty was not to rest on the shoulders of the 
OAU alone but a partnership endeavour with RECs who are to assist the OAU in 
achieving its peacemaking mandate. 
3.1.4 The OAU’s Ad Hoc approaches to peace-making 
It is important to deal with the term ad hoc as this descriptive term poses significant risks 
for OAU effectiveness in peace operations; most notably the peacemaking arena. Even 
before the inception of the OAU, the African continent was bombarded with a variety of 
conflicts varying in complexity and magnitude; demanding attention and solutions. The 
OAU did not have a fixed peace and security arrangement, hence the reference to ad hoc 
peacemaking which inhibited the organisation’s ability to develop actualised institutional 
legal weapons to bring settlement and resolution to African conflicts. For example, the 
OAU established an ad hoc commission on the Algeria-Morocco border dispute during its 
infancy as a continental actor in the peace and security domain. Gomes (2008:119) 




namely Mali, Ethiopia, Nigeria and Sudan. Collaborative efforts by the aforementioned 
countries resulted in Algiers and Rabat agreeing to a negotiated settlement. The OAU’s 
reliance on ad hoc bodies and approaches to peacemaking stunted the organisation’s 
ability to develop institutionalised legal approaches to settle both disputes and conflicts.  
According to Akokpari et al. (2008:121) when assessing the OAU’s role in peace and 
security, it is evident that the organisation was reliant upon the OAU, its moral authority, 
to address disputes and conflicts in Africa. Subsequently, moral persuasion based on 
political, social, cultural and religious commonalities was employed to secure the peaceful 
settlement of conflicts. Moreover, the OAU’s peacemaking efforts extended to include 
mediating between Kenya and Somalia over the disputed district situated on the border 
of both countries. The OAU also engaged in mediation between Libya and Chad 
regarding the disputed Aouzou Strip in 1977, establishing a committee which included 
Gabon, Nigeria and Cameroon to name a few. The dispute went to arbitration where the 
International Court of Justice had the final say. The OAU also supported Nyerere’s 
mediation efforts in the Burundi peace process. Even though there exists a portfolio of 
evidence regarding OAU actions in pursuit of peace and security, the organisation was 
constrained and unable to initiate sustainable peace.  
3.1.5 Comparing the OAU and the AU 
The OAU’s over-reliance on its moral authority proved to be inconsistent when it was 
employed to settle disputes. Gomes (2008: 123) argues that the OAU’s approach to 
peacemaking and mediation was conducted on a case-by-case method seeing as the 
organisation was void of the institutional capacity needed to facilitate peacemaking on the 
continent. The AU on the other hand, was more careful to timeously create an institution 
purposed and capacitated to address matters pertaining to peace and security. Both the 
OAU and AU represent the willful expression of effective political leadership exercised by 
African leaders. Persistent conflicts alongside the Rwandan humanitarian crises 
illustrated that Africans needed to revisit and re-evaluate the norms responsible for 
maintaining peace on the continent. Diplomacy is the means which governs interactions 
between African states as well as their relations with external actors (Akokpari, 2016b:4). 




as it relates to their propensity to deal with peace and security must consult similarities, 
differences and/or continuity in strategy towards peace on the continent. At the forefront 
of any institutional comparison must be the institutional framework, principles and/or 
guiding vision which informs how an institution is to respond to a given challenge. First 
and foremost, non-interference which the OAU adopted disabled its ability to bring relief 
and/or peace to conflict within member states. As a consequence of this institutional 
preference the OAU was relegated to being a bystander unable to act because atrocities 
of this nature were not jurisdictionally accounted for in OAU frameworks. Moreover, on 
the peacemaking front, the OAU was also restricted in terms of the ad hoc nature in which 
they could offer meaningful assistance. Because OAU member states were still very 
much worshippers of sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of member 
states the organisation as a whole was handicapped. 
One must be cognisant of the context and environment the aforementioned institutions 
were born into, in order to understand their respective mandates and structural 
frameworks. In contrast, the AU was cognisant of the changing international climate and 
thus made it a point to welcome interventionist mechanisms. This process started with 
the formation of the Constitutive Act which provided for organs whose actions were 
designed to give the AU a more effective diplomatic presence and impact than the OAU 
was ever able to enjoy. The permanence of institutions under the auspices of the AU, are 
more successful in dealing with conflict by means of peacekeeping, peacemaking and 
peacebuilding. As a peacemaking strategy, mediation by heads of government stands out 
as a prominent feature of diplomatic practice conducted by the AU. The tragedy of the 
Rwandan genocide in 1994 reverberated throughout the continent giving rise to urgency 
on the part of African governments and institutions to assume greater responsibility when 
dealing with issues related to peace and security on the continent (Gomes, 2008:125). 
The AU’s adoption of peace ands ecurity frameworks such as non-indifference now 
enabled the continent to defend the human rights and dignity of all African people. 
Deresson (2012:14) noted that Ambassador Said Djinnit, AU Commissioner for Peace 




 No more, never again. Africans cannot watch the tragedies developing in the 
continent and say it is the UN’s responsibility or somebody else’s responsibility. 
We have moved from the concept of non-interference to non-indifference. We 
cannot as Africans remain indifferent to the tragedy of our people.  
Section two  
This section considers the emergence of IOs as independent actors able to influence the 
conduct of world affairs. It also expounds on the purpose of IOs and assesses their acting 
in global politics today. 
3.2 The rise of international organisations as actors in international relations 
Kegley (2007:170) makes the case that IGOs are institutions both founded and joined by 
states’ governments which “give them authority to make collective decisions to manage 
certain problems on the global agenda”. The addition of IOs as prominent actors on the 
international stage existed as early as the 19th century, however, recent years have 
witnessed the birth of more than 100 of these organisations each tasked with specific 
political and economic mandates. These organisations play an especially important role 
in global governance processes where designing, decision-making and policy 
implementation remain indispensable tasks. Notably, these organisations differ on the 
basis of composition, size and objective goals. At the most fundamental level, IOs can be 
understood as associations of states established for a particular task. Another essential 
feature of these bodies is the presence of permanent organs. Further, another definition 
reads as follows “international organisation” was defined as “those intergovernmental 
arrangements made up of three or more states that maintain a permanent secretariat to 
carry out tasks related to a common purpose” (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004:177). 
Importantly, the underlying liberal inspired belief establishing these organisations is the 
idea that member states decide to act collectively to address non-territorial issues which 
affect all member states. IOs are also referred to as IGOs as the organisation itself has 
rules which entitle states to be part of them. Of key importance here is that IGOs are a 
product of nation states. Reinalda and Verbeek (2014:453) state that the conclusion of 
an interstate treaty under international law is what gives rise to IOs. Further, the treaty 




states are represented, and establishes a secretariat tasked with implementing decisions 
taken by the organisation. 
Both the global and regional contexts responsible for the emergence of IOs, and in this 
particular case, the AU, are important to comprehend as it entails prescriptions for the 
management and resolution of threats to peace and security. Section one thus highlighted 
the reasons behind the establishment of such organisations while the later sections 
address their functioning and the roles they assume in structuring contemporary global 
and regional contexts. The AU forms an integral part of the global governance 
architecture which specialises in issues ranging from security, human rights, 
development, finance, migration and the environment. When examining the agency of 
IOs, there exist two predominant perspectives.  
The first approach assigns the agency of IOs to the member states whose policies and 
actions require the consent of the most powerful member states (Reinalda and Verbeek, 
2014:455). In opposition to this view, the second approach looks at the international 
character of the secretariats as a means to measure the agency of IOs. When referencing 
historical circumstance, it is clear that international civil servants share the conviction that 
their loyal service must be for the benefit of IOs and not in the interest of their nation 
states as stipulated in the League of Nations Covenant (1919), with other IOs following 
suit (Rhodes and Paul’t Hart, 2014:464). Consequently, this makes allowance for the 
main executives of IOs to exercise agency and leadership by developing autonomous 
policies. Overall, it is evident that the escalating number of IOs and their functional 
complexities involved in global politics today, should encourage IOs’ leadership to be 
studied more intensely within the field of Politics and IR. The study of how top bureaucrats 
and civil servants lead their organisations serves as an indication of organisational 
effectiveness, for instance. 
The OAU-AU treaty between founding members has binding power. The association acts 
because it is governed by international law and its membership consists of subjects of 
international law. IOs are distinguished from non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 
and other organisations because the bureaucracy is moved by law and thus IOs act by 




emergence of IOs as actors in IR and subjects of international law (Kille, 2013:218). As 
such, the AU is an institution with its own habits, character and culture. It is important to 
recognise summitry diplomacy as a key catalyst for the institutionalisation of Pan-
Africanism on the continent. Worth mentioning are: the Sirte (Libya) Extraordinary 
Session (1999) that decided to establish the AU; the Lome Summit (2000), which adopted 
the Constitutive Act of the AU; the Lusaka Summit (2001) that drew the roadmap for 
implementation of the AU; the Durban (South Africa) Summit (2002) that launched the AU 
and convened the 1st Assembly of the Heads of State and Government of the AU (African 
Union Compendium, 2016:11). 
3.2.1 The role played by Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma in institutionalising the African 
Union  
Notably, as the Republic of South Africa abandoned apartheid and transitioned towards 
democracy, the OAU similarly geared itself towards the attainment of political 
independence for the continent, in turn freeing Africa from its colonial ties (Magadla and 
Cornell, 2019:41). However, as stated previously the OAU’s institutional and policy-
related issues, being Article Ⅲ of the OAU Charter, restricted its ability to effectively 
respond to security, political and socio-economic dynamics of the intra-state war on the 
continent. As such, the linguistic make-up of the Constitutive Act responsible for guiding 
the objectives of the AU had serious and transformative implications for the organisation’s 
interpretation of sovereignty which makes provision for intervention in the internal affairs 
of member states. Importantly, South Africa happened to be the host when the AU was 
instituted in July 2002. Malala (2012: para.6) described that Dlamini-Zuma was deemed 
“the nuts and bolts woman” who played an instrumental role in ensuring that necessary 
documents were signed behind the scenes. In addition, the manner in which former 
Chairperson, Dlamini-Zuma conducted deliberations was nothing short of admirable and 
this sentiment was echoed and shared among diplomats across the continent. Piccone 
(2016) goes on to add that Dlamini-Zuma was at the forefront of initiatives which led 
Mbeki’s endeavour to rebuild and reform the AU into a positive representation of Pan-
Africanist continental aspirations. Nagar and Nganje (2016:30) state that the AUC 
witnessed and supervised the transition from the OAU to the AU and was instrumental in 




Constitutive Act of 2000. Since inception, the Commission has struggled to establish its 
independence and fulfill its mandate.  
Section three 
The norms, principles and practices which govern the operation of the AU are subject to 
analysis. Documents such as the Constitutive Act are carefully studied to understand the 
continent’s stance and aspirations for peace and security. 
3.3 Understanding the normative cycle following the OAU’s transition to the AU  
It is imperative to review the normative transformation within the AU especially when it 
holds significant implications for the “people centered collective security arrangement” 
adopted by the body. From a historical point of view, norms play an important and yet 
underestimated role in understanding the effectiveness of organisations like the AU. 
Within IOs it has become increasingly clear that the norm adoption cycle and its various 
processes significantly impact how successful an organisation is in terms of carrying out 
its stipulated institutional agenda. However, the concept itself has been scrutinised in 
academic literature as a multitude of articulations concerning its relevance surfaced by 
scholars and their ideological affiliations. Okeke (2018:21) is of the opinion that within 
IOs, leadership of individuals or states  dubbed  “norm entrepreneurs”  are motivated by 
a diverse range of principles and ideas and they are able to, with a great degree of 
success, inspire buy-in and the adoption of particular norms. 
Finnemore and Sikkink (1998) present the argument that the social constructivist 
informed perspective regarding the norm cycle occurs in three stages: “norm emergence, 
norm cascade, and norm internationalization”. The initial stage centres on “emergence” 
of the norm which is a by-product of leadership inspired by norm entrepreneurs. Second, 
norm cascade is defined as the process whereby states engage in peer learning or a 
“dynamic of imitation” as norm entrepreneurs begin to internalise these norms (Finnemore 
and Sikkink, 1998:895). When considering the AU as the case in point, it is apparent that 
African heads of state made the decision to adopt a Constitutive Act which took seriously 
the need to endorse a “stable, peaceful, and prosperous” continent through a collective 




Further, the second stage of the norm cycle makes the claim that “pressure for conformity 
alongside desire to enhance international legitimacy” further compounded with the desire 
of state leaders to bolster their self-esteem plays a role in facilitating norm cascades 
(Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998:895). Notably, the final stages of the norm cycle involve 
the process of norm internalisation. Internalisation of norms is basically indicative of the 
completion of the norm cycle and makes reference to a standardised set of behaviours in 
compliance with the agreed upon normative prescriptions. Discussions surrounding the 
validity of the norm are now settled and focus is on the consensual adoption of the norm 
thereby consolidating its status as expected standards of behaviour. Despite this social 
constructivist analysis being subject to criticism by the realist school, for instance, 
suggests that state interests triumph over mutually recognised objectives and are thus 
the primordial reason for states implementing norms within IOs (Morgenthau 1946; 
Guzzini 1998; Krasner 1995). This analysis is pertinent to understanding the core 
institutional frameworks, principles and design of the AU, and of its new collective security 
regime in particular.  
Landsberg (2018:50) makes the case that the AU has sought to establish its authority as 
“an independent socializing actor” able to act on its own accord and not on the dictates 
of individual states. However, these efforts were curbed owing to an implementation gap. 
Reasoning for this implementation crisis within the organisation itself, is because of AU 
member states’ propensity to pursue self-interest goals at the expense of collective 
continental interests. This results in the AU constantly fighting for control of its own 
agenda and relevance in global politics today. From the literature one can extract various 
reasons for the chief goal of IOs in the contemporary world order. This goal is to cultivate 
cooperation and collegial interactions to enable a more stable world order. Whether this 
objective is still the main reason for interstate collaboration between AU member states 
is debatable at best.  
3.3.1 The AU Constitutive Act of 2002 
The Summit of Heads of State and Government, in Durban, in July 2002 saw the demise 
of the OAU and the inauguration of the AU (Murithi, 2005:37). Notably, the AU Constitutive 




OAU, the AU is more proactive and considers interventionist mechanisms in the 
attainment of its objectives. The AU Constitutive Act of 2000 states that the need to 
promote peace, security and stability is a prerequisite for African development and 
integration. It is of key importance to scrutinise the founding document responsible for the 
creation of Africa’s premier continental organisation. For the purpose of this study, the 
objectives and goals contained in the Act as it relates to peace and security and role of 
the AUC in this regard will be the focus of this section. The establishment of the AU has 
important implications for the stance taken against conflict, violence, complex 
humanitarian emergencies, human rights violations and terrorism. In comparison with the 
OAU, the AU Constitutive Act makes allowances for the doctrine of “non-interference” by 
member states in their peers’ internal affairs as a key AU principle. Unlike the OAU 
Charter which practised “non-indiffference”, under the jurisdiction of the newly established 
AU, the principle of non-interference pinpoints certain instances which permit the AU the 
legal right to intervene in the internal affairs of member states. These permitted instances 
include: crimes against humanity, war crimes, genocide and unconstitutional change of 
government (UCG) (Cook and Husted, 2016:6). Moreover, the Act allows AU member 
states to request AU intervention in pursuit of restoring peace and security.  
The OAU suffered much criticism because of its doctrinal preference for non-indifference 
which often sidelined the organisation from actively addressing conflict and imminent 
threats to continental peace and security. As such, the OAU was seen as overly protective 
of state sovereignty at the expense of the promotion and respect of human rights; a 
supposedly equally important principle as stipulated in its founding document. The AU 
has shown its willingness to condemn unconstitutional change of government and has 
taken further action to suspend member states who assume power by such means.  
According to Gomes (2008:125), the establishment of the PSC represents the epitome of 
Africa’s desire to have a mechanism premised on preventative diplomacy, peacemaking, 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding. In sum, the Constitutive Act which is essentially the 
equivalent of a “constitution” of Africa’s premier continental body urges the AU to give 
high priority to international cooperation especially in the advancement of peace, security, 
and stability on the continent and finally help to establish conditions which enable Africa 




3.3.2 Objectives and principles as it relates to peace and security  
The World Peace Foundation Report on African Politcs and African Peace (2016:8) states 
that important instructions exist when discussing Africa’s politics of peace. These are 
reflected in at least seven AU documents that complement the plethora of decision-
making instruments the institution has available, one of which is the “ratified policy 
framework” which is binding on all member states of the continental body. Included in 
these instruments are: The AU Constitutive Act; The African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights; The Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security 
Council of the African Union;  African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance; 
The NEPAD Declaration on Democracy, Political, Economic and Corporate Governance; 
The Declaration on the Framework for an OAU Response to Unconstitutional Changes of 
Government; and,  The OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism. 
The key informant regarding Africa’s peace and security ambitions can be located within 
Articles 3 and 4 of its Constitutive Act. As such, the AU’s 14 objectives explicitly express 
the willingness of African leaders to effectively respond to challenges 21st century Africa 
is exposed to. Despite the Constitutive Act inheriting most of the OAU’s objectives, the 
Act made a point to include new objectives which speak to the promotion of human and 
people’s rights, good governance, sustainable development and good health (Badmus, 
2015:24). The addition of the latter goals simultaneously bear testimony to Africa’s 
commitment to positive peace. This form of peace seeks to work towards a goal even in 
the absence of conflict and is a principal feature when assessing Dlamini-Zuma’s term as 
Chair. The addition of these goals and objectives represent the willingness of African 
leaders to recognise that new norms are needed to ensure that the AU remains relevant 
and capable to provide African solutions to African problems. What stands out is that both 
the promotion of human and peoples’ rights, protection and good governance, are treated 
with seriousness as problems associated with these objectives which characterised 
Africa’s relations with the West in the post-Cold War period (Badmus, 2015:26). This is 
important because much of Africa’s relations with development partners and agencies 
often link their aid and technical provisions to African states based on how their 




Sesay (2008:18) postulates that African leaders were keen to provide solutions to Africa’s 
problems and also tread carefully so as to avoid the problems which inhibited the OAU’s 
ability to respond decisively. The reasoning behind this can be traced to the Constitutive 
Act which adopted OAU principles which in short, was overly protective of the inherited 
Westphalian right to sovereignty and its importance within IR. Together with the objective 
of defence of sovereignty stands territorial integrity and independence of member states 
as instructed in Article 3b. Importantly, Article 4g makes reference to the principle of non-
interference by any member state in the domestic affairs of another member state; 
however, this does not disallow the AU from intervening in internal conflicts. By 
incorporating Article 4 (h) the AU is given the legal right to “intervene in a member state 
pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war 
crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity” (AU 2000: art. 4(g) and (h)). The 
abovementioned Article 4 (h) demonstrates the credibility of Africa’s premier continental 
body. It is significant to note that other existing principles affirm the AU’s legitimacy 
regarding intervention in situations of domestic conflict. For instance, these principles 
include: 
• Article 4e: Peaceful settlement of disputes; 
• Article 4j: The right of member states to request interventions from the Union in 
order to restore peace and security; and 
• Article 4m: Respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law. 
Even though these impressive policies and principles exist, the AU’s right to intervene in 
the domestic affairs of states hinges on a broad consensus of the Assembly which further 
hampers a speedy response and is thus susceptible to inaction. As seen in the 1960s, 
African leaders ensured that the institutional make-up of the OAU imposed legal and 
normative constraints on member states in addressing internal conflict situations. Further, 
the introduction of Article 4p speaks to the AU’s condemnation and rejection of UCG in 
Africa. Sesay (2008) notes that UCG was a recurring issue under the OAU regime which 
was often left unpunished as no provisions were made for the organisation to deal with 
issues of that nature. Article 4p empowers the Union itself to both reject and exclude the 




Albert (2007: 41) articulates that the AU’s institutional prescription pertaining to peace 
and security has managed to energise African leaders to assume an active role in peace 
operations in Africa which include peacekeeping and peacebuilding initiatives. The new 
normative framework as stipulated in the Constitutive Act represents the need on the part 
of African leaders to resolve conflict situations perpetrated by both internal and external 
actors. Albert (2007:41) goes on to identify that African states and their leaders’ lack of 
commitment to positive peace stands out as a key contributor to the declining state of 
peace on the continent. Other issues pinpointed as barriers to a peaceful Africa include 
lack of funding for the IO which is further compounded by poorly trained national armies 
which in certain cases are known to adversely affect the efficiency of peace support 
operations.  
Parchment institutions refers to formal rules which cause outcomes to occur (Elgie, 
2018:34). In the case of the AU this is demonstrated in the AU principles, AU Charter and 
the AU Constitutive Act. Implementation of AU objectives and protocol should have a 
causal effect on African conditions. Critical to this analysis is the AUC which is the 
implementation organ of the continental body. From the institutional approach one learns 
that causal potentialities do not mean causal realities. Often, the formal rules of an entity 
are left for actors to interpret because some are ambiguous. At the most basic level, the 
institutionalist approach drives the idea that institutions and actors interact to produce 
organisational outcomes (Elgie, 2018:35). Human agency and leadership are needed to 
implement institutions (formal rules and principles) and produce outcomes. In this sense, 
institutions are unwritten and are completely unobservable yet represent the ethos of the 
institution. 
3.3.3 Agenda 2063 
Agenda 2063 is Africa’s strategic framework that aims to deliver on the goals of inclusive 
and sustainable development and is a concrete manifestation of the Pan-African drive for 
unity, self-determination, freedom, progress and collective prosperity pursued under Pan-
Africanism and African Renaissance. It is anchored on the AU Constitutive Act, AU Vision, 
AU Assembly 50th Anniversary Solemn Declaration of 2013 and seven African 




progress. Agenda 2063 was adopted by the AU Assembly on 31 January 2015 at its 24th 
Ordinary Session (Assembly/ AU/Dec.565(XXIV)). In January 2016, the Assembly 
reiterated that Agenda 2063 is a common continental framework for socio-economic 
development (Assembly/AU/Dec.588(XXVI)).  
Included in the list of objectives for Agenda 2063 are:  
•  A prosperous Africa based on inclusive growth and sustainable development  
•  An integrated continent, politically united, based on the ideals of Pan Africanism 
and the vision of Africa’s renaissance 
 •  An Africa of good governance, democracy, respect for human rights, justice and 
the rule of law • A peaceful and secure Africa  
•  An Africa with a strong cultural identity, common heritage, values and ethics 
 •  An Africa whose development is people-driven, relying on the potential of African 
people, especially its women and youth, and caring for children 
 •  Africa as a strong, united, resilient and influential global player and partner (African 
Union Commission, 2015: 3) 
Agenda 2063 treats the AU’s peace and security agenda with much seriousness, clarity 
and assertiveness in terms of its prescriptions for the continent’s management of threats 
to peace and security. These prescriptions for peace and security will be subject to further 
analysis in chapter five as fruits of Dlamini-Zuma’s visionary, functional and peace 
leadership. 
Section four 
The institutional structure of the AU is discussed below with specific reference to the 
continent’s peace and security architecture. Different AU organs and their mandates are 
investigated, more importantly understanding the role of the Commission Chair in 




3.4.1 Structure of the AU 
It is necessary to understand the make-up of an organisation before proceeding to 
analyse or assess its performance or the performance of its executive leadership. 
Basically, the AU is a “policymaking, representational, and diplomatic actor which 
frequently engages in peace and security related efforts and programmatic development 
work” (Cook and Husted, 2016:4). In terms of hierarchy, the Assembly is regarded as the 
most authoritative decision-making organ and further receives support from multiple 
subsidiary institutions. The executive council is responsible for the coordination of the 
Assembly’s work and elects the AUC from among the five sub-regions.  
The AUC, the AU’s secretariat, implements diverse AU initiatives for the Assembly and 
Council, administers AU legal instruments, manages relations with the RECs, and 
undertakes a range of programmatic activities, as do other subsidiary AU functional 
organs (African Union Handbook, 2015:22). Notable among these are the PSC, the AU’s 
primary decision-making organ for the prevention, management and resolution of 
conflicts; the Department of Political Affairs, which coordinates AU election observation 
missions and other governance-related activities; and NEPAD Planning and Coordinating 
Agency, which carries out a number of the AU’s flagship development projects.  
The AUC made it a priority to facilitate the construction and expansion of a programme 
specifically targeting conflict prevention, management and resolution. Also, the 
Commission advocated for the Common African Defense and Security Policy (CADSP) 
together with other programmes on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development 
(PCRD). Following the early integration of strategic pillars under the mandate of the 
Commission, the Strategic Plan (2009-2012) makes provision for activities to achieve and 
maintain “continental peace and security and stability”− by extension this includes the 
stabilisation of security, economic and political systems; continental social and 
environmental management systems; and policies addressing transnational crime 
(African Union Handbook, 2015:36). Issues relating to member states’ “buy-in” to these 
policies remain a problem as delegation of sovereignty to the Commission remains 




Commission’s efforts in terms of policy coordination and harmonisation as it diligently 
manages the organisation’s functions related to peace and security.  
An important milestone for the AU was the adoption of the Protocol Relating to the 
Establishment of the PSC on 9 July 2002 in Durban, South Africa. However, the chief 
decision-making organ as it relates to the AU’s role in the prevention, management and 
resolution of conflicts came into effect in late 2003 (African Union Compendium, 2016: 
45). This organ is the embodiment of a collective security arrangement which also made 
provision for an early warning system able to timeously respond to conflict in Africa. In 
essence, the PSC is deemed a key constituent of Africa’s Peace and Security 
Architecture (APSA), which is the framework for promoting peace, security and stability 
on the continent. This study thus requires that the powers of the PSC, in conjunction with 
the Chairperson of the AU Commission, include:  
• “Anticipate and prevent disputes and conflicts, as well as policies, which may lead to 
genocide and crimes against humanity 
• Undertake peace-making and peacebuilding functions to resolve conflicts where they 
have occurred 
• Authorize the mounting and deployment of peace support missions, and lay down 
general guidelines for the conduct of such missions including the mandate 
• Recommend to the Assembly, pursuant to article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act, 
intervention, on behalf of the Union, in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances, 
namely, war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity as defined in relevant 
international instruments 
• Institute sanctions whenever an unconstitutional change of government takes place in 
a Member State 
• Implement the AU’s common defense policy 





• Promote harmonization and coordination of efforts between the regional mechanisms 
and the AU in the promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa 
• Follow-up promotion of democratic practices, good governance, the rule of law, 
protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, and respect for the sanctity of 
human life and international humanitarian law 
• Promote and encourage the implementation of conventions and treaties on arms control 
and disarmament 
• Examine and take action in situations where the national independence and sovereignty 
of a Member State is threatened by acts of aggression, including by mercenaries 
• Support and facilitate humanitarian action in situations of armed conflicts or major 
natural disasters” (AU Constitutive Act: 2000: Article 7). 
Based on the above set of responsibilities, it is clear that the PSC Secretariat provides 
direct operational support to the PSC, and is housed within the Peace and Security 
Department of the AUC. Further, the PSC is assisted by the AUC, Continental Early 
Warning System, Panel of the Wise, African Standby Force and the Peace Fund. The 
PSC also works in collaboration with the RECs and Regional Mechanisms (RMs) for 
Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution; the UNSC and other similar IOs; civil 
society organisations; and other AU organs, including the Pan-African Parliament and the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
3.4.2 PSC meetings 
The frequency of PSC meetings means that all members must maintain a permanent 
presence at the AU. These meetings occur at the level of permanent representatives, 
ministers or Heads of State and Government. In particular, Article 8 (2) informs that PSC 
members must meet on a minimum basis of twice a month whereas Heads of State are 
only required to meet once a year. Consensus guides the adoption of PSC decisions. The 
principle of majority rule guides decision-making within this organ. In situations where the 
principle of consensus is harder to arrive at, decisions with regard to procedure is left to 
majority vote (PSC Protocol, article 8(13)). The PSC Protocol also makes provision for 




the meeting as an observer. Important to note is that the invited state is denied the 
opportunity of contributing to the decision-making process of that particular conflict. The 
AU Commission Chairperson participates in PSC activities and meetings by motivating 
the seriousness and or severity of a potential threat to peace and security. Furthermore, 
the Commission Chair is able to request briefing sessions from PSC committees and 
other relevant AU organs. On the question of including any item on the proposed agenda, 
member states are prohibited from opposing thereof (African Union Compendium, 
2016:74). 
It is necessary to study and scrutinise the Commission’s role in the maintenance of 
continental peace and security. As such, it is crucial to be aware of the fact that the 
Commission plays an understudied role in agenda-setting and organising PSC meetings. 
Additionally, it drafts major PSC communiques, decisions as well as related summit 
documents (African Union Handbook, 2015:66). Notably, the frequency of PSC meetings 
is an indication of the AU and AUC’s commitment to the resolution and management of 
crises related to peace and security on the continent. On average, the PSC hosts around 
three meetings per month, these gatherings present a platform for dealing with pertinent 
conflicts on African soil, this extends to include the 2011 Arab Spring as well as a few 
post-conflict scenarios in the CAR, Burundi and the DRC where the AUC provided support 
to the AU’s field missions (Cook and Husted, 2016:31). From this analysis, it is evident 
that the Commission is regarded as the “logistical muscle” of AU peacekeeping missions, 
and this is expressed in the 2006-approved AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) which 
supported the Transitional Federal Government against al-Shabaab militia from 
Mogadishu. The Commission also renders support to the hybrid mission in Darfur referred 
to as the United Nations and African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) which 
commenced operation in 2004. The AU High-Level Panel has echoed the importance of 
the AUC as the most significant mouthpiece as expressed in its acting when engaging 





3.4.3 The African Union and the promotion of peace and security 
Given the frequency of armed conflict and its devastating impact on human life as well as 
political and economic stability, peace and security will be a continued priority for the AU. 
The AU has on many occasions shared that insecurity on the continent is a hindrance to 
development, investment attraction and human welfare. In response to this view, the AU 
laid out the ambitious goal of “Silencing the guns by 2020” in hopes of achieving a conflict-
free continent by 2020. Eight years since the announcement was made, although given 
an unrealistic time frame, the overarching goal of ending armed conflict which still plagues 
parts of the continent remains not just admirable, but vital for Africa’s security as well as 
that of the rest of the world.  Conflict prevention and mitigation in Africa should provide 
fertile ground for international cooperation, particularly between the US and Europe 
(Akokpari, 2016b:15).  Although the AU has an extensive body of policies regarding 
unified security objectives, implementation gaps continue preventing these policies from 
affecting positive change. To this end the AU attends to various approaches geared 
towards strengthening peace and security with much urgency and seriousness. The 
dominant narrative to address the persistence of conflict in Africa has largely focused on 
galvanising support for inclusive development, transparent governance, human rights and 
democracy. Despite what is being done on the prevention front, it is important to decipher 
what the continental organisation prescribes in terms of conflict management and 
resolution. On the other hand, processes involved in the APSA, contain a broad 
framework that encompasses diverse policies and institutional development efforts 
relating to peace, security, and stability in Africa. Chapter four will discuss the historical 
roots of conflict in Africa and African states’ relationship with post-colonialism violence; 
before discussing the security challenges under Dlamini-Zuma’s AUC leadership. 
3.4.4 Normative ownership of AU documents and protocol 
The AU’s normative corpus containing key values, principles, policy frameworks and 
instruments is both conclusive and expansive. Although the AU has an exhaustive arsenal 
at its disposal, the implementation of these commitments remains one of the most 
significant institutionally handicapping features of the revered Pan-African institution. 
Gebrehiwot and De Waal (2016:21) suggest that the implementation challenge lies in 




and security agenda are aware of their responsibilities and capabilities. Second to this is 
the domestication and integration of these commitments into national governance and 
foreign and security policy processes of AU member states. As such, public education 
stands out as an essential feature if AU protocols and decisions are to be implemented 
at national government level; the African people must understand the course of action 
embarked on by their leaders.  
Gebrehiwot and De Waal (2016:22) position the view that when analysing the AU it 
becomes evident that its norms and capabilities affords the institution a comparative 
advantage in respect to other international stakeholders when dealing with issues related 
to peace and security. In this context, capabilities refer to the legality of political 
obligations and opportunities which governs how an institution is able to respond; 
whereas the term capacities, speaks to the financial, organisational and human capital 
needed to fulfil those capabilities (Gebrehiwot and De Waal, 2016:22). At the core of AU 
capabilities is the history of Pan-Africanism which advocated for the emancipation and 
liberation of the African continent and its people. This is increasingly evident when 
studying AU documents such as the Constitutive Act as well as in the functional 
procedures of the PSC. In the PSC there are no permanent members or veto powers 
accorded to certain members and the powers of the PSC are to be exercised in 
partnership with the Chairperson of the AUC (Gebrehiwot and De Waal, 2016:24). 
The AU’s 2011 African Governance Architecture (AGA) has attempted to improve the 
coherence and relevance of continental governance. Its three pillars are: shared norms 
and values center on the promotion of democracy, sovereignty, and human rights; a set 
of institutions encompassing the AU and the RECs; and a platform comprising agreed 
processes for interaction adopted by institutions, states, and civil society actors. 
Furthermore, Article 16 of the 2002 Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the AU PSC 
is an integral part of the continental peace and security architecture. The Protocol 
assumes the primacy of the AU in maintaining peace and security in Africa, but calls on 
the PSC and the Chairperson of the AUC to work closely with RECs in order to harmonise 
and coordinate the activities of these regional organisations. The ultimate goal of this 




principles and objectives of the AU. In accordance with this requirement, a Memorandum 
of Understanding on Cooperation in the area of peace and security was signed in January 
2008 between the AU, RECs and the Coordinating Mechanisms of the Regional Standby 
Brigades of Eastern and Northern Africa. Heywood (2017:22) notes that variables such 
as norms, rules and values possess important regulatory power in that they are able to 
shape the conduct of political actors. In terms of practicality, this manifests most potently 
when organisations gain a measure of legitimacy when actors consider policy planning, 
policy design and policy implementation with a degree of seriousness and urgency. To 
put it plainly, African decision-makers who operate within the confines of the AU should 
factor in the impact of macro- organisational phenomena (Landsberg, 2012:67).  
Section five  
This section considers the AUC and its leadership structure quite closely. More pointedly, 
it discusses the powers and abilities of the Chair to fairly hold political leaders within the 
AU, to account. 
3.5 The AUC’s functions and objectives according to the Constitutive Act 2002 
3.5.1 The AUC explained  
In short, the Commission is the Secretariat of the AU and is assigned with executive 
functions. Its structure represents the AU and protects its interests under the auspices of 
the Assembly of Heads of State and Government as well as the Executive Council (AU 
Constitutive Act 2000). Also, the AUC carries out its functions via  eight main portfolios, 
namely Peace and Security; Political Affairs; Trade and Industry; Infrastructure and 
Energy; Social Affairs; Rural Economy and Agriculture; Human Resources, Science and 
Technology; and Economic Affairs; each headed by a commissioner. Functional portfolio 
work is undertaken by a network of AUC departments, bureaus, and directorates and 
specialised councils, commissions, and research centres. 
The Commission is the key organ playing a central role in the day-to-day management of 
the AU. Among other functions, it represents the AU and defends its interests; elaborates 
draft common positions of the AU; prepares strategic plans and studies for the 




coordinates and harmonises the programmes and policies of the AU with those of the 
RECs; ensures the mainstreaming of gender in all programmes and activities of the AU 
(African Union: 2000: Statutes 8 and 10). 
3.5.2 AUC functions  
There is an impressive arsenal of protocols and principles under the watchful mandate of 
the Commission which affirm its commitment to the continent’s peace and security 
agenda. Among the 36 functions available, the recurring thematic categories which 
emerge include: global governance; peace and security; women, gender and 
development. In sum, the Commission is responsible for the implementation of decisions 
taken by other organs. The practice of monitoring, coordinating and evaluation are 
indispensable activities to the successful completion of tasks within the scope of the 
Commission. Further, the Commission itself is called to act as the custodian of the 
Constitutive Act, its protocols, treaties, legal instruments, decisions adopted by the Union 
and those inherited from the OAU. 
According to the AU Compendium (2015:78), the AUC must take action in the domains 
of responsibility as may be delegated by the Assembly and the Executive Council. The 
domains include: control of pandemics; disaster management; international crime and 
terrorism; environmental management; negotiations relating to external trade; 
negotiations relating to external debts; population, migration, refugees and displaced 
persons; food security; socio-economic integration; and all other areas in which a 
common position has been established (Rukato, 2018:118). To provide operational 
support to the PSC and ensure the promotion of peace, democracy, security and stability 
also falls within the responsibility of the AUC and its Chairperson. This chapter seeks to 
interrogate what role the Chairperson is to play in ensuring a peaceful and secure Africa 
in line with the AUs organisational philosophy, instruments and frameworks available and 
capacity to implement these as well as the nature of relationships among APSA organs 
and the AUC.  
According to Louw-Vaudran (2016), the ISS reports that the Commission Chairperson is 
able to exercise flexibility in the exercise of his/her powers as it relates to the peace and 




for executing the decisions of the PSC and for appointing special representatives and 
force commanders for missions (AU Protocol 2002: Articles 10 and 13). According to 
Article 7 of the Protocol establishing the PSC, the powers of the PSC are supposed to be 
exerted in conjunction with the AUC Chairperson. In this framework the Chairperson 
remains under the authority of the PSC but plays an important role in raising awareness 
about crisis situations.  
Moreover, he or she ensures the implementation and the follow up of the decisions 
of the Council and the Assembly; and prepares comprehensive and periodic 
reports and documents as required, to enable the Peace and Security Council and 
its subsidiary bodies to perform their duties effectively (Louw- Vaudran, 2016: para. 
3).  
Importantly, the Chairperson is allowed to take action when it comes to preventive 
diplomacy. For example, the provisions in the PSC Protocol allowed Dlamini-Zuma to 
appoint former OAU Secretary General Edem Kodjo as a mediator in the DRC to try to 
assist with a national dialogue and diffuse political tensions in the country. However, any 
legally binding action can only be carried out through a decision of the PSC. Still, the 
impact of the Chairperson in the area of peace and security depends on the degree of 
coordination between the Chairperson and the commissioner for peace and security. 
According to the PSC Protocol, the AUC Chairperson “shall be assisted by the 
Commissioner in charge of Peace and Security who shall be responsible for the affairs of 
the Peace and Security Council”. 
3.6 Conclusion  
This chapter set out to understand the relevant actors and their purposes within Africa’s 
peace and security architecture. From the onset, it discussed the origin of the premier 
continental body by explaining the transition from the OAU to the AU and its implication 
for security. Then chapter three moved to conceptualise the AU as an IO in the context 
of IR and international law. This is important because IOs have assumed their own legal 
personality and/or habits as prominent actors within the discipline of IR. In this way, when 
the AU takes action against any threat, for instance, it acts on behalf of all its member 




Constitutive Act and various other protocols and principles used to provide the 
organisation with strategic guidance on how to ensure the maintenance of peace and 
security on the continent. Section four dealt with the institutional make-up of the APSA 
where it was necessary to establish the role of the Commission and its Chairperson in 
pursuing sustainable peace on the continent. Coordination among the Department of 
Political Affairs and the Peace and Security Department play an important role within the 
Commission to ensure that the peace and security mandate is attended to with sufficient 
attention and resources. Furthermore, research revealed that the AUC plays an 
understudied role in the agenda-setting of PSC meetings and that the frequency of those 
meetings serve as an indicator as to whether Africa’s first Chairperson genuinely pursued 
peace. Although the functions of the AUC Chairperson are primarily understood as being 
the Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Legal Representative and Accounting Officer of the 
Union, the role also entails a commitment to the AU’s vision of a peaceful Africa. The 
functions and objectives of both the AU and AUC Chairperson were subject to rigorous 
study with the intent of highlighting key performance indices against which to assess Dr 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma in her capacity as head of the Commission. Above all, the AU 
mission of an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and 
representing a dynamic force in the global arena; remains the ultimate guiding vision for 
the continent. With this vision firmly anchored in the AU, this study intends to establish 
whether the AUC and its Chair were capacitated to deal with challenges to peace and 













CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO PEACE AND SECURITY UNDER DLAMINI-
ZUMA’S AUC LEADERSHIP 
4.0 Introduction 
Chapter four is premised on the question: what were the main challenges to peace and 
security under the AUC leadership of Dlamini-Zuma? To start off, section one deals with 
Africa’s relationship with peace. This is important because much of the security issues 
and violence we see manifested today can be traced to historical processes and events. 
Furthermore, section one makes a point to discuss the root causes of conflict before 
section two explains the role of negative and positive peace in measuring the 
peacefulness of a society and/or state. Section three discusses the challenges highlighted 
in the Solemn Declaration on a CADSP framework which was adopted by the AUC. 
Unique about this framework is its commitment to measuring negative and positive peace 
in Africa. Before proceeding to study Africa’s security challenges, levels of analysis will 
be introduced as they help explain the intersection between individual, state and system 
level as causes of war.  Included in the list of challenges are:  UCGs and coups d’état; 
electoral violence and improper conduct of electoral processes; consolidating democracy; 
lack of respect for human rights, human life; acts of terrorism and subversion; corruption; 
poverty and inclusive development. However, the analysis to follow excludes electoral 
violence and electoral processes, and corruption as they are integrated under the other 
challenges. To provide a holistic account of the security environment under Dlamini-
Zuma’s leadership, the Ebola outbreak will be included in the analysis. More pointedly, 
child marriage and gender-based violence are explained under the auspice of lack of 
respect for human rights and human life. Because the AUC Chair plays an important role 
in addressing peace and security issues, they are also responsible for engaging the 
continent’s internal and external partners as the AU relies on partnership to actualise its 
peace mandate. The AU’s relationship with RECs and the UN will be discussed in this 
regard.  




4.1 Africa’s relationship with peace  
Africa is portrayed as a continent with a complex relationship with peace (Murithi, 
2009:223). This is true in both the ideological and practical sense. The literature informs 
a particularly pessimistic view of the persistence of violence and scourge of conflict on 
the continent without an acknowledgement of the foundations for the security challenges 
plaguing the continent today. Often, the current narrative present in academic literature 
describes the security conditions in Africa without delving into the enduring legacies of 
coloniality on African state survival and economic welfare. Important is understanding 
how historical events shaped Africa’s peace and security space which exists today. The 
question then remains how to address these challenges at their root level to achieve 
peace. However, this study encourages the broadening of the scope through which one 
conventionally pursues peace as the mere absence of war. Positive peace then suggests 
that peace should evolve beyond a mere systematic study of war to instill non-violent 
practices of achieving peace while ensuring the reduction in the number of wars on the 
continent. Zondi (2017:105) claims that African states’ inability to escape the post-colonial 
state will continue to hamper its effort to establish durable peace as opposed to extended 
peace enforcements. He goes on to add that the neocolonial state will be prevented from 
knowing peace until deeper levels of peace becomes the new norm which hinges on the 
“continued decolonization of African states to realize a decolonial peace” (Zondi, 
2017:105). 
There is a need to sketch the peace and security environment by locating the source of 
violence and conflict in African states. It was in 1885 when Otto Bismarck inflicted “the 
Curse of Berlin” on Africa which saw African states being colonially crafted for exploitation 
and rulership by its European counterparts (Adebayo, 1999:4). Until today, Africa 
struggles to rid itself of the European curse of artificial nation-states with its unviable 
economies and artificially imported political systems, as renowned scholar Adekeye 
Adebajo puts it.  The Cold War then impressed the need for Africans to now address their 
own challenges to peace and security. Before then, the USSR and US had fought most 
of Africa’s wars. The first embodiment of a collective security regime was the LON formed 
in 1939. This grouping was soon disbanded owing to its inability to prevent the Second 




for the institutionalisation of the LON. Interestingly, the US never joined the League.  
During this turbulent time after the Second World War, the UN was born in 1945. The 
primary intention here was to protect international peace and security. In this context, the 
UN saw itself playing a role in interstate conflict as opposed to intra-state conflict which 
would later be the case. The 1960s was largely defined by the African states’ struggle for 
independence, hence the OAU’s formation in 1963 to assist in this regard (Murithi, 
2014:3). It is imperative that the international conditions at the time be taken into account 
in order to completely comprehend African states clinging to their sovereignty. It is 
apparent that the Treaty of Westphalia and its recognition of state sovereignty and 
complete jurisdiction of the internal affairs of member states, continues to shape African 
states’ relations with external actors today; especially in the peace and security context. 
Dlamini-Zuma was not the pioneer of the peace and development nexus. Ndlovu-
Gatsheni (2013:13) points out that as long as ‘neocolonized postcolonial’ conditions 
endure, peace and development will evade African peoples and their states. The origin 
of the peace and development connection can be linked to the 1980s’ Structural 
Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) introduced to African states by the long-standing Bretton 
Woods Institutions, in particular, the International Monetary Fund (IMF). With these loans 
came stringent conditionalities which would entangle African states in further debt and 
reinforce the global South economic dependence on the industrialised North. So, beyond 
the discourse on positive peace, there is a call for the realisation of a decolonial peace. 
Grosfoguel (2011:10) identified decolonial peace as one which does not ignore and/or 
marginalise the role of colonial continuities which entrenched war and violence in the 
fabric of African states. He went on to elaborate that the African state as we know it is still 
representative of the coloniser’s model of the world and its colonial political economy. 
Zondi (2017:107) argues that despite AU and REC’s interventions in the area of conflict 
resolution, their effort has been hampered simply because of unwillingness to change the 
inherited colonial state. The state spoken of above is one where its political and economic 
foundations have been constructed and sustained through violent processes such as 
colonisation and domination. In light of this, Zondi sums up that any articulation of peace 
which refuses to consult the effect of coloniality and its championing of repeated violence 




positive peace and decolonial peace are apparent in the destructive impact of structural 
violence in African states. In the words of Du Bois (1953:1), “peace is about a fundamental 
shift from the paradigm of violence at the root of the African states to a paradigm of peace 
that fosters the African renaissance”. 
Then came the Rwandan genocide in 1994. What this incident revealed is the 
international community’s hesitancy to act when not in their narrowly pursued national 
interests. Moreover, the OAU and its member states themselves were unable to act in a 
manner to bring peace in the country and region beyond. The early 2000s witnessed the 
rebirth of the OAU into the AU which would profoundly alter the organisation’s ability to 
assume its role as security actor and custodian of peace (Murithi, 2014:4). Because this 
study is situated within the confines of an IO, it is necessary to determine what role IOs 
play as agents of collective security and whether the AU in particular is capacitated to 
deal with 21st century challenges to peace and security. With this in mind, it is important 
to determine what role IO executives have on organisational outcomes. To do so 
effectively, one must understand the security environment when Dlamini-Zuma assumed 
office and from a leadership perspective, determine the impact of political leadership in 
driving outcomes of peace and security pursued by the AU and APSA. 
One must acknowledge the effort of African political leadership to bolster their peace 
architecture. The AU has taken considerable time to develop its framework for 
implementing a holistic peace which includes peace paradigms present in Boutras-
Boutras Ghali’s Agenda for peace. To elaborate, this involves conflict prevention, 
peacemaking, peacekeeping, post-conflict reconstruction and peacebuilding (Zondi, 
2017:110). Peace is among the indispensable components which prompted the transition 
from the OAU to AU. Much of the AU’s peace architecture is derived from the UN’s 
Agenda for Peace conceptual framework which includes prevention, peacemaking, 
peacekeeping and peacebuilding. Moreover, these processes and strategies are 
intertwined and mutually reinforcing. One of the successes of the AU has been the 
interconnected nature of the processes which now entangle peace and development as 
twin goals of equal necessity and significance (Zondi, 2017:113). Africa remains the 




maintenance of peace in the region. The AU’s intellectual and leadership effort in 
producing a legal framework which permits intervention as prescribed in Article 4 (h) 
paved the way for the international community to endorse the R2P. 
4.1.2 Root causes of African conflicts: long-term ideological repercussions 
resulting from the imperial experience 
Mazrui’s (1967:190) work voices the impact of imperialism and colonisation on the psyche 
and ideological preference of African states, their governments and citizens as a result of 
the abovementioned processes. One could even go as far as to state that these violent 
conquests created a false consciousness among Africans concerning the state of affairs 
in their regions as a tribute to their “lack of hard-work” and cultural and technological 
backwardness. In terms of peace and security then, the former was associated with 
disarmament so as to suggest that a mere silencing of the guns would end all Africa’s 
wars. History reveals that human dignity has been demonstrated in the taking up of arms 
instead of their rejection. This is even codified in America’s constitution and has caused 
much racial trauma and the killing of black African Americans especially. Peace and 
dignity are linked as much as peace is tied to development. Mazrui (1967:194) points out 
that manliness endorsed the significance of protecting oneself physically. 
Embedded in the teaching and ideas of Pax Bitannica, Mazrui (1967:196) notes that white 
races were liable for the disarmament of mankind, especially African peoples. Hence, in 
an attempt to introduce Africans to a life without violence, Britain sought its ferocious 
conquest of sanitising the savage Africans. Kenyatta (1938:212) lamented that: 
The European prides himself on having done a great service to the Africans by 
stopping the ‘tribal warfares’, and says that the Africans ought to thank the strong 
power that has liberated them from their "constant fear" of being attacked by the 
neighbouring warlike tribes. But consider the difference between the method and 
motive employed in the so-called savage tribal warfare, and those employed in the 
modern warfare waged by the ‘civilised’ tribes of Europe, and in which the Africans 




For one, the OAU represented the need for Africans to question why the powers to initiate 
war rest in hands of Europeans alone. Mazrui (1967:197) writes that somewhat of a 
merger occurred between the “state-monopoly in physical coercion and the imperial claim 
of monopoly in warfare as was the case in Africa and Asia”. These understandings inform 
the basis of Africa’s relationship with violence and the inherent nature thereof in state 
formation in Africa. Much of the security problems cannot be divorced from the question 
of statehood in national and regional affairs. 
4.1.3 Africa’s security environment after the Cold War  
Du Plessis and Kasperson from the World Economic Forum (WEF) (2016: para.1) argue 
that the drivers of conflict and violence thus include: high unemployment, lack of equal 
opportunities, urbanisation, poverty, and inequality, too many guns, and bad governance 
and corruption. This description neglects the impact of the enduring legacy of coloniality 
embedded in African states as a persistent hindrance to the continent’s goals of a 
peaceful Africa. First, the end of the Cold War gave rise to a new geopolitical setting which 
witnessed a stark increase in armed conflict in Africa. The African continent was left on 
its own to deal with all the distortions and mess that the Cold War rivalry left behind in the 
wake of its demise. Former Secretary-General of the UN, Kofi Annan, put it, “Across 
Africa, undemocratic and oppressive regimes were supported and sustained by the 
competing super-Powers in the name of their broader goals but, when the cold war ended, 
Africa was suddenly left to fend for itself” (Annan, 1998: para. 11). More pointedly, Africa 
became somewhat irrelevant as it declined in strategic value to the Western and Eastern 
powers post-Cold War. 
 In sum, the African continent is representative of the ongoing struggle for self-
determination (Dersso, 2012:12). This includes the quest for the management and control 
of politics, culture, geography and economics which eclipses the continent’s historical 
reality. It remains significant to note the impact of the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 which 
solidified the end of the Cold War and marked the demise of the self-interested 
superpower interventions and support for corrupt authoritarian systems in Africa which 
transferred responsibility and guardianship of peace and security to African states 




up and colonized by European powers and turned into pawns, knights and rooks on a 
cold war chessboard by the superpowers, Africa now faces a devastating new problem: 
indifference”. Mazrui (1967:203) argues that after the Cold War and the emergence of a 
multipolar world order in the 21st century, this struggle manifests as the need to revisit 
Pax Africana, a peace “that is protected and maintained by Africa herself”. Today, Pax 
Africana is embedded in the linguistic framework expressed in the statement ’African 
solutions to African problems’. Regarding the peace and security context, the 
aforementioned ideal is of great value to ensuring that the continent is conflict free. 
In an effort to give adequate expression to this revered political ideal, one must 
comprehend the interplay of political and historical factors responsible for its inception. 
Esmenjuad and Franke (2008:138) note that “African solutions to African problems”, is 
rooted in the Pan-African movement; more specifically two recent developments. Dersso 
(2012:12) positions the view that the Cold War and the emergence of the new global order 
in which Africa declined in strategic relevance to the superpowers, obliged Africa to deal 
with the effects of colonialism and the Cold War without external assistance. Second to 
this is the evolving nature of conflict which inspired African political leaders to strategise 
a way forward which affords the continent an opportunity to develop mechanisms and 
institutions to sufficiently address challenges to peace and security. Annan (2017:5) goes 
on to say that Africa has experienced multivariate conflicts during the past two decades 
and the provision of adequate responses to these conflicts mean that concerted action is 
needed to manage them. For illustration purposes, these crises include violence, political 
discord and the humanitarian impact as a result of the protracted nature of these crises. 
A pressing issue remains effectively dealing with the long-term social and economic 
impacts of conflict which includes rebuilding communities with the focus on outcomes of 
positive peace. This can only be accomplished with the help of institutions and groups 
whose efforts are scarcely accepted as being actors capable of contributing to conflict 
management on the continent. To this effect, women, youth, migrants, legal institutions, 
commercial enterprises, the state, media and civil society must assume their part in 
consensus building, identity formation, fairness, shared norms and cohesion between 
state and society which are all indispensable components of the “fabric of peace and 




Armed conflict threatens Africa’s socio-economic development (Braude, 2015: para.4). 
The frequency of armed conflict can be traced from 1960-1980 and an assessment 
thereof shows devastating socio-economic and humanitarian impact. The period from 
1960-2000 witnessed 80 forceful changes of government in Southern Africa alone. The 
prevalence of conflict in Africa at the end of the Cold War resulted in growth in the number 
of child soldiers, refugees and internally displaced peoples (IDPs). Aall and Crocker 
(2017:7) contend that the common denominator of all African conflict rests in the 
disagreements which arise over the basic idea of what a nation is. This is further 
compounded by state and society relations which involves who gets to rule. In several 
cases in Africa, early prevention has drastically reduced the spread of war; for example, 
in Sierra Leone. 
Sketching Africa’s security landscape is no simple task. In short, one has to understand 
the profound impact of historical events in order to make sense of recurring conflicts 
today. The aftermath of the Cold War, for example, and subsequent marginalisation of 
African countries (because of the increasing influence of globalisation) left these states 
unable to assert themself in the international system because of their weak economic and 
political arsenals. This adversely affected African countries’ capacity to both protect and 
advance their own interests when engaging with the hegemonic powers at the time. 
Dersso (2012:16) points out that the marginalised status of African states increased their 
vulnerability to external intervention; making it easier for Western powers to intervene in 
Africa “when they need to, and did not need to maintain presence in Africa” because of 
the interplay of national and regional forces as well as external interventions from outside 
the continent. 2012 is of particular significance as the AU celebrated 10 years since its 
establishment in Durban, South Africa and both the AU and its predecessor were 
entrusted with the guardianship of African unity (Malan, 2012:11). The strategic shift from 
prevention to intervention essentially gave rise to a wider array of responses and 
reactions from member states when it came to addressing issues related to peace and 
security. Generally, in an organisational setting predicated on preventionist mechanisms 
and structures, it is easier to arrive at consensus; however, in an “intervention-
empowered union”, indifference and lack of commitment can be expected (Malan, 2012: 




to the multivariate challenges which emanated from difference of opinion and strategy on 
the part of member states. 
Section two 
4.2 Measuring peace in African states: using positive and negative peace as 
indicators 
Chapter two played a significant role in delineating what peace means and how it 
manifests in society. Is peace only indicative of ending all wars as professed by the AU’s 
“silencing the guns by 2020”? According to Zondi (2017:105), an understanding of peace 
which is still dominated by coloniality will be content with the mission of silencing the guns 
because the state itself is a product and distributor of violence. Hence, the emergence of 
a decolonial peace stands out as the only solution able to revolutionise the basis upon 
which the modern/neocolonial state and society in Africa are established. Therefore, in 
this articulation, peace must be accompanied by the “decolonization of power, statehood 
and state-citizen relationships” (Zondi, 2017:105). Chapter four builds on the discussion 
regarding peace to identify whether and how peace can be measured within states. Owing 
to the dominance of states as actors in the international system and members of IOs, the 
state-level of analysis will be looked at to measure peace. For the purpose of this study, 
the binary distinction of peace means to pursue conflict resolution on the continent. 
Positive peace and negative peace are needed to produce a complete peace; however, 
there has been greater emphasis on negative peace in the form of peacekeeping as it 
pertains to available literature. 
As noted in the earlier section of this chapter, the peace and security regime under the 
AU diverges from the conventional approaches to security which only look at violent 
conflict and is rather deemed a regime which equally considers broader human security 
issues. According to the AU (2004:3), the Solemn Declaration on a CADSP represents 
the most accurate depiction of the AU’s quest to encompass both a military and non-
military approach to security. What differentiates CADSP is thus its perspective of peace 
which considers the impact of militaristic and non-militaristic means owing to the nature 
of the new international environment. Again, the repercussions of the Cold War resulted 




to accept the normative prescription of human security as foundation of the AU’s peace 
and security framework. The AU’s peace and security regime is best characterised by 
issues relating to armed conflict inasmuch as consideration is apportioned to issues of 
democracy, human rights and governance. Central to the latter challenges to a conflict 
free continent is the impact of political leadership. For instance, the promotion of 
democratic principles and institutions, popular participation and good governance forms 
part of the objectives of the AU (OAU 2000b: art. 3(g)). For that reason, CADSP has 
outlined threats to peace and security in Africa to include: 
• “Unconstitutional changes of government and coups d’eteat 
• Electoral violence and improper conduct of electoral processes 
• Consolidating democracy  
• Lack of respect for Human rights, human life  
• Acts of terrorism and subversion 
• Poverty and inclusive development  
•Corruption” (Dersso, 2012:32) 
The outline mentioned above will be the basis of analysis used in this study to make sense 
of key threats to a peaceful and secure Africa. The list provided above is not exhaustive 
as it neglects to consider other challenges such as women’s inclusion in peace 
processes, the gendered impact of conflict as well as other phenomena such as child 
soldiers and child marriage. Under lack of respect for human rights and human life, child 
marriage and women’s rights will be discussed. Therefore, the challenges discussed 
below are not limited to the CADSP framework only. Importantly, the majority of the 
challenges discussed fall within the human security paradigm and by assessing how 
these issues were managed chapter five will give credence to whether outcomes of 




4.2.1 Importance of negative and positive peace in measuring peace 
The dominant threats to peace and security are presented below. These challenges were 
carefully selected as they were encapsulated under the CADSP framework and broader 
human security paradigm. It must be noted that there indeed were other prominent threats 
on the continent during Dlamini-Zuma’s term which will form part of the analysis as well. 
Although these challenges surpass the time frames mentioned above, the specific threats 
to peace and security under the former Chairperson’s term will occupy the focus of section 
two. A distinction is also made between which challenges are regarded as falling under 
either the negative or positive peace paradigm to measure how peaceful African states 
were during Dlamini-Zuma’s tenure. To correctly analyse whether Dlamini-Zuma’s 
leadership was genuinely committed to pursuing peace on the continent, her approach to 
both negative and positive peace must be studied. The aim of this thesis is to determine 
how Dlamini-Zuma responded and subsequently addressed these challenges from the 
perspective of political leadership. 
4.2.2 Unpacking negative peace  
When discussing security-related issues, negative peace constitutes as manifestations of 
armed violence otherwise referred to as visible violence. In its most basic form, it is taken 
to mean the reduction of violence and eradication of conflict in its entirety. Much of the 
literature available today speak to issues of negative peace; more pointedly advocating 
peacekeeping strategies to address conflict. As an umbrella term, negative peace rarely 
addresses the root causes of inequality and injustice as the deployment of peacekeepers 
represent an immediate response to quell and minimise the severity of an ongoing and/or 
pending conflict. A visible trend in peace in 2014, can thus be attributed to internal 
conflict/civil war in most Global Peace Index (GPI) reports. The best available evidence 
over a range of indicators of violence, conflict and warfare specifies that the world has 
become much more peaceful since the end of the Second World War. As noted above, 
the indices used to inform peace are dominated by negative peace solutions as opposed 
to positive peace (GPI, 2014:43). The obsession with just ensuring an end to war and 
conclusion of armed violence only remedies security situations in African states on a 
temporary basis. Lacking in the GPI reports is any consideration of the impact of political 




Granting that negative peace (armed conflict) is not the chief purpose of this research, 
understanding its causes and drivers affords institutions a greater chance to respond 
more effectively to restore peace. Gebrehiwot and De Waal (2016:14) positions the view 
that at the core of armed conflicts in Africa is its “weak position in the world order, 
unconsolidated democracies and the legacies of exploitation and inequality because of 
the historical impact of colonization”. It can be said that African countries have always 
struggled to assert their independence by way of agenda- setting and controlling their 
own resources. Because Africa has been buffeted by colonialism, the Cold War, austerity 
and illicit financial flows; the continent has had to endure the prevailing effect of poverty, 
unemployment, authoritarian regimes and lack of education (Gebrehiwot and De Waal, 
2016:15). Shields (2017: 6) claims that there exists a broad consensus concerning the 
“singular dominance of negative peace” which essentially limits how collective security is 
understood which later impacts the outcome of policymaking. By no means does the 
abovementioned statement advocate for the marginalisation of the study of negative 
peace but instead for greater recognition to be accorded to more comprehensive notions 
of peace in security discourse. In fact, Galtung (1964:2) conceptualised positive peace as 
the “integration of human society” and further restated the idea that positive and negative 
peace be considered mutually exclusive variables. 
4.2.3 Unpacking positive peace 
On the other hand, positive peace tends to assess the social origins of conflict in Africa. 
In this way, it goes beyond seeking an urgent remedial response and instead focuses 
attention on addressing the deeper often structurally embedded political, social and 
economic causes responsible for the outbreak of conflict and/or continuation of these 
kinds of protracted humanitarian crises. Shields (2017:7) elaborates that positive 
manifestations of peace emphasise values and principles which include justice, 
democracy, sympathy, cooperation, order and collaboration. Unlike negative peace, 
positive peace involves non-violence and innovative conflict transformation strategies 
(Shields, 2016:324). The notion “if you want peace prepare for war” is blatantly rejected 
by advocates of positive peace. Key to pursuing outcomes of positive peace in Africa is 
the need to understand inequality and injustice as drivers of violent conflicts in Africa. 




resolve multifaceted African conflicts. The CADSP framework in this way identifies 
challenges to peace and security which for the most part fall under the domain of positive 
peace and will thus constitute the focus for this chapter. Notably, the addition of three 
other issues are included in the list as they too were regarded as pertinent and escalating 
threats under Dlamini-Zuma’s reign as head of the Commission.  
As articulated in the World Development Report (2011), violence in society and state can 
be linked to weak institutions which are unable to arrive at peaceful processes and 
solutions. Hence, institutions in this case, are the frontrunners in addressing violence; 
however, this needs to transcend action from an individual level to the core issue of 
institutional legitimacy. The GPI employs the same definitions of both negative and 
positive peace and therefore analysis is highly compatible to the findings of this study. 
Positive peace (defined as the attitudes, institutions and structures that create and sustain 
peace over time) inform efforts to create peaceful and resilient societies. What follows 
positive peace are other important qualities which extend to include gender equality, 
stronger economies and fairer societies (GPI, 2014:64). The report also makes a point to 
include a framework titled the Pillars of Peace which was drafted after extensive 
consultations, quantitative and qualitative research to determine the most common 
features of peaceful societies. 





Figure 1: Pillars of Peace 
Source: Institute of Economics and Peace (2014) 
Unique about the pillars of peace mentioned in Figure 1 is that they are interconnected 
and thus show that improvements in one area catalyses progress in the next. Likewise, 
decline in the resilience of one pillar is able to destabilise another, thereby reiterating the 
influence of any pillar on the overall peace in society. The GPI report (2014:79) indicates 
that there is much complexity concerning which factors cause and prolong conflict. 
Largely, this is because of the increasingly multifaceted causality among economic, 
political and social events. Caution must be exercised to avoid the over-simplification of 
the causal relationships which exist among the aforementioned variables. Hence, 
causality is impacted by circumstantial evidence and relationships. What the Institute of 
Economics and Peace (IEP) methodology does is aim to concentrate on the drivers of 
peace and it views sustainable peace as a systemic process. There are many 
compatibilities when assessing the CADSP framework adopted by the AUC as well as 
the peace pillars present in the GPI report. Therefore, the adoption of the CADPS 
framework is decidedly pro-positive peace in its configuration which reveals a continuity 
in global and regional standards for peace. 
To get a full picture of a peaceful society, one must consider the interaction and 
intersection between the political, economic and social spheres. More pointedly, how the 
government, economy and culture overlap. In the case of peace pillars and CADSP 
framework then, these areas affect one another to varying degrees. Missing from the 
criteria is the role of political leadership in building peace. Lack of analytical focus on the 
phenomenon of leadership itself creates a space where its impact on outcomes of peace 
are limited. When considering institutions as a driving force of peace as advocated by 
positive peace, it is useful to study the political leadership of IO executives and their 




4.3 Explaining the challenges to positive peace in Africa 
4.3.1 Consolidating democracies 
Murithi (2006a:11) contends that to understand the violent outbreak of conflict in Africa, 
one must look at the quality of political leadership governing these countries. Landsberg 
(2018:5) claims that even though democracy is frequently discussed in Africa and by the 
AU in particular; since the end of the Cold War, African states and leaders remain 
undecided about democracy promotion and state society relations. Notwithstanding the 
African Charter for Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG) which was drafted 
and came into force in 2012 in order to foster democratic governance in Africa, the 
domestication of constitutional democracy remains a challenge on the continent. 
Vencosky (2007) makes the claim that term limits are vital in that they allow for “power 
alternation” thus enabling a healthy democratic space. In the case of a presidential 
system, for instance, term limits serve to narrow the opportunity for monopoly power 
which manifests most potently in the “big man and president for life phenomenon”. The 
elected leaders in countries such as Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Burkina Faso, Madagascar and 
Burundi have been guilty of unsuccessfully attempting a “coup from within” thus damaging 
the process of democratic consolidation in African states (Afrobarameter, 2016). Riedl 
(2014) goes on to add that while a mere 34 African countries have two-term limits in 
accordance with their constitutions, only 20 per cent of these have observed their 
constitutional obligations. 
Ake (1996:139) elaborates that instead of focusing on the acquisition of political rights as 
in Western democratic discourse, emphasis should be on the democratisation of 
economic opportunities and a social welfare system. Socio-economic equality occupies 
an important role in Africa. Therefore, there was a general consensus among Africans 
that democracy indicated an alternative to socio-economic equality, and liberation from 
all forms of oppression (race, ethnicity, gender or class). Bangura (2007:126) contends 
that poverty deprives individuals of human dignity and freedom. Hence, democracy in 





According to Gebrehiwot and De Waal (2016:14), contested government transitions are 
a major source of political conflict that can result in violence. While most forms of armed 
conflict have consistently declined, election-related violence has increased. This includes 
violence during election campaigns, the period of voting, and immediately thereafter. A 
persistent barrier to Africa’s quest to be a haven of stability and peace is opposed by 
“third termism” and constitutional changes in countries such as Rwanda, DRC, Uganda, 
among others. Dulani (2015:1) notes that 2015 witnessed the heads of state of the DRC, 
Benin, Burundi, and Rwanda (whether explicitly or via the avenue of political supporters), 
express their intention to seek additional terms of office. This is a challenge faced by 
many countries whereby presidents unwilling to vacate office after serving their full term 
choose to stay in power and thus spark controversy and political tension which 
reverberates beyond the state. Again, this challenge represents the fragility of statehood 
in Africa as well as contestation regarding what the nation-state should look like. Based 
on the binary distinction of peace, consolidating democracy is a measure of positive 
peace.  
4.3.2 Unconstitutional change of government  
The problem with political leadership in Africa is that political and military elites have 
skillfully used the divisions and legacies of colonialism and the illegitimate nature of the 
post-colonial African state to exacerbate tension and fuel conflict (Murithi, 2006a:13). 
Hence, African states became home to personalised rule and subsequent abuse of power 
because of state monopoly. Issues such as nepotism and patrimonialism became 
commonplace within the make-up and functioning of African states. These abusive 
practices form part of third termism and constitutional amendments to sustain the ‘lifetime 
president’ phenomenon. In many of the cases of this nature, African heads of state 
themselves have been at the forefront of violating the human rights of their citizens.  
Adebajo and Landsberg (2000: 11) notes that in the 1950s it was almost impossible to 
separate the military from politics. This is indicative of a continuation of embedded 
violence in the state structure and the operationalisation thereof. Statistics revealed that 
a mere 40 years since African states celebrated their independence, the continent 
witnessed 80 successful military coups and multiple assassinations (Adebajo and 




which probes whether strides have been taken by regional and continental actors to 
address this matter.  
Murithi (2006b: 27) argues that colonialism in Africa not only deprived Africans of their 
self-worth but corrupted their indigenous practices regarding governance and conflict 
resolution practices. He goes on to add that indigenous traditions as it relates to the 
settling of disputes in African societies were used to serve the interest of the colonial 
administration. Moreover, because Africa is characterised by many cultures and linguistic 
people groups one must appreciate that each of these prescribes certain norms and 
principles able to guide peacebuilding initiatives on the continent. 
Adebajo and Landsberg (2000:18) note that greater collaborative efforts on the part of 
South Africa’s Mbeki and Nigeria’s Obasanjo have led to the discussion of the severity of 
military coups as a form of regime change in Africa under the auspice of the OAU. From 
this, one is able to observe the interconnectedness among security issues. For instance, 
coups on the continent reflect the nature of unconsolidated democracies across the 
board; hence, the need for the continental leadership to institute measures able to punish 
the offense of coups. Notably, Nigeria and South Africa were at the forefront of this African 
doctrine which further resembled their commitment to stability, democracy and peace on 
the continent. 
Versi (2016:27) makes an interesting distinction between true leadership and positional 
leadership. This is particularly important when looking at military coups because, from a 
leadership perspective, it illustrates that forceful occupation of a leadership position is 
further indicative of an illegitimate power source. This is also true of politicians who 
occupy certain positions neither education nor experience has prepared them for. Where 
this type of leadership exists, issues such as poverty, widespread violence and human 
rights violations persist. According to Burns (1978), leadership emerges in response to 
conflict, notwithstanding the abuse of leadership to stay in power, which also results in 
conflict. As much as abuse of political leadership can be a source of conflict, effective 
political leadership serves as an instrument of development and catalyst for peace. 
Respect for the principle of national sovereignty and of non-interference in the internal 




US, EU and France, gave rise to autocracy in Africa in the early decades after 
independence. Governance challenges include: constitutional amendments, weak civil 
society, and mismanagement of diversity, fragile institutions and failure to institutionalise 
effective policies. 
With elections due in the DRC and Rwanda in 2016, the leaders of these countries were 
plotting constitutional amendments to enable them to prolong their stay in office. They 
usually portray their desire for more time in office as a response to popular demands. But 
it has been established that there is strong support for presidential term limits among 
citizens across almost all African countries (Dulani, 2015:3). Surveys conducted between 
1999 and 2015 by Afrobarometer (2016:4), a Pan-African, non-partisan research network 
that conducts public attitude surveys on democracy, governance, and economic 
conditions, it was discovered that in 34 African countries, about 75 per cent of the citizens 
favour limiting presidential mandates to two terms. Moreover, the support for term limits 
has been consistently high over time and is the majority view even in countries that have 
never had term limits or that have removed term limits from their constitutions. 
Interestingly, 78 per cent of those polled in Nigeria supported term limits, a confirmation 
of the public outcry against former President Olusegun Obasanjo’s plan to get a third term 
in 2007. Equally, support for term limits was highest in Benin (90 per cent) where 
President Yayi Boni is reportedly contemplating removing them, while in Burkina Faso, 
nearly two thirds of the country’s citizens (64 per cent) expressed support for term limits, 
justifying the protests that ended Compaoré’s reign in October 2014. In Burundi, 62 per 
cent of the population supported term limits by 2014 also justifying the widespread 
protests that greeted President Pierre Nkurunziza’s third term bid. Grasa and Mateos 
(2010: 12) argue that although the data regarding the major armed conflicts shows this 
remarkable decline, there are some regions where the high levels of tension, violence 
and political and social instability deserve special attention. In that respect, in recent 
years, coups d’état (of varying intensity and consequence) have been staged in Chad, 




4.3.3 Poverty and inclusive development  
Adebajo and Landsberg (2000:12) advance the rhetoric that British colonial ties in Sudan 
and Nigeria, Portuguese policies in Angola and Mozambique and Belgian policies in 
Rwanda and Burundi planted the seeds for future conflicts. This implies that African states 
were not prepared to assume independence and provide for their citizens’ socio-
economic and political welfare. Moreover, the African political leadership at the time was 
faced with many inherited problems and thus incapable of pursuing development shortly 
after independence was achieved. 
Murithi (2006a:14) points out that the modernisation process in Africa has given rise to 
states which are heavily centralised in the capital city. Consequently, this enabled 
marginalisation and exclusion from wealth as populations living in rural areas do not share 
in the wealth and resources of the country. Many post-colonial nation states do not have 
adequate social security systems able to address this wealth and resource deficiency. 
Lack of access to state resources exacerbates the pervasiveness of poverty in that 
society. Increased poverty levels in society result in tension, mistrust between the 
government and the public.  Wars are a costly endeavour. Their widespread impact not 
only destroys infrastructure but consumes financial resources which could have been 
used for development purposes. 
By using the state as the unit of analysis, research reveals that there exists a diametrically 
opposing relationship between poverty and the resilience to conflict. Whether through soft 
or hard power, poverty can greatly reduce an institution's ability to act on its mandate and 
capacity to ensure that people’s needs and organisational goals are met. Poverty worsens 
insurgency at the individual and community level by lowering the opportunity and cost of 
mobilising for violence. High rates of unemployment and inequality, combined with low 
levels of education and development, are thought to soften the ground for recruitment 
and provide motives to fight (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2008:438). These individual 
correlates of poverty often follow systematic patterns that lead to “horizontal inequalities”. 
Horizontal inequalities occur when members of ethnic, religious, or other identity groups 
have unequal access to public goods, opportunities and resources. Group-level 




violent conflict (Østby 2008; Stewart 2009). Of course, these dynamics alone do not start 
wars. Political grievances and conflict proneness are most likely to lead to violence − from 
terrorism to civil war − when poverty and inequality combine with repression, particularly 
in anocracies, regimes that are neither strongly democratic, nor wholly autocratic (Abadie, 
2004: 50). 
Our understanding of the effects of conflict over time is still nascent. Evidence from 
Burundi suggests that households exposed to violence at the local level are more likely 
to face long-term poverty and deprivation than those who were spared. Exposure to 
violence also hurts those who participate in armed groups, as they have to overcome an 
education deficit, social stigma, and psychological distress that can leave them 
economically alienated and socially marginalised (Annan et al. 2011:3). At the country-
level, this leads to what some call the “conflict trap” (Collier et al. 2003:15). The strongest 
predictor of civil war onset is whether a country has recently experienced civil war, with 
harmful ‘neighbourhood effects’ making surrounding countries similarly vulnerable to 
conflict spill-over. However, vicious cycles of conflict that exacerbate poverty, slow 
economic growth, destabilise weak institutions and lead to violent relapse are not 
inevitable.  
The GPI (2014:68) reveals that a peaceful environment is where violence and insecurity 
are low, business and investment have a higher chance of thriving. In assessing the 
causal relationship between peace and economic growth, context must occupy an 
important space in the analysis. This is because this relationship is not a linear process 
nor is it constant. However, what this articulation neglects, is the uneven development of 
African states and their resilience to poverty. Poverty and social injustice remain pressing 
concerns to the welfare of African people and the stability of their states. In concurrence 
with the pressing human security issues identified by CADSP, the WEF argues that it is 
imperative that African states raise their living standards and eradicate inequality caused 




4.3.2 Lack of respect for human rights, human life 
4.3.2.1. Women’s rights and inclusion in peace processes 
Woroniuk (1999) highlights “the crucial gendered dimensions that have been absent 
within human security discourse, notably (1) violence against women, (2) gender 
inequality in control over resources, (3) gender inequality in power and decision-making, 
(4) women’s human rights, and (5) women (and men) as actors, not victims”. 
The effects of conflict on women will occupy the focus of this section. Both periods of 
negative and positive peace have consequences for women. In most instances of post 
conflict situations, the women suffer major psychological trauma (Maina, 2012:5). Despite 
these conditions of violence, women still get raped and are forced to enter into marriage 
to alleviate economic stress for their families. On the other spectrum, because most 
women were culturally dissuaded from schooling, their future career and economic 
prospects are severely limited in comparison to men. The interlocked nature of these 
impacts of conflict on women must be understood before they can be addressed. It is 
important to not ignore the pervasiveness of the physical, social and psychological impact 
of conflict on women. 
Even though the international community has shed more light on the issue of gender 
based violence, it has not done enough to explore this issue in environments which are 
not at the mercy of armed conflict (Mutisi, Ogunsanya and Ettang, 2011). There is a 
tendency to assume that the absence of armed conflict indicates the automatic existence 
of peace in which issues such as sexual and gender based violence (SGBV) does not 
occur. This is where positive peace enables one to identify indicators which point toward 
issue areas which threaten peace even though a country is not involved in inter-state war.  
International efforts to address this issue is seen in the adoption of legal instruments to 
include women in all aspects of peace operations. These include but are not limited to 
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (Women’s 
Convention 1979), the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women (1993), 
the Declaration of the Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing (1995), and United 
Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325, expressly condemn all forms of 




parties to armed conflict to take special measures to protect women and girls from gender-
based violence, particularly rape and other forms of sexual abuse, and all other forms of 
violence in situations of armed conflict (United Nations Security Council, 2000). 
An illustration of the extent to which gender based violence impacts on women and girls 
is evident in the case of Burundi. Another contributor to this societal evil is the patriarchal 
culture in Burindi which enables and exacerbates gender discrimination against women. 
Customary practices serve to maintain the inferiority and insecurity of girls and women in 
society. Women are even discouraged from owning property, making decisions about 
their interests. Women are of a perceived lower social standing not because of ability but 
because they were discouraged from going to school and being financially independent.  
A culture of ignorance and silence in response to gender-based violence has resulted in 
women being deprived of justice on account of crimes of rape. Amnesty International 
(2014:54) records that both the justice system and law enforcers humiliated women when 
they report gender-based crimes. 
4.3.2.2 Child marriage 
Gender inequality is among one of the leading causes of child marriage. Before consulting 
the effect of economic, social and cultural enablers, the inferior status of girls and women 
in society must be the first point of departure (Budoo, and Ramnauth, 2018:25). Even 
though child marriage affects boys as well, girls are disproportionally affected, hence, will 
be the subject of the analysis to follow.  
Mckay (2004:153) records that insecurity in its entirety is gendered, meaning that no 
context is excluded from the manifestations, patterns and level of severity; however, she 
notes that they are context specific. Child marriage has both immediate and long-term 
effects for individual girls and their life expectancy. Of these devastating consequences 
lack of education adversely impacts reproductive rights, sexual health and future 
employment; which continues the poverty cycle in communities. From a global 
perspective, statistics read that one in four girls are married as children before the age of 
18. Based on the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF, 2016:33), East and Southern 
Africa comprise 36 per cent of the global total and 10 per cent of the girls are married by 




It is important to locate the root causes of child marriage in order to understand the impact 
thereof. Succinctly put, child marriage has significant short- and long-term consequences 
for girls and their future offspring. Girls are not only deprived of education but are at a 
higher risk of having problems in terms of sexual health and this greatly reduces their 
employment prospects. It is apparent that child marriage then reinforces the cyclical 
nature of personal and community poverty. This bears testimony to the intertwined 
relationship which exists between peace and development. UNICEF (2016:33) reports 
that in East and Southern Africa, the share is 36 per cent, and 10 per cent of girls in the 
region are married by age 15. Recognising that child marriage is a human rights violation 
enhances one’s comprehension concerning how its practice devalues efforts at 
sustainable development. Statistics read that in the last decade, child marriage has 
affected 58 million girls, many of whom were married against their will and in violation of 
international laws and conventions.  Moreover, the severity of its consequences must not 
be underestimated. Again, the UNICEF report (2012:14) revealed that national and 
international indicators on maternal health, education, food security, poverty eradication, 
HIV/AIDS, and gender equality are all negatively correlated with high child marriage rates. 
Owing to the pressures on child brides, they are increasingly susceptible to fertility issues 
and greater maternal and new-born morbidity. Unsurprisingly, married girls under the age 
of 15 are five times more likely to die in childbirth than married women in their 20s 
(UNFPA, 2004:15). The International Center for Research on Women (ICRW, 2007:4) 
documents that child brides are also at greater risk for contracting HIV and other sexually 
transmitted diseases due to their inability to reject unsafe sexual practices. 
Political instability and times of humanitarian emergencies increases a girl’s chances of 
child marriage. As witnessed in the case of droughts in the Sahel region, child marriage 
rises rapidly among the affected communities (USAID, 2012:9). This is largely due to 
economic pressures put on the family and is employed as a means of coping with food 
insecurity. Moreover, in areas more harshly affected by armed conflict, fewer girls attend 
school and child marriage is then presented as a “socially acceptable pathway to 
adulthood”. The report produced by the United States International Development Agency 




leadership, there are inflated chances of legally reducing the age of marriage as 
witnessed in post-Mubarak Egypt. 
On the whole, child marriage in Africa is significantly higher than the global average and 
if current trends persist, Africa will become the region with the largest number and global 
share of child marriages by 2050 (UNICEF, 2015:22). Specifically, in West and Central 
Africa it is estimated that four out of 10 women aged 20 to 24 were married before age 
18. For instance, Mali, which is one of the countries under study, reported a child marriage 
prevalence rate of 71 per cent in 2006 and 55 per cent in 2010. Although trends have 
shown a slow and uneven decline in the overall prevalence of child marriage in Africa, the 
continent is home to a young and rapidly growing population. This means that without 
economic growth, social development and increased efforts to end child marriage, the 
number of girls married by age 18 is expected to rise. This trend is most pronounced 
among poorer households and in rural areas, where child marriage is twice as prevalent 
as in urban areas and showing little sign of decline.  
Similarly to the case of Burundi, Mali suffers from the issue of child marriage. The 
statistics in Mali indicate that at least 55 per cent of girls are married before the age of 18 
(UNICEF, 2015:7). In particular, the Kayes region is known to host 87 per cent of the 
cases of child marriage. The dominant regions being affected include the Hodh Charghi 
(55 per cent) and Gorgol (50 per cent) areas. Sub-Saharan Africa hosts at least 48 per 
cent of women between the ages of 20 and 24, who were estimated to be married before 
the age of 18. 
According to the Human Rights Watch Report (2013:15), poverty infiltrates nearly every 
aspect of social, economic and political life. Its pervasiveness knows no bounds 
irrespective of factors such as gender or race. In this case, poverty has both enabling and 
causal effects on the phenomenon of child marriage. Poorer countries are also more 
prone to experience child marriage because of the levels of poverty in those regions. 
These statistics are especially evident in the case of Mali and Mozambique. Moreover, 
these correlations are also seen at a regional level. In Mali and Mozambique, two 
countries in which roughly half of the girls are married before 18, at least three quarters 




Women, 2007:32). The correlation between poverty and child marriage is also evident at 
the level of sub-national regions, as the regions with high prevalence listed in the previous 
section are overwhelmingly also the poorest and/or most rural regions of respective 
countries. For instance, in Mozambique, the prevalence of child marriage is 56.4 per cent 
in rural areas against 42.4 per cent in urban areas. In the DRC, the prevalence is 50 per 
cent in rural Katanga and Province Orientale against only 18 per cent in urban Kinshasa. 
The practice of ukuthwala in South Africa is only found in rural areas. Poverty also plays 
a role in making children vulnerable to transactional relationships, which in some cases 
lead to child marriage. In Uganda, South Africa and Kenya the phenomenon of ‘sugar 
daddies’ is reported, where older men seek sex from children and adolescents in 
exchange for money or other goods (The Centre for Human Rights, 2018:27). Other ways 
poverty encourages this practice is through transactional sex relationships in order to 
secure resources for the family. The dire consequences are that these relationships 
frequently lead to child marriage and premarital pregnancy. This issue deserves adequate 
attention and chapter five intends to answer whether and how Dlamini-Zuma addressed 
the situation. 
4.3.3 The Ebola epidemic in West Africa 
Rukato (2018:118) argues that because of the convoluted nature of the AUC, certain 
functions such as the control of pandemics and disaster management could be delegated 
to member states. However, the AUC assumed the lead role in responding to the Ebola 
health crisis. Based on the AU fact sheet on the Ebola crisis (2015:1), the first outbreak 
of cases was reported in December 2013 in Guinea. However, it must be noted that the 
outbreak which occurred from 2013-2015 pales in comparison to its initial cases traced 
back to 1976. It is apparent that the Ebola virus was by no means a new phenomenon, 
however, its resurgence was one marked by increasing severity. Health crises of this 
nature falls within the mandate of the AU’s PSC. As acknowledged prior to this analysis, 
the AU relies on multiple partners to deliver on its peace and security objectives. In this 
regard, the AU has strategised a way forward in curbing the spread of the disease 




Part of the AU’s initial response to addressing the Ebola virus commenced in April 2014 
at a gathering convened by the AUC, World Health Organisation (WHO) and African 
Ministers of Health (AU Fact sheet, 2015:1). The AUC also issued a communiqué and a 
call to states who have dealt with the management of the Ebola virus to avail themselves 
for assistance when requested. This proved successful as the feedback provided was 
largely positive. Moreover, certain AU member states even dispatched specialists to 
those affected states. In accordance with the joint power provision between the AUC and 
the PSC in the execution of the organisation’s peace architecture, the AUC mostly deals 
with the operational costs and logistical arrangements for peace processes. The AU fact 
sheet (2015:1) enumerates that various organs together with the AUC contributed to the 
financial resources needed to effectively quell the crisis. Moreover, the AU fact sheet also 
lists the PSC’s decisions formally adopted on 19 August 2014 which read as follows: 
1. “The authorization of an immediate deployment of the AU-led Military-Civil 
Humanitarian Mission, comprising medical doctors, nurses and other medical and 
paramedical personnel, as well as military personnel, as required for the effectiveness 
and protection of the Mission: and, 
2. That the Commission should take, without further delay, the necessary steps to develop 
a Concept of Operations for the AU Mission, including its logistical, financial and other 
relevant aspects”.  
In spite of the strategies put in place, Adebajo (Personal interview: 2020) stated that 
Dlamini-Zuma addressed the Ebola virus eight months later. Because Dlamini-Zuma is 
also a medical doctor by profession, there was a greater expectation for her management 
of the crisis in a more timeous and coherent fashion.  
4.4 Examining the AU’s peace partnerships with RECs 
RECs represent collective security entities mandated to ensure peace and security in 
their respective geographical locations. The notion of collective security implies that all 
states party to the organisation have an equally important role to play in conflict resolution. 
However, Adebajo and Landsberg (2000:19) point out that regional security mechanisms 




and thus support warring factions. In terms of advantages, regional entities rely on conflict 
resolution as the looming threat of instability could later impose detrimental realities on 
their domestic political situation. Moreover, it empowers regional leaders to assume a 
greater role in the maintenance of peace and security as well as provides a platform for 
dialogue to agree on common positions. In this context, the OAU then attempted to create 
greater collective engagement between these regional security mechanisms.  
Zondi (2017:110) states that the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the 
Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Arab Maghreb Union 
(AMU), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the 
Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) possess institutionally informed 
mandates to build and enhance peace in their respective regions. Obouga (2016: para. 
4) adds that coordination and communication channels between the AU and RECs are a 
hindrance to their collective role in creating conditions for peace in their regions. There 
are still traces of the initial contestation regarding who should own the continent’s peace 
and security agenda, hence the AU’s hesitance to delegate more responsibility to RECs 
in the maintenance of peace. As a result of this complex partnership between the AU and 
RECs, the UN and individual external actors will assume a lead role in addressing the 
conflict. 
Badmus (2015:87) goes on to add that alongside the AU, RECs are the backbone of the 
APSA, helping to actualise its commitment to the development of the AU’s security 
architecture. However, Zondi (2017:107) argues that despite AU and REC’s interventions 
in the area of conflict resolution, their effort has been hampered simply because of 
unwillingness to change the inherited colonial state. The state spoken of above is one 
where its political and economic foundations have been constructed and sustained 
through violent processes such as colonisation and domination. In light of this, Zondi 
sums up that any articulation of peace which refuses to consult the effect of coloniality 
and its championing of repeated violence will cease to instil a credible and lasting peace 






Peace is essential. Without peace it will not be possible to achieve the levels of 
cooperation, trust and inclusiveness necessary to solve Africa’s challenges, let alone 
empower international institutions and organisations necessary to address them. In order 
to understand the main challenges to building a peaceful and secure Africa, it is important 
to correctly identify the type, nature and magnitude of these issues which prevent the 
realisation of AU goals pertaining to the establishment of a conflict-free continent. These 
challenges were explained under the banner of negative and positive peace. This chapter 
set out to sketch Africa’s complex security environment by tracing the core issues 
responsible for the persistence of conflict and protracted crises. It became evident that 
historical processes resulted in unviable African states which now repeat the same cycles 
of violence used to acquire its freedom. Then, it discussed the AU and its profound 
implication for dealing with peace- and security-related challenges. This is crucial to 
reframing our understanding of AU jurisdiction over security issues in accordance with its 
new normative framework and emphasis on its politics of peace. Peace and security 
challenges which fell under the CADSP framework together with other issues were 
studied in this chapter. The list includes: poverty and inclusive development, 
unconsolidated democracies, unconstitutional changes of government, child marriages, 
women’s inclusion in peace processes and lack of effective regionalism. The 2015 GPI 
report points out that where positive peace is evident, there is a higher probability to 
achieve its development goals. Additionally, societies with higher outcomes of positive 
peace, are more inclined to employ non-violent strategies when faced with resistance 
movements. All of this is necessary to comprehend as chapter five now assesses Dlamini-
Zuma’s response to these pressing problems from the perspective of political leadership. 
Key to fully comprehending the purpose of this chapter is to take heed that when 
assessing the former Chairperson’s response to peace in Africa, the intent is to determine 








ANALYSING THE ROLE OF POLITICAL LEADERSHIP IN DRIVING OUTCOMES OF 
PEACE: THE CASE OF DLAMINI-ZUMA AS AUC CHAIR 
5.0 Introduction 
The previous chapter dealt with Africa’s complicated relationship with peace before 
examining the main threats to the AU’s goal of a peaceful and prosperous continent. It 
was important for the researcher to acknowledge the colonial legacy of violence and 
expose the interconnected relationships which exist among the identified security issues 
the AU is expected to address. Importantly, positive peace was used to specify the indices 
used to measure peace in the absence of armed conflict. Now that the foundations are 
laid concerning the main challenges to positive peace on the continent, it is easier to study 
Dlamini-Zuma’s response to them. Chapter five is divided into four sections to answer the 
stated research questions and objectives. The main research question reads as follows: 
To what extent did Nkosazana Dlamini- Zuma's political leadership at the AUC lead to 
positive peace outcomes for Africa? In answering this question, section one begins by 
studying Dlamini-Zuma’s political history, beliefs and values before moving to examine 
the recruitment process responsible for her election. Key to assessing political leadership 
is understanding the recruitment process, a leader’s biography and political beliefs; 
context; and leader-follower relations. Section two then goes on to explain the impact of 
gender on political leadership as informed by secondary research question three. Here, 
the interplay of women and political leadership is discussed to determine whether 
gendered expectations of leadership impacted her performance as Chair. Next, section 
three focuses on the extent to which Dlamini-Zuma was able to shape the AU’s peace 
and security agenda as AUC Chair. With this in mind, section four is able to use the 
generated insights as a result of the political leadership assessment to explain Dlamini-
Zuma’s response to the prioritised challenges mentioned in section three. Finally, section 
five summarises the findings.  




5.1 Understanding Dlamini-Zuma as a political leader 
As stated in chapter two, Herman (1986) contends that to assess political leadership one 
must understand a leader’s biography and political beliefs. Hence, section one makes a 
point to study Dlamini-Zuma’s political history, political beliefs and values, to determine 
who she was as a leader. 
Dlamini-Zuma, a formidable female political icon, was born on 27 January 1949. Both her 
parents played a vital role in shaping her outlook on life. Du Plessis (2017:7) describes 
that from her father, Willibrod, she inherited a reverence for education and from her 
mother, Rose, a deep-seated sense of responsibility. It is clear that in the Dlamini 
household, education and hard work, were taught as factors conducive to development 
and independence which would later empower the parents’ eldest, Nkosazana Clarice, to 
study an extra year in high school to improve her competency in mathematics and 
science. Somniso (2012) demonstrates that Willibrod encouraged his daughters to get 
educated because in their tradition the inheritance belongs to the eldest boy. She goes 
on to highlight one of the most profound statements made by Dlamini-Zuma’s father “but 
your education will not go to the eldest boy it will be yours until you die”.  Despite her 
predilection to the field of law, she decided to pursue medicine, which was Willibrod’s first 
choice for her. Adams College, today known as Amazimtoti Training College, is often the 
place credited for Dlamini-Zuma’s political awakening and leadership. It was there where 
she assumed her first formally recognised leadership role within the prefect body where 
she was extremely vocal and critical of the substandard education offered in the form of 
Bantu Education (Du Plessis, 2017:8). 
It is suggested that despite Dlamini-Zuma later being recognised as a remarkable 
institutional leader, proficient in managerial acumen for one, her election to the position 
of Commission Chair was also based on ideo-philosophical grounds (Landsberg and 
Orderson, 2017:4). One incident in particular is arguably deemed the beginning of 
Dlamini-Zuma’s Pan-African identity. The teaching staff at Adams College consisted of 
both black and white teachers, however, there was a discernible difference between how 
these racial groups were treated. In the book, Woman in the Wings, Du Plessis (2017:5) 




forbidden to wear. It took the dehumanisation and humiliation of a black teacher to inspire 
an understanding of the dire oppressive political situation in the country. A beloved history 
teacher shared his story as to how he was humiliated after fetching a tea cup from the 
white staffroom from which he then drank his tea, a white teacher approached him and 
“smashed it thereby ensuring that no white person drank from it in future” (Turok, 2006). 
This incident, where her teacher was being subject to such treatment simply on the basis 
of his African identity, was something Dlamini-Zuma would never forget. 
By 1976 Dlamini-Zuma was active in South Africa’s Students Organisation (SASO) where 
she remained vice president and still very much dedicated to the fight against the 
oppressive apartheid regime of the time (Hlalethwa, 2018: para.4). Despite moving to the 
United Kingdom (UK) to complete her studies in medicine, Dlamini-Zuma continued to be 
involved in the ANC’s political affairs. Magadla (Personal interview: 2020) and Du Plessis 
(2017:12) agree that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma’s political beliefs had been informed by 
Black Consciousness as opposed to socialist-motivated thinking which dominated ANC 
ranks. Her inclination towards Black Consciousness serves as a mere glimpse towards 
understanding and appreciation of Pan-Africanism, its ideals and prescriptions for African 
unity, solidarity and a re-interpretation of African history. She felt that at the core of the 
political struggle in South Africa was its socio-economic structure: “capitalism built on 
imperialism” (Du Plessis, 2017:13). To understand this fully, a deeper conceptual 
recognition of Black Consciousness is needed. At its core, the Black Consciousness 
movement and philosophy as advocated by Steve Bantu Biko, speaks to the mental 
emancipation of black people. It depends entirely on an outright rejection of mental 
oppression responsible for the spiritual, economic, political and social oppression and 
ostracization of black people. 
Black Consciousness is based on the premise that a black perspective is needed for the 
black man’s struggle. Owing to the black person living their entire conscious life totally 
and completely affected by the institutionalisation of apartheid, one must understand that 
every facet of their life was segregated and confined to a specific space. This space was 
one tainted with inequality, shortage, inadequacy and deeply embedded feelings of 




person, the black person thus forfeited their personhood as they were blinded by the false 
consciousness created by the apartheid regime. In sum, it was for this reason that Black 
Consciousness demanded that true integration will only be achieved if preceded by 
raising the consciousness of black people.  Even as she moved up the ranks in SASO, 
she adamantly pursued the introduction of class and economic programmes into their 
thinking. This soon changed as Dlamini-Zuma began viewing Black Consciousness as a 
mere “means to an end” but the ANC was the only movement able to take the political 
liberation of South Africa forward. In her own words, she used the metaphor that Black 
Consciousness represented “a child learning to crawl before it could walk” (Sechaba, 
1977). Based on this perspective, one may see that Black Consciousness was deemed 
an appropriate tool to liberate black South Africans from mental emancipation; however, 
its prescriptions for true integration without multicultural involvement were not widely 
supported. It is clear that Dlamini-Zuma emerges from a history that is no stranger to the 
ills of racism, gender bias and economic inequality and thus what prompted her devotion 
to Black Consciousness political ideals and beliefs as an antidote to the black people’s 
struggle for liberation in all its forms.  
Landsberg (2018) describes Dlamini-Zuma as “a policy-orientated, technicist and 
implementation leader”. In support of this view, Magadla and Cornell (2019:36) comment 
that Dlamini-Zuma is best demonstrated as a strategic leader in comparison to a visionary 
leader in domestic and regional organisational contexts. Her lineage of roles in various 
ministerial positions in South Africa speak of her capacity as an effective organisational 
leader. Included in this list is her position as Health Minister (1994-1999), followed by 
Foreign Affairs Minister (1999-2009), Home Affairs Minister in (2009-2012) and currently 
as Minister of Traditional Affairs and Cooperative Governance. This high praise was 
indeed tested when the apartheid activist had to tackle institutional reform on a much 
larger scale as the continent’s Commission Chair. Yet another achievement for South 
Africa, the not so long-ago pariah state had taken the step to elect its first female Foreign 
Affairs Minister. Much of the criticism which followed her appointment was grounded upon 
a lack of diplomatic involvement and history (Du Plessis, 2017:68). Her election to this 





Dlamini-Zuma’s appointment as the foreign policy leader in South Africa came as a 
surprise to many (Du Plessis, 2017:39). Magadla (Personal interview: 2020) argues that 
this was an intentional move by Mbeki who needed an individual able to put his African 
Renaissance vision into practice. Mbeki and Dlamini-Zuma met in exile while in Swaziland 
and had developed a long-standing relationship. To Dlamini-Zuma’s advantage, her 
intimate involvement in Black Consciousness, entrenched a deep-seated commitment to 
black people’s liberation in all its forms and this uniquely empowered her to be the Foreign 
Minister (able to carry out Mbeki’s African Renaissance vision for the continent). 
Presidents are judged based on the leaders they choose and deem as able to champion 
their vision. Hence, Mbeki’s decision to appoint Dlamini-Zuma can be interpreted as a 
systematic move as he had full confidence in her ability to ensure that domestic and 
continental conditions are synchronised to give effect to the African Renaissance project. 
It must be noted that Mbeki was criticised for focusing the majority of his attention on 
Africa instead of domestic stability in the Republic. Both Mbeki and Dlamini-Zuma were 
fully aware that the prosperity of South Africa is inextricably linked to Africa. One must 
understand the socio-economic and political context in which they were acting which 
informed that instability in African states affects South Africa directly and indirectly 
(Magadla, Personal interview: 2020). The African Renaissance project sought to address 
peace and security at a regional and continental level because of awareness of the 
destructive multifaceted impact of conflict. Instability in Southern Africa and the sources 
of insecurity regionally, prompted the transformation of the OAU to the AU, enabling the 
body to address conflict in the internal affairs of member states. Now that one has a more 
consolidated view of Dlamini-Zuma’s political upbringing and beliefs, one is better suited 
to understand the recruitment process responsible for her election.  
5.1.2 The recruitment process: understanding Dlamini-Zuma’s controversial AUC 
appointment 
 In order to conduct a successful political leadership assessment, the recruitment process 
must be studied. In particular, research objective three is determined to find out whether 
Dlamini-Zuma was the most suitable candidate to assume the AUC Chair position. One 
must consider the nature of the recruitment process responsible for South Africa’s victory 




ability to execute her role within the continental body. South Africa’s rationale for putting 
forward the candidacy of Dlamini-Zuma will be discussed below. Important to note is the 
Republic’s relationship with the AU especially in the context of advancing its peace and 
security agenda.  
5.1.3 South Africa and the AU 
It is necessary to understand South Africa’s relationship with the AU as the Republic 
invested much in pursuing the Commission Chair position in 2012. South Africa has also 
invested much ideational, human and resource capital in advancing the continent’s peace 
agenda. When reviewing Africa’s peace diplomacy, which, according to Prah (2019:78) 
includes peacemaking, peacebuilding and peacekeeping, there is an observable shift 
from the realist state-centric view of security. By studying South Africa’s peace diplomacy 
and in particular the foundations established during the Mandela presidency, peace in 
Africa emerges as a key driver of its foreign policy. As noted earlier, Mandela’s presidency 
witnessed human rights being entrenched in the country’s foreign policy agenda. In this 
way, it can be likened to a so-called moral diplomacy which advocated for peaceful 
transitions of power and preference for peacemaking practices of mediation and 
negotiation as means to resolve conflict on the continent. During this period, Dlamini-
Zuma served as Health Minister and in this way was keenly aware of Mandela’s advocacy 
and prioritisation of human rights from which its peace diplomacy arguably developed. 
Spence (2007:343) continues that because of its prior oppressive history, South Africa 
invested both financial and ideological resources in its rebranding and transforming its 
foreign policy identity to reflect that of a “conflict resolver, defender of human rights and 
regional leader”. 
Pretoria adopted a multilateral approach to diplomacy, placing Africa at the helm of its 
foreign policy, however, this is not particularly evident during the Zuma administration. 
Despite the adoption of a 2010-2013 DIRCO Strategic Plan which affirmed the 
“consolidation of the African Agenda” and the “continued prioritization of the African 
continent” as the core priorities of South Africa’s foreign policy, this was not evident in 
practice. In March 2012, the Deputy Minister of IR, Ebrahim Ebrahim also stated that “…to 




Furthermore,  in that speech, he went on to argue that “South Africa’s foreign policy 
remains firmly anchored in championing the African Agenda: the vision of an African 
continent that is prosperous, peaceful, democratic, non-sexist, people-centred and 
united, and which contributes to a world that is just and equitable” (The Diplomat, 2012: 
9).  
  Nagar and Nganje (2016:34) state that it was Mbeki who helped to foster South Africa’s 
commitment to multilateralism. To this effect, the 1992 creation of ANC foreign policy 
sought to promote and include continental interests in terms of global governance as well 
as peace and security.  Following this, in 1994 the ANC stated the need to reflect the 
interests of the continent of Africa (ANC- ready to govern, May 1992 and 1994).  Given 
this, one must appreciate the context in which Dlamini-Zuma was elected as Foreign 
Affairs Minister in 1999. Noticeably, this came at a time just after apartheid where there 
emerged a need to transform South Africa’s image both regionally and continentally. Not 
only was the apartheid state regarded as a bully to its neighbouring states especially, it 
desperately sought to rid itself of its pariah status and assume the role of good 
international citizen. Other speculation included South Africa’s need to neutralise its male-
dominated image and its implicit racist associations by positioning a woman for the 
position (Magadla and Cornell, 2017:40). In retrospect, one may see that the ANC indeed 
has an impeccable track record in terms of women’s inclusion in foreign policy and 
security fields. To some, Dlamini-Zuma’s election was criticised as she had been painted 
as unsmiling and lacking charisma which are the expected characteristics for an individual 
assuming such an important diplomatic role. Reverting back to the discussion of context, 
because the apartheid state had acquired a reputation of oppression and abuse even 
beyond its own borders, democratic South Africa had much fence building to do. It soon 
became evident that instability in SADC affects the domestic stability in South Africa; thus, 
embedding the important role the Republic would have to assume in ensuring peace and 
security (Magadla, Personal interview: 2020).  
On a continental level on the other hand, the OAU in 1963 played an instrumental role in 
removing colonial shackles and providing liberation movements with the necessary 




in 1994, signalled a completion of the OAU’s stated claim of liberating the continent from 
the ills of colonialism. Among these liberation groups was the ANC and this arguably 
cemented the priority of continental affairs on the ANC’s foreign policy agenda once they 
assumed the leadership of South Africa. Unlike the timely action and support provided by 
the OAU, the international community was slow to condemn apartheid and recognise it 
as a crime against humanity. To demonstrate this, the UN only declared apartheid as a 
crime against humanity in 1973 after more than a decade of institutionalised racism and 
gross human rights violations. With all of this in mind, Mbeki elected South Africa’s first 
female foreign policy leader. Mbeki’s selection of Dlamini-Zuma infers that she would be 
able to implement his African Renaissance vision for the continent. Gevisser (2007:323) 
echoes that because of Dlamini-Zuma’s roots to Black Consciousness, she was an 
obvious candidate. This means that she understood the ideological revelation implicit in 
the African Renaissance vision for the continent. Further, under Mbeki’s presidency, 
South Africa played a key role in the transition from the OAU to the AU. Important to note 
is that Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma herself played a significant role in the negotiation 
process which witnessed the birth of the AU (Malala, 2012). As a result of this 
modernisation project of the AU, the body now enshrined the right to intervene in cases 
mentioned in Article 4(h) for instance. In sum, the AU was created as a tool Africa could 
use to engage external powers from the north more effectively, however, this depends on 
unity, cohesiveness and policy consistency among AU member states. 
Since the establishment of the OAU, the organisation and its agenda has been dominated 
and dictated by major African powers, namely those from North and West Africa. South 
Africa has also been known to take its participation in continental affairs quite seriously 
as its rhetorical commitments were further backed by material and financial resources 
under Mbeki’s presidency (Magadla and Cornel, 2019:44). Mbeki was known to pioneer 
AU reform in the early 2000s and even sponsored the African Renaissance project which 
served to modernise the AU thus empowering the body with instruments to deal with 
development, among other key goals (Van Nieuwkerk, Personal Interview: 2020).  This 
implies that the modernisation of the OAU was of necessity if the AU was to be of any 
relevance to its people and the continent as a whole. Now that the AU equipped itself with 




political goals on the continent, one must consider the kind of leadership needed within 
such an institution for it to carry out its mandate. 
Put plainly, Dlamini-Zuma got caught in the headwind of confusion regarding South 
Africa’s foreign policy orientation under the Zuma administration. Moreover, the 
noticeable decline in South Africa’s interest and investment in the AU during the Zuma 
years resulted in the Republic losing its “leadership quality” and strategic partnership 
Mbeki worked to establish, now corroded (Naidu, Personal interview: 2020). South 
Africa’s relationship with the AU was neglected during this time and can be seen as one 
of the factors which adversely influenced how it was received (Naidu, Personal interview:  
2020). Because the Zuma administration was dismissive in its approach towards Africa, 
there was no observable and coherent strategy in place to guide South Africa in its 
diplomatic conduct with the premier continental organisation in which it had invested so 
much intellectual and financial capital to revamp in previous years. Under the leadership 
of President Ramaphosa, South Africa possesses a unique opportunity to rebuild its value 
proposition to the AU.  
On the whole, it is evident that Dlamini-Zuma was more than qualified to assume the AUC 
Chair position. Her closeness to Mandela’s human rights-based foreign policy, coupled 
with her advancement of Mbeki’s African Renaissance vision bear testimony to her 
experience as a qualified candidate well versed in continental politics. Moreover, her time 
spent as Foreign Minister entrenched the importance of peace in Africa and 
understanding the factors responsible for perpetuating violence. Although the election 
process was widely perceived as controversial, this should by no means devalue the 
quality of leadership Dlamini-Zuma has presented throughout her political career.  Next, 
the impact of her controversial AUC election will be discussed. 
5.1.4 Breaking the “Honour code” 
Herman (2005) argues that a political leadership assessment hinges on understanding 
the context in which leadership is occurring as well as the nature of relations between the 
leader and their followers. The candidacy of the former Chair and the threat it posed to 
African unity within the AU will be highlighted and elaborated upon. Hengari (2013: 




result of the election of South Africa’s Dlamini-Zuma. Nevertheless, her reputable record 
of effective governance resembled a refreshed commitment to effective leadership that 
the AU very much needed. Thus, making sense of the fractured unity among African 
states is key as it affected how the first female Chair was received at Addis. In short, 
Dlamini-Zuma entered AU offices when the continent was divided along regional and 
linguistic lines. Sanusha Naidu, a researcher from the Institute for Global Dialogue puts it 
this way: “Dlamini-Zuma entered Addis as a compromised individual and this did not serve 
her well at the AU” (Personal interview: 2020). In furtherance of this statement, she 
explained that Dlamini-Zuma lacked credibility in terms of securing regional backing from 
key countries within the AU. This is partly due to South Africa’s lack of commitment to the 
AU and its Africa first foreign policy under the Zuma presidency. Similar to the lost decade 
of African diplomacy, one is able to make the equivalent claim of a lost decade of South 
Africa in Africa. It is then important to ask the question: how useful and realistic was it for 
South Africa to send Dlamini-Zuma to AU Headquarters in Ethiopia? Dlamini-Zuma was 
not welcomed when she entered the AU offices and she herself was well aware of the 
need to mend fences and restore trust within AU member states. 
Kantai (2016:31) makes the case that Dlamini-Zuma was a party-person first and 
foremost which suggested that she acts based on ANC instruction. Based on interviews 
conducted for this study, it became evident that she was reluctant to contest the AUC 
position, however, if the party deemed it fit, she saw herself as having no choice. Further 
to this, Dlamini-Zuma’s reluctance was due to the fact that action on the part of South 
Africa and SADC would violate the AU’s unwritten belief that the big five states  (Algeria, 
Nigeria, Libya, Egypt and South Africa) not contest important decision-making positions 
within the AU to give smaller African counties a sense of inclusion and agency. Van 
Nieuwkerk (Personal interview: 2020) echoes that Dlamini-Zuma’s candidacy was in 
technical violation of this unwritten rule. Of significance is the timing of the decision to 
push for the candidacy of Dlamini-Zuma which coincided with the centenary celebrations 
of the ANC. Why the ANC government, which was renowned for unity and solidarity, 
embarked on such a divisive course of action by fielding one of their own for such an 




According to Landsberg (2016:255), “the talk of commitment to Pan-African supra-
national schemes notwithstanding, the Africa of the early 21st century is one in which 
leaders cling to narrow sovereignty and self-interests, and typically compete with each 
other instead of co-operating”. In other words, the political landscape as it relates to 
African states’ compliance and participation within IOs such as the AU is one where 
national interest continues to take precedence over continental interest, despite Pan-
African ideals. This decision had serious implications for unity on the continent. West 
Africa, known to have a strong hold on AU affairs, together with other economic players 
on the continent interpreted South Africa’s move as being nationalistic. Consequently, 
their diplomatic relationship with South Africa was adversely affected. One may see that 
the unspoken rule of African diplomacy was completely disregarded by South Africa and 
SADC which instead positioned the view that it was SADC’s turn to assume the AUC 
position. From this viewpoint, one assumes that the ANC moved her to Addis Ababa to 
both mute and isolate her thereby ensuring a discontinuance in the Zuma legacy. 
Munusamy, a journalist for the Sunday Times (2017) argues that “her nomination to serve 
as chairperson of the African Union Commission was a convenient way to get her off the 
domestic scene”. This perspective relates that President Zuma collaborated with other 
African countries and regions to ensure that Dlamini-Zuma’s bid for the AU post was 
successful. 
More pointedly, Dlamini-Zuma was later supported by most African countries even though 
her nomination was strongly opposed by Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda and Uganda, 
a group which interpreted Pretoria’s actions as a move from solidarity which historically 
promoted the representation of African interests by the continent’s less powerful countries 
(Nagar and Nganje, 2016:35). Therefore, the distribution of power within the AU must be 
understood if one is to understand the process of getting proposals passed and approved. 
Pretoria’s insistence on Dlamini-Zuma’s candidacy in essence shifted the tectonic plates 
upon which African diplomacy had anchored its unwritten rules of solidarity. Even in light 
of the abovementioned statement, Dlamini-Zuma was well aware of the work ahead of 
her and the need to cultivate a culture of unity within the AU and on the continent at large. 
Magadla (Personal interview: 2020) argues that Dlamini-Zuma’s nomination for the AUC 




personal involvement in the transformation of the OAU, and her commitment to not just 
black but Pan-African liberation on the continent. Perhaps South Africa’s lobbying and 
political bidding can be described as anti-Pan-Africanist but Dlamini-Zuma herself was a 
Pan-Africanist in her own right. Her closeness to the African Renaissance and 
commitment to its objectives reflected her awareness that Africa must unite to defeat its 
adversaries of poverty, inequality, injustice and both direct and indirect violence. Dlamini-
Zuma comes from a legacy of racial, class and gender exclusion which all served to shape 
her political beliefs and ideological preference of Black Consciousness which would later 
find expression in Mbeki’s African Renaissance. 
Like most elected positions, particularly at multilateral levels, the process of her election 
to the post of AU Chair was contentious. When she could not garner the two-third votes 
required to win the election in the first round, the election process went into the second 
round; a point in which voters were divided along Anglophone and Francophone Africa 
lines (Adetola, Personal interview: 2020). However, after she emerged the winner, she 
was able to pool the immense human and material resources of the AU to promote the 
AU Agenda. 
 Among issues which hamper the continent from speaking with a unified voice is the lack 
of reconciling opposing views and thus projecting an African response which is in 
harmony with itself and in accord with the decided African continental agenda. It is no 
surprise that in practice, the AU struggles to internalise its Pan-African commitments and 
verbal professions. Landsberg (2016:255) argues that “lack of leadership and 
implementation of, and compliance with that Agenda on the part of Africans, and 
undermining of the continent by the international community in general, and by Western 
powers in particular” add to the AU’s lack of agency and impact. The AU vision, Agenda 
2063, is indicative of an attempt to unite the continent under a common strategic vision 
to guide its conduct for 50 years. Notwithstanding questions of validity and relevance, 
Agenda 2063 is recognised as an output of good political leadership on the continent and 
at the least, an expression of Africa’s commitment to outcomes of positive peace. 




Before assessing the impact of gender on the political leadership assessment of Dlamini-
Zuma, it is vital to consult the leadership expectations of what the head of the AU 
Commission should be able to accomplish. This is necessary because an inflated 
perception regarding an individual leader’s ability to address years of problems 
compromises the integrity of an objective performance analysis. 
5.2 Normative prescriptions of what the leadership of the AUC Chair should look 
like 
Deya (2016:36) expounds that the Chairpersonship of the AUC should be occupied by a 
leader who is able to manage and predict change on the continent. If this discussion is 
being guided by the aforementioned statement, then it becomes apparent that the 
Commission Chair is, in Deya’s opinion, required to manage change whether short- 
medium- or long-term. Owing to the rise in non-state actors now convoluting the 
international system, it follows then that new challenges arise and existing protocol no 
longer offers appropriate governing instruments to monitor and/or regulate their 
behaviour. There is a constantly changing international environment which is plagued by 
non-territorial issues such as climate change, piracy and terrorism. These issues affect 
all states and must thus be tackled as a collective through platforms such as multilateral 
IOs. 
In the words of Deya (2016:36) the AUC needs a Commission Chair who is a “big picture 
thinker”. This type of a thinker can be absorbed under the distinction of visual leadership. 
It is imperative that the Chair realises that the challenges affecting the African continent 
are not Africa-centric but global in nature and seeing that their origin is global, their 
solutions must be global as well. Visionary leaders have an important grasp of continental 
challenges as well as how national, regional and international challenges intersect 
(Landsberg, 2016b:289). The Chair needs to be someone capable of identifying abusive 
practices, processes and systems such as the global trading system, for instance, and 
then mobilise support to address the issue and/or strategise a new way forward (Deya, 
2016:36). Included here, is the AUs relationship with the UN and the often secondary role 




to be made to rebalance the relationship between the AU and UN in order to have more 
productive engagements which yield tangible outcomes. 
The Chairperson role of the AUC must be occupied by an experienced bureaucrat. From 
a leadership perspective, this is understood as a functional leader. Any individual who 
assumes this secretariat position at the AU must be able to command the respect and 
attention of other actors such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), Organisation for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), European Union (EU) and other 
bilateral partners such as the US and China (Reinalda and Verbeek, 2013:38). Van 
Nieuwkerk (Personal interview: 2020) opines that the type of leadership needed within 
the AUC position must be a leader who is responsive to the needs of all African states 
despite their Anglophone and/or Francophone colonial orientations. This is because the 
leader must be able to build unity among African states but also be an astute coalition-
builder when it comes to the continent’s external relations (Van Nieuwkerk, Personal 
interview: 2020). Owing to the organisational make-up of the AU and its need to operate 
within a conflicted space between state-centrism and the drive towards multilateralism, 
the AUC Chair position demands a leader who is both familiar with national and regional 
dynamics and able to apply diplomacy in seeing its goals materialised (Naidu, Personal 
interview: 2020). Simply put, the position can be likened to that of a supranational 
ambassador and by comparison an equivalent to the UN Secretary-General. The Chair 
of the Commission must thus be an individual who is aware of the geopolitical and political 
architecture on the continent as well as being well versed in how political inclusion is 
managed between African states. Versatility is needed as the AUC position demands a 
skilful bureaucrat and diplomat who is able to navigate different spaces, endorse 
inclusivity and instil an appreciation of state sovereignty while operating under the banner 
of continental multilateralism. 
5.2.1 Assessing the impact of Dlamini-Zuma’s AUC leadership on the 
effectiveness of the Commission 
Hermann (2005) claims that despite the dedication of scholarship to national governments 
and leaders who are required to address various issues from budgets to the political 




Hence, mapping Dlamini-Zuma’s political leadership within the Commission will occupy 
the thematic focus of this section. Suffice it to say that there were high expectations 
regarding her ability to transform the AU into a serious and credible actor able to assert 
its agency in the international system. However, this must be measured within the 
parameters of the reality of African diplomacy. This is to say that AU member states’ ‘buy-
in’ and willingness to commit resources and competent personnel to the offices of the AU 
play a huge role in the organisation’s ability to attend to continental problems (Du Plessis, 
2017:67).     
 Of the main reasons put forward during Pretoria’s campaign was that Dlamini-Zuma was 
an institutional leader whose effectiveness knew no limits. Louw-Vaudran (2016) states 
that the Commission was plagued by bureaucratic inefficiency and a lack of 
implementation capacity. Because of this assumption forming part of her election 
success, the changes she instituted will be identified in an effort to determine whether 
they were effective or not. Areas of analysis include: AU funding, overreliance on Western 
donors and AU summitry to name a few. Notwithstanding what a powerful and effective 
institutional leader she may be, and what the standing of her credentials are, it was no 
simple task to lead a continental organisation. However, Dlamini-Zuma had no illusions 
of the work ahead of her.   
There is danger in over-estimating an individual leader’s ability to transform an 
organisation beset with an implementation crisis. The added expectation of being flawless 
and impenetrable to corruption exposes women leaders to more scrutiny that male 
leaders when they fail to live up to these unrealistic expectations. The tendency to blame 
an individual political leader for an organisational inability and/or failure must begin to 
appreciate other factors such as the setting and the nature of leader and follower relations 
before executing judgement. This is why chapter two made a point to emphasise the 
insight gained as a result of marrying gender and political leadership to facilitate 
understanding regarding the treatment of women political leaders. 
5.2.2 The financial autonomy of the AU  
Unfortunately, as long as one discusses challenges to the AU being able to deliver on its 




lurking in the shadows. The AU must thus navigate the terrain of depending on former 
colonial entities for both human and financial resources to fund its peace architecture. 
This represents an obvious contradiction of its ‘African solutions to African problems’ 
embedded in the formation and its motivation for the conduct of AU decision-making 
(Zondi, 2017:115). The conceptual foundation upon which the AU was established sought 
its inspiration from the African Renaissance vision advanced by South Africa’s Mbeki. 
African Renaissance spoke of re-interpretation of African history, a cultural and 
intellectual revolution which put Africa at the forefront of controlling its own destiny. By 
having limited choices in terms of funding, the AU defers its responsibility to ensure the 
maintenance of peace and security to external actors. What is problematic is that these 
Western and European powers are able to dictate the terms, conditions and plan of action 
in resolving and managing the conflict. This stands in sharp contrast to the AU’s drive to 
be self-reliant. Zondi (2017:115) expands that lack of AU member states’ financial 
contribution to the AU compounded by the organisation’s inability to fund its peace 
processes adversely affects the “second decolonization of Africa”. Hence, an identifiable 
lag in the complete liberation of African states. Zondi goes further to say the AU’s 
acceptance of EU generosity in funding peace efforts compromises the sustainability and 
sovereignty of the organisation’s peace architecture. 
Dlamini-Zuma’s record of rendering underperforming organs effective and efficient is 
evident in her fight for the financial autonomy of the AU. For this reason, she received 
both disdain and support as her efforts to maintain an African interest-driven AU were 
now recognised and valued. If one delves into Dlamini-Zuma’s political history and beliefs, 
it becomes apparent that she vehemently opposes historical events such as colonisation 
and was thus careful in her engagements with external partners so as to not compromise 
the integrity of the Pan-Africanist AU agenda. To her credit, she managed to ensure that, 
in 2016, only US$200 million of the AU’s overall US$782 million budget came from 
member contributions (Lalbahadur, 2017). This establishes Dlamini-Zuma’s leadership 
competencies and protective nature of the AU and the integrity of its agenda. Another 
persistent hindrance to AU effectiveness is the challenge of funding. Many AU member 
states are either struggling or unwilling to pay their dues which restricts the organisation’s 




is also heavily dependent on the financial contributions of Northern African countries as 
well as oil-producing countries, which at times indirectly allows these states a greater 
opportunity to dictate AU affairs. It is no surprise that great opportunity accompanies the 
financial autonomy of any institution. The beneficiation of an institution’s financial 
autonomy affords the group greater decision-making power, control of its own agenda 
and increased responsiveness to address challenges from any sector. Key to this 
analysis, is AU responsiveness to peace and security challenges on the continent. 
Lalbahadur (2017) contends that to ensure the AU’s ability to deliver on the objectives 
present in the continent’s adopted development plan, Agenda 2063 together with the UN’s 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), financial autonomy is a key ingredient.  
 To bear testimony to Dlamini-Zuma’s proficiency in institutional leadership, it is a credit 
to her that she managed to transform summit diplomacy within the AU (Deya, 2016:30). 
Here she ensured that heads of state stuck to time allocations when delivering speeches 
and made sure events were conducted with the highest degree of professionalism. 
Further, she also introduced measures which curbed external donor involvement in all of 
the AU’s summit activity so as to ensure that AU interests would not be interrupted by 
external meddling. Du Plessis (2017:9) states that Dlamini-Zuma restricted the access of 
non-African delegates from joining mid-year summits. This was not a favourable decision 
in the eyes of some delegates as the AU relied on Western donors to finance its agenda.  
Moreover, Dlamini-Zuma was reported to have said “South Africa must cough up the 
commission’s cost, you put me here, you must look after me” quoted in Du Plessis (2017: 
103). The implications were Dlamini-Zuma also established the AUF premised on 
monetary donations provided by the continent’s high net worth individuals. Most notably, 
Dlamini-Zuma was said to have elevated the stature of the AUC position in which she 
resembled a head of state, according to a Nigerian diplomat based in Addis (Kantai, 
2016:33). 
Within a team setting such as the AUC it is important to maintain strong leader-follower 
relations. Based on interviews, it was revealed that some co-workers and staff members 
in Addis Ababa often described Dlamini-Zuma as a micro-manager and hard worker 




micro-manager title because she streamlined travel and other processes to ensure the 
AU cut costs of non-essential matters. This meant that all travel requests had to be 
approved by her first. Further AU bureaucratic make-up made it difficult to fire 
incompetent staff at the AU. South African staffers in top positions at the AU created the 
narrative that Dlamini-Zuma mistrusted AU civil servants from other African states (Du 
Plessis, 2017:80).  
Although overwhelming accounts support the first female Chairperson being a hard 
worker and being a person of integrity, her personal style lacked the charisma and charm 
it needed to be painted in a favourable light by the media as well as in other quarters 
(Tikum, 2016: para. 5). She came under much scrutiny for not smiling and exemplifying 
behaviour of a candid international diplomat and the face of Africa’s premier continental 
body. The abovementioned prescribed standards of behaviour of women leaders speaks 
to gendered understandings of how women are expected to behave (Cohn, 2004:18). 
Hence, the risk of typifying women leaders as more agreeable and peaceful than men 
because of their socialised identities is a dangerous and unfruitful practice. Feminist 
critique of this type of rhetoric is particularly useful in unpacking the danger associated 
with the idea that women are endowed with special peacemaking skills able to transform 
conflict realities and ineffective institutions. It is for this reason that the leadership 
assessment criteria first and foremost, considers the impact of beliefs and the recruitment 
process before measuring leadership on a gender informed basis.  
5.2.3 Exploring the impact of gender on political leadership in the case of Dlamini-
Zuma as AUC Chair 
 
This section will consider the impact of gender on political leadership throughout Dlamini-
Zuma’s political career, however, her tenure as AUC Chair will occupy the majority of the 
analysis to follow. Chapter two highlighted that gender offers unique insight into the 
election and treatment of women political leaders.  
Secondary research question three considers the impact of gender on the political 
leadership assessment of Dlamini-Zuma as AUC Chair. Gender and political leadership 




organisational spaces. What is significant in this case is that these dynamics play out in 
Dlamini-Zuma’s victory campaign as well as throughout her term. To provide an accurate 
account of this subject matter, the intersection of women and political leadership will be 
explored at national, regional and AU levels. Domestically, despite Dlamini-Zuma’s initial 
hesitancy to avail herself for the AUC job, it must be noted that she herself was a 
“reluctant redeemer” (Landsberg and Orderson, 2017:6). Based on this, one may assume 
that Dlamini-Zuma had alternate priorities and perhaps even predetermined the divisive 
nature of her candidacy at a time when the continent was recovering from the crisis in 
Libya, among other factors. Using this perspective infers that Dlamini-Zuma has and 
always will be a willing servant to the ANC, even if this goes against her personal 
convictions.   
Journalists referred to her as ‘Godzuma’, in remembrance of the monster Godzilla who 
was infamously known for leaving destruction in its wake (BBC News, 1999).  It must be 
noted that on more than one occasion, Dlamini-Zuma has been mistreated and 
misrepresented by the South African and international media. An incident which comes 
to mind is South Africa’s broadcaster which referred to her as former President Jacob 
Zuma’s ex-wife instead of using her own name. In response, the SABC CEO Nomsa 
Philoso, said that these mistakes were “sexist and wrong” (BBC News, 2017). Indeed, 
one may see that these seemingly casual linguistic and phraseology mishaps 
depersonalise her own political credentials. By reducing her to the title of former ex-wife, 
deliberately negates her own political will, leadership and her right to be treated fairly and 
justly without invoking the association to her ex-husband at every turn. 
As Foreign Affairs minister, it is rehashed that Dlamini-Zuma approached her new 
portfolio with the same brusque, abrasive management style reflected during her time as 
Minister of Health (Du Plessis, 2017:38). Similarities were drawn between the ANC’s loyal 
servant, Dlamini-Zuma and Madeline Albright, who hailed from the US, as a firm woman 
Secretary of State. The so-called shared traits among these women leaders being that 
they were seen as “stubborn, arrogant” and having “blunt decisiveness” (Du Plessis, 
2017:38). What stands out as a problematic observation regarding the abovementioned 




various leadership positions. By extension, this speaks to women having to assume so-
called male characteristics such as assertiveness and strength to be taken seriously (Mar 
et al, 2009:408). Owing to diplomacy’s close ties to charismatic leadership, Dlamini-
Zuma’s perceived lack of approachability, energy and charisma should have disqualified 
her from occupying such an important position. It must be noted that she was fiercely 
critiqued for being chosen; as in the opinion of her detractors, diplomacy had not been 
her forte. She made a point of informing reporters of the distinction between diplomacy 
and decisiveness, thus highlighting her proficiency in both. Further, her seeming lack of 
charisma dampened the spirit of a candidate who was to assume a role which very much 
values personality and approachability. That being said, Dlamini-Zuma nonetheless went 
on to become Foreign Minister and later head of the Commission. From this one may see 
the relevance in using gender as an additional lens to understand the expectations and 
treatment of women in political leadership positions. 
5.2.4 Assessing the impact of gender on leader and follower relations  
Dlamini-Zuma reportedly had so-called hostile relations with major states within the AU 
who vehemently disapproved of her candidacy. This plays into the narrative that she was 
already limited in her ability to affect change and attitudes as she lacked the backing of 
key states and was also indebted to many African countries who sacrificed political favour 
by voting for her (Landsberg and Orderson, 2017:5). On the score of entering a politically 
volatile space where the AU and the continent was so divided, Dlamini-Zuma, despite her 
extensive political pedigree was not perceived as a leader who could play the role of AUC 
Chair (Naidu, Personal interview: 2020).   
Multilateral organisations function differently to other Non-state Actors (NSAs) based on 
their criteria for membership, scope and mandate. Key to effective multilateral 
organisations is to acquire the ‘know-how’, in terms of lobbying, negotiation and how to 
engage critical issues to garner necessary support. The position of AUC Chair is, in 
simplistic terms, a very complex and demanding job. The AU is a politically-loaded 
organisation consisting of 55 member states who each reserve the right to protect their 
sovereign equality and national interest (Van Nieuwkerk, Personal interview: 2020). 




your proposals to be approved was a great challenge for Dlamini-Zuma (Naidu, Personal 
interview: 2020). 
Du Plessis (2017: 34-49) and Landsberg (2016:255) contend that Dlamini-Zuma was 
good at executing tasks under her respective domestic portfolios as Health and Home 
Affairs Minister. Her proficiency can be summed up as being an efficient manager of 
structural conditions in South Africa whose tireless efforts aided institutional reform in 
underperforming ministries, bar the Sarafina scandal (Adebajo, Personal interview: 
2020). The Sarafina scandal of 1996 involved Dlamini-Zuma’s allocation of R14 million 
from her budget to an anti-AIDS play by a close associate, Mbogeni Ngema. Another 
aspect of this narrative is the “check book diplomacy where the plan was to remove her 
from the political equation in South Africa and within the ANC” (Naidu, Personal interview: 
2020).  
According to Naidu (Personal interview: 2020), just because the AU inaugurated its first 
female Commission Chair does not dismiss the ‘Big Man’ syndrome which for many years 
dominated the mind-sets and beliefs of AU leaders and their member states. The 
recruitment process together with the patriarchal history of the AU was indicative of the 
existence of archaic value systems and patterns of thinking which disqualified women 
leaders from operating within spaces as complex as that of the multilateral AU. Dlamini-
Zuma’s election to the AUC Chair was not going to instigate an automatic shift in norms 
and beliefs, especially concerning the understated leadership role of women in AU affairs. 
Contrary to this perspective, an official from the AU stated that South Africa’s aggressive 
lobbying for the AUC position limited Dlamini-Zuma’s ability to exercise effective political 
leadership within the AU and not because she was a woman (Rukato, Personal interview: 
2020). Dlamini-Zuma, did, however, make headway in terms of gender development, 
gender parity and the WPS agenda. Recognition must be given to the steps taken by 
Dlamini-Zuma to advocate for vulnerable groups, specifically looking at women and 
children; which will be expounded on in section four. 
Officially, the gender issue was also advanced as a reason behind the decision; per a 
report in the then new DIRCO publication, The Diplomat, Vol. 6 of 2012, “her election 




the resolution to declare the decade between 2010 and 2020 the Decade of Women”. 
This study argues that the gender prerogative was not the major rationale behind her 
candidacy. Instead, as stated earlier, the internal and external rationale of South Africa in 
pushing Dlamini-Zuma’s candidacy goes beyond its goal to “make good” on its 
commitment to its protocol on gender.  When surveying the content of Dlamini-Zuma’s 
acceptance speech in Addis Ababa, she boldly declared that her appointment served as 
a victory for women in general but for the continent at large. In her speech she even 
echoed the famously-stated cosmopolitan phrase “we made it” (Dlamini-Zuma, 2012:3). 
She later informed the public that her election was based on qualities she possessed and 
they found it in a woman not because of a shortage of women but because of their 
invisibility. Similarly, in a speech made shortly after her election while in Pretoria she 
informed the audience of the status of African women who had held important leadership 
roles in the pre-colonial era (Du Plessis, 2017:67). 
 Sudarkasa (1986:91) clarifies that in pre-colonial times women occupied so-called ‘high 
places’ and by extension describes them as queens, princesses, occasional warriors, 
chiefs and the famously known case of the Lovedu supreme monarch. By extension, she 
shattered the glass ceiling and actively paved the way for the entrance of more female 
political leaders. It is clear that Dlamini-Zuma publicised her stance towards women’s 
issues, however, it is important to establish what steps she took and measures she 
instituted to actively address these issues. Seeing that South Africa is chairing the 
continental organisation in 2020, it is important to look back at what was done to improve 
the lives of women during Dlamini-Zuma’s term especially in relation to WPS. Gender 
was advanced by both Pretoria and SADC as one of the important reasons for promoting 
Dlamini-Zuma’s candidacy effectively making her the first female head of the AUC which 
had largely been dominated by male political leaders. Notwithstanding her qualifications, 
her track record in terms of revolutionising underperforming institutions was among the 
chief features which caught the AU’s attention too.  
The institutionalist approach to understanding political leadership maintains the view that 
institutions exist independent of actors (Elgie, 2018:46). They operate according to the 




Therefore, normative mechanisms can regulate institutional behaviour. If pre-existing 
norms of an institution include patriarchy, ‘Big Man’ syndrome or sexism, then it means 
that these beliefs have been legitimised within the institutional fabric of the organisation. 
Concerning women’s representation in these institutions then, an increase in women 
parliamentarians around the world, even though current parliaments are male-dominated, 
does not mean that women enter these spaces with specific priorities based exclusively 
on their socialised experience of being women. Hence, women can feel obligated to act 
in a certain manner that is common to that institution (Elgie, 2018:49). 
Any analysis of women’s leadership must be careful of assuming that certain traits and/or 
behaviours are common to women because of their gender. Saad (2004: 596) notes that 
sexual differences between males and females must not be discarded in understanding 
human behaviour. Hence, it would be more legitimate to consider sexual difference 
alongside socialization to determine human individuality. The notion that women enter the 
workplace, political office and high-portfolio institutions based on special qualities 
endowed to them only is an unfair assumption used to hold them accountable to 
championing specific women-centric priorities a male leader would not pursue (Magadla 
and Makhunga, 2014: para. 4). Because some institutions, since inception have excluded 
women; it sometimes follows that women would try to undo this by attempting to increase 
the participation of women in these fields. A better question to ask is thus, what is the 
extent to which a leader is able to transform the institutional culture of an organisation? If 
the institution itself does not allow for transformation, then it does not matter who the 
leader occupying the Chair position is. Assimilation without transformation remains a key 
stumbling block to institutions as long as the above approach is relied upon. Despite 
political will and quality leadership, if institutions are not permitting change it does not 
matter who occupies important leadership positions (Magadla, Personal interview: 2020); 
50 years of the same institutional culture is not going to be undone by one four-year 
tenure. 
Section three 
By and large, most analysis of IOs emphasise the role and impact of structural conditions 




agenda. In light of this deficit, section three investigates the proposition that an individual 
leader’s actions matter in understanding organisational outcomes, especially in the 
context of peace and security. 
5.3 Making sense of the peace and security landscape in Africa  
According to De Waal (2016:30), instead of focusing on who occupies office at the AU 
and AUC in particular, concentration should be on what must be done in the office. When 
evaluating AU protocol, organs and architecture it is evident that the body has high 
expectations for its role on the continent; however, whether it possesses the capacity to 
fulfil these aspirations is the question. De Waal remains adamant that to advance the 
position the AU must prioritise its “politics of peace”. This not only refers to how all peace 
processes are conducted but also touches on the political legitimacy and financial 
capability needed for Africa to sufficiently address issues pertaining to peace and security.  
Owing to Africa’s violent and oppressive history, it is no surprise that the continent is 
plagued by violent conflict today. Dlamini-Zuma’s four-year tenure, for instance, 
witnessed African states including Sudan, Darfur, Somalia, Mali, the Great Lakes region, 
among several others being engaged in long-standing conflicts (Du Plessis, 2017:71). It 
is acknowledged that one individual cannot be attributed the blame for protracted crises 
in Africa especially if they were inherited from the previous Commission Chair, Jean Ping. 
However, room must be made to analyse attempts towards conflict resolution and 
implementation of existing AU protocol in response to these challenges. The security 
situation in Africa is further exacerbated by the overwhelming number of UN 
peacekeeping missions in Africa. According to a prominent researcher in the field, as long 
as Africa hosts the majority of UN peacekeepers, peace and security will continue to be 
a vitally important area under the care and supervision of the AUC’s Chairperson 
(Adebajo, Personal interview, 2020). Hence, secondary research question two reads: to 
what degree was Dlamini-Zuma, as AUC Chair able to shape the AU’s peace and security 
agenda? 
A decade after the establishment of the AU, there was a considerable reduction in wars 
and coups on the continent while a simultaneous increase in democracy within African 




the adoption of impressive principles embedded in the Constitutive Act and other 
documents which explicitly expressed the AU’s commitment to non-indifference. Based 
on this new doctrine, which allowed for the AU to intervene in the internal affairs of 
member states as informed by Article 4h, it became clear that the organisation was 
seriously committed to seeing its vision of a peaceful and stable Africa materialise. The 
AU rejects unconstitutional changes of government and supports democratic principles 
and the democratisation processes across the continent (AU Constitutive Act 2000: 
Article 4p). Discussed earlier, the AU and specifically the PSC has progressive 
procedures in place enabling the body to effectively address conflict prevention, 
management and resolution. Almost any threat of armed conflict or political crisis is 
present in AU policy and PSC agreements (De Waal, 2016:31). In agreement with Nagar 
and Nganje (2016:28), de Waal argues that implementation is the core challenge. 
 The AU declared 2016 as the year of Human Rights and more significantly, the year of 
Women’s Rights. It must be made clear that first and foremost the primary responsibility 
for the protection and advancement of human rights rests with the government before a 
portion of the responsibility is delegated to RECs or the AU. It is important to note that 
until the 1960s, Africans’ rights were not recognised due to colonial oppression and in this 
way became what motivated their struggle for independence. In other words, political 
independence in Africa was driven by the need to secure for Africans human rights and 
“the full spectrum of rights including security, employment, education, justice, freedom 
and health” (Versi, 2016:26). Nagar and Nganje (2016:32) point out that each new Chair 
comes with their own priorities and their agendas have not exceeded a single four-year 
term, thus leaving the AU without a continuity in purpose. Dlamini-Zuma’s term falls prey 
to this observation, however, it is important to study which issues she did advocate for to 
discern whether links exist between women’s political leadership and the propensity to 
produce peace. 
5.3.2 How Dlamini-Zuma shaped the Peace and Security Agenda of the AU  
The contribution of women in the field of international development among others 
abounds, however, this is not applicable in the peace and security sector (O’Reilly et al, 




decision-making in peace and security, practical change has been slow to follow. The 
dominant perspective in today’s literature seldom goes further than acknowledging the 
varying impact conflict has on vulnerable communities, to exploring the leadership role of 
women in the peace and security domain. Section three addresses this information deficit 
by examining the impact of Dlamini-Zuma’s political beliefs and values on the peace and 
security issues she prioritised as Commission Chair.  
Because she was the first female Chairperson of the Commission, it remains important 
to assess her in the light of being a competent decision-maker, strategist and/or 
implementer of policy and protocol in support of maintaining peace on the continent. 
Scholars seldom ask the question of what the purpose of leadership is beyond the search 
for effectiveness, thus this study aims to locate potential links between political beliefs 
and the prioritisation of peace and security challenges. According to Adekeye Adebajo, 
any Commission Chairperson of the AU must take seriously the task of peace and security 
in Africa (Personal interview: 2020). Although many functions are absorbed under the 
Chairperson and Commission’s portfolio at large, the Chair has a vital role to play in 
creating conditions for lasting peace. Despite the often narrowly narrated conception of 
peace as merely the opposite to war, positive peace lends a deeper perspective in terms 
of the different manifestations of peace which do not obsessively cling to a lack of armed 
violence (Kikkawa, 2009:283).  
According to Rukato (2018:44), the AU’s agenda is dictated by the Chairperson. Munroe 
(2006:22) adds that whatever your priority, its impact will become your reality. Evaluating 
the areas which she addressed with practical action could thus be an indication of the 
issues she deemed most important. Nagar and Nganje (2016:37) contend that identified 
priorities according to Dlamini-Zuma emphasise women and vulnerable groups, greater 
African funding, reduction of donor dependency, and a strategy to coordinate with 
external players such as China and the EU at the continental level. Among the peace and 
security issues Dlamini-Zuma focused on during her tenure are: UCG; lack of women’s 
inclusion in peace processes; child marriage; poverty and inclusive development. It must 




and Ebola crisis) were present during Dlamini-Zuma’s tenure, however, the issues 
highlighted above will be considered in this analysis.  
According to Dlamini-Zuma (2015:4), “even when we have silenced the guns conflict will 
continue to happen but the difference is that they must be managed in a nonviolent way”. 
What became abundantly clear in Dlamini-Zuma’s speech made at the Africa Peace 
Awards was her conception and articulation of the concept and practice of peace in Africa. 
To her, peace embodied much more than simply conflict resolution and management 
techniques but went beyond this to explore prospects of development. Based on Dlamini-
Zuma’s interpretation of peace, it is evident that her associated understanding speaks 
more specifically to the manifestations of positive peace in society which at the most 
fundamental level involves working towards goals in the absence of armed conflict. She 
contends that “for peace to be achieved we cannot only look at conflict resolution and its 
architecture but we also have to look at development”. Dlamini- Zuma’s response to the 
aforementioned peace and security challenges are presented below to determine whether 
her response matched her pro-African and peace-development lexicon. It will be 
determined whether she acted in accordance with her professed philosophy on peace by 
prioritising certain issues as it relates to the AU’s security landscape. 
Table 1: Summary of Dlamini-Zuma’s political beliefs used to inform her priorities 
as witnessed in her previously held leadership positions 
Political beliefs Values  Position  
Black Consciousness Mental emancipation; 
unity; solidarity; 
restoration of black 
identity; education as 
empowerment 
Vice President of SASO 
(1976)  
African Renaissance African dignity; 
restoration of black 
identity; re-
interpretation of African 
history; unity; 
Championed this vision as FA 







Pan-Africanism   Solidarity; self-reliance; 
self-sufficiency; unity; 
dignity. Political, 
economic and cultural 
unity via regional 
integration.  
African Union Commission 
Chairperson (2012) 




equality; and women’s 
liberation. 
Championed this vision as 
Minister of Health in South 
Africa (1994) as well as AUC  
Chairperson (2012). 
Positive Peace  Non-violence; human 
rights; recognition of 
peace and development 
as inextricably linked; 
social justice issues; 
root causes of conflict. 
Preference for dialogue 
and inclusion of 
marginalised groups. 
Championed this vision as 
African Union Commission 
Chairperson (2012) creation 
of Agenda 2063 speaks to the 
accomplishment of these 
goals.  
 
Van Dijk (1997:17) elaborates that political discourse analysis is particularly helpful in 
discovering a leader’s priorities. Focus should be on the amount and nature of the 
information shared by the leader. Questions pertaining to the classification of words, 
content sensitivity, all help to establish a narrative regarding a leader’s decision-making 
ability and political behaviour in office. Based on Dlamini-Zuma’s political beliefs, Table 
one captures the dominance of liberation in all its forms, present in the ideologies which 




African Renaissance vision and Pan-Africanism is restoring the dignity of African peoples, 
reclaiming the black narrative and entrenching a respect for human rights. At the root of 
all indignity is poverty and to address the common challenges faced by most African 
states, social, economic and political unity must be a collectively pursued agenda.   
This study sought to identify whether individual leadership of an IO executive leads to 
organisational outcomes in the context of peace and security. The case study used to 
illustrate these dynamics was Dlamini-Zuma’s term as Chair of the AUC. There are many 
fascinating aspects to explore, including the nature of her appointment, South Africa’s 
persistent lobbying, SADC’s regional backing, and the victory of the first woman AUC 
Chair. In Dlamini-Zuma, you have a leader who has an extensive record of performance 
within institutions where her focus has been professionalising them as well as making 
these spaces accommodating of gender. Thus, she leaves traces of her priorities in all 
the ministerial positions she has held in South Africa. The analysis to follow will seek to 
reveal her prioritisation of issues as well as her response to them in an effort to determine 
the impact of her leadership on outcomes of peace. 
Section four  
5.4 The role of political leadership in producing outcomes of peace 
A common misconception when evaluating political discourse analysis is that the recipient 
and/or object of analysis is the political leader alone. The concentration is on the text and 
talk of individuals in formal positions of leadership. In general, discourse analysis focuses 
on the way in which language is used in both texts and contexts. Van Dijk (1997:20) 
argues that this data analysis tool examines language used to communicate a specific 
idea, urgency and perspective. It is therefore particularly useful in qualitative studies 
which study a political leader’s beliefs, values and speeches to determine their approach 
and understanding of problems.  
The main research question reads as follows: To what extent did Nkosazana Dlamini-
Zuma's political leadership at the AUC lead to positive peace outcomes for Africa?  In 
answering this question, section one commenced by unpacking Dlamini-Zuma’s political 




and actions have been governed by political ideologies intent on achieving liberation. For 
instance, her intimate acquaintance with Black Consciousness, then African Renaissance 
and Pan-Africanism all emphasise the centrality of African liberation and the need for 
unity. Feminism also stands out as in identifiable political priority to Dlamini-Zuma. The 
liberation of women, gender equality, their health, rights, inclusion, and representation 
are consistent priorities pursued by the former Chairperson. Positive peace emerges as 
a priority as witnessed during Dlamini-Zuma’s AUC tenure. In this sense, positive peace 
refers to human rights issues as well as an understanding of peace and development as 
inextricably linked.  Moreover, Table one bears testimony to the shared political goals, 
values and visions implicit in Dlamini-Zuma’s political belief system. Even though section 
two explained the controversial nature of Dlamini-Zuma’s AUC appointment, she was 
more than qualified to assume the AUC Chair position. Her exposure to the continent’s 
security dynamics as Foreign Minister in South Africa as well as her diplomatic 
involvement in the transition of the OAU to the AU meant that she understood AU politics 
and its intended role in advancing peace on the continent.  
 Now that one understands Dlamini-Zuma’s political beliefs, the impact of her recruitment 
process, as well as the impact of gender on her leadership performance as Chair, section 
four discusses her response to positive peace challenges introduced in chapter four. 
Another focal area of this chapter is to highlight the AU objectives and principles which 
inform the institution’s response to the calamities studied below. By mentioning the 
protocols which speak to peace and security under the auspice of the AUC Chair as well 
as her joint powers with the PSC, one is able to determine whether she was empowered 
to produce peace. Essential to political leadership is the need to implement goals and 
visions and protocols (Elgie, 2015:65). The AUC Chair position is not only the custodian 
of the Constitutive Act, but must promote cooperation with other entities. An understudied 
aspect is its role in advancing the AU’s peace architecture through the exercise of its joint 
powers with the PSC. Included in the list below are challenges to positive peace. Dlamini-
Zuma’s leadership will be assessed on the basis of her response to the challenges 
mentioned below. Imperative to this analysis is locating whether she implemented the 
relevant AU protocol to address the challenges to positive peace. Based on Article 7 of 




promote African peace, stability and security, anticipate and prevent conflict, promote and 
implement peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction activities, and promote 
democratic practices, good governance, the rule of law, protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms, among other things (Badmus, 2015:97). The success of this 
analysis is dependent on explaining her action and/or inaction to positive peace 
challenges from the perspective of political leadership. In sum, her articulation of the 
problem, proposed solution and implementation of AU objectives and protocol in 
response to the impediments to continental peace below will enable the researcher to 
answer to what extent Dlamini-Zuma’s AUC leadership led to outcomes of positive peace.  
5.4.1 Poverty and inclusive development  
As long as poverty and injustice persist, sustainable peace will evade African states, 
according to Dlamini-Zuma. Moreover, the former Chair holds firm to the belief that self-
sufficiency is the root of economic principle. Africans must utilise continental resources 
for the inclusive growth and prosperity of all. For inclusive socio-economic transformation 
to be realised, women must be involved and prioritised at all levels and in “all areas of 
human endeavour including peacekeeping, conflict resolution and post conflict 
reconstruction and development” (Dlamini-Zuma, 2015:6). Importantly, the wealth gap 
must be reduced in Africa as research shows that a larger wealth gap is more susceptible 
to violence and crime. Peace will be elusive to Africa in a  global context where the top 
10 percent of the wealthiest own 86 per cent of the world’s wealth, while the bottom 50 
per cent own only 1 per cent of the world’s wealth.  Peace and development will be a 
fleeting illusion as long as half the population lives on less than US$2 a day. In light of 
this, continental efforts must be driven towards unleashing creativity, energy and talent of 
every individual so that they can reach their full potential.  This means we must create 
space for everyone including the poor to also benefit from the positive aspects of 
globalisation. Again Dlamini-Zuma (2015:6) singles out poverty and injustice as opposing 
factors towards the development of a peaceful Africa.  
The creation of a continental vision, Agenda 2063, formally launched in 2014, bears 
testimony to the much-needed strategic vision offered by Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma in 




and vision for not only the Commission but for the continent at large. It is aimed at creating 
“an integrated, prosperous and peaceful Africa, driven by its own citizens and 
representing a dynamic force in the global arena” by the year 2063. At its core, Agenda 
2063 emphasises the importance of fairness, inclusivity and transformation at the centre 
of continental affairs (Braude, 2015: para.4). In general, the development of a 50-year 
continental vision came under much criticism by African scholars, in particular. The 
dominant critiques point towards an overwhelming normative commitment to principles 
and protocols, however, the AUs problems lie in implementation (Adebajo, Personal 
interview: 2020). In its totality, Agenda 2063 merges Pan-Africanism and the promotion 
of continental integration. Dlamini-Zuma was strongly invested in Africa “claiming the 
twenty-first century as the African century”, and that under her leadership, “Africa will 
promote peace, security, governance, and economic development”. These are not new 
goals; African leaders have prioritized these goals since the end of the Cold War.  
 Agenda 2063 comprises of a developmental approach to matters of peace and security. 
It also advocates for the programme, ‘Silencing the Guns’ by 2020, advanced by 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. It is 2020 and thus the opportune time to evaluate AU progress 
in moving towards a peaceful Africa. Du Plessis (2017: 69) states that Silencing the Guns 
by 2020 was a mantra consistently repeated by Dlamini-Zuma during her term at the AU. 
It forms part of the larger Agenda 2063 vision. Despite this, there is much contest 
concerning Dlamini-Zuma’s lack of urgency in dealing with threats to peace and security; 
however, other accounts suggest that in retrospect she seemed to offer lasting solutions. 
Du Plessis’ (2017: 69) analysis of Dlamini-Zuma’s performance as AUC Chair describes 
that her strategy for addressing conflict was informed by a developmental approach. As 
stated earlier, peace cannot be sustainable unless approached from a developmental 
perspective. She was very vocal concerning issues such as marginalisation, inclusion and 
the proper management of diversity. At the US-Africa Leader’s Summit held in 
Washington DC in 2014 she candidly expressed her concern for the vastness of conflicts 
in Africa. This important takeaway point suggested closer cooperation between Africa and 





5.4.2 Women’s rights  
Dlamini-Zuma has never been modest concerning her advocacy for the advancement of 
women’s rights and empowerment not only in South Africa but on the continent at large. 
Throughout her political career within the ANC, she was very vocal concerning women’s 
struggles and the need to resist being overpowered by men. Louw-Vaudran (2017) 
comments that for “two years in a row, the AU theme, discussed at its bi-annual summits, 
focused on women and this did not please everyone”. The prioritisation of women’s rights 
and gender mainstreaming on the part of the former AUC Chair, is by no means a new 
phenomenon. This particular trend is a recurring feature which can be traced back to her 
political career history in South Africa. In her portfolio as Minister of Health under Nelson 
Mandela’s presidency, she relentlessly pursued women’s health by managing to “sway 
Mbeki to increase the availability of anti-retrovirals (ARVs) to both rape victims and HIV-
positive pregnant mothers” (Du Plessis, 2017:34). Thus, following Zuma’s ascension to 
the presidency, the government distributed AIDS medication more widely which 
enhanced life expectancy by 10 years. Her passion for women’s issues to occupy focus 
on the national agenda of South Africa was soon on both SADC and the AU’s radar. 
According to du Plessis (2017:80), Dlamini-Zuma entered AU offices at a time when the 
organisation itself was male-dominated, however, she was able to maintain her position 
when “AU rules were clear but hesitated when the situation was more problematic”. Her 
political opinions failed to transcribe into practical implementation able to influence 
political situations on the continent. Despite Dlamini-Zuma’s predilection for women’s 
empowerment and recognition of rights, the Constitutive Act of the AU informs that the 
Commission is responsible for the mainstreaming of gender in all programmes of the 
Union (Rukato, 2018:129). From a leadership point of view, her inclusion of women in the 
AU’s leadership reveals her commitment to positive peace.  
To further this agenda, she not only fought for women to assume more decision-making 
positions within the organisation itself but also stayed faithful to the advocacy of projects 
which enhanced the ordinary lives of women across the continent. The most frequently 
asked question by the AUC Chairperson when meeting an African president, was whether 
there was adequate female representation within their government. She also pushed for 




Potgieter-Gqubule maintained the view that women’s access to political power and 
representation was the main driver of Dlamini-Zuma’s tenure at the AU (Du Plessis, 
2017:86). An expression of Dlamini-Zuma as a functional leader is evident in that she 
successfully introduced a scorecard system which set out to monitor member states’ 
progress in terms of hiring women (Du Plessis, 2017:85). It must be noted that she indeed 
received backlash for her insistence on hiring women even if they were not necessarily 
the best personnel available for the job. This was perceived to adversely impact the 
success of the Commission and AU itself. Dlamini-Zuma was quick to defend her stance 
on the representation of women in decision-making positions and went on to add that she 
selected the best women candidates presented to her. Also, she refused to consider 
shortlisted candidates unless women featured on the ballot (Du Plessis, 2017:85).  
No AUC Chairperson has brought the issues of youth and women empowerment to the 
forefront of continental discussion like Dlamini-Zuma (Tikum, 2016: para.6). From 
declaring 2015 as the Year of Women’s Rights to the declaration of 2017 as the Year of 
Investment in Youths, she has galvanised the continent and forced heads of states to 
consider women and youth policy issues as fundamental to achieving the African 
transformation agenda. On women’s issues, her greatest legacy will be the establishment 
of gender parity at the AUC level ensuring that there are five men and women each as 
Commissioners (Louw-Vaudran, 2017). Even in appointments of staff, she ensured the 
appointment of highly-qualified women into several positions within the Commission. 
Hendricks (2017:80) notes that during Dlamini-Zuma’s tenure, four out of the eight 
Commissioners were women. Even though targets concerning gender parity were not met 
in full, women occupied high ranking offices such as Chief of Staff, Deputy Chief of Staff, 
Directors, Heads of Divisions and as Special Representatives (Hendricks, 2017:80). 
She also appointed a Special Envoy on Women, Peace and Security to shine the spotlight 
on the challenges faced by women in conflict situations on the continent (African Union 
Commission, 2016:35). This is coupled with an institutional reform of the Gender 
Directorate, ensuring the appointment of a competent director to further drive home efforts 
on women’s empowerment on the continent. Braude (2015: para.4) claims that “the multi-




of Women’s Empowerment and Development towards achieving Agenda 2063 highlight 
the AUC’s efforts as part of a continent-wide movement for gender equality”. 
Dlamini-Zuma entered office in 2012, which was a significant year in terms of the nature 
of conflict and resurgence of security threats such as terrorism on the continent. Along 
with these challenges came greater awareness of the differential impact of conflict on 
women, hence the AUs need to strengthen the implementation of the WPS Agenda 
(Hendricks, 2017:78). Gender-based violence against women in conflict-ridden states 
was becoming commonplace and needed to be addressed. O’Reilly et al (2015:2) 
reaffirms the idea that both women and men take on different roles during and after 
conflict which extends to include peacemakers, perpetrators and victims. Because 
women are less likely to be the frontrunners in armed conflict, they suffer the indirect 
effects more drastically. Recognition of the differential impact could be what informs the 
different priorities women raise during peace operations. To demonstrate this, peace talks 
where women are involved, centre on social and humanitarian needs as opposed to 
territory. 
5.4.3 Gender-based violence  
The conflict in South Sudan was notorious as a conflict in which sexual and gender-based 
violence manifested as an act of war (Du Plessis, 2017:76). According to the figures 
produced by the UN mission in that country, it became apparent that more than 100 cases 
of sexual violence occurred in July 2016. In this regard, the raping of women became 
common practice as they were used as the personal sex slaves of soldiers. As a response 
to these gross human rights violations, the AU through its Commission, launched a three-
month campaign “to restore the dignity of women and to ensure accountability in South 
Sudan” (AU Press Release, 2016). Here, Dlamini-Zuma enlisted the help of the special 
WPS envoy and its portfolio manager, Senegalese Bineta Diop to head up the campaign. 
Notably, these measures were taken despite earlier efforts of the AU to negotiate a peace 
agreement to solve the mounting conflict in the region. Although the AU indeed initiated 
a plan, there was no establishment of a human rights court to prosecute war crimes and 
rape in particular. When evaluating the decision to cast all the blame on Dlamini-Zuma 




factors such as South Sudan’s lack of commitment to the peace plan as well as the chain 
of command within the AU. The AU did not deliver on its promise to send troops after the 
conflict intensified. It was the problem of indecision among AU member states which 
restricted efforts to address the violence in Africa’s then newest country as some 
members had vested interests and there was a reluctance to pursue mediation (Du 
Plessis, 2017:77).   
In the area of the AU’s department of Women, Gender and Development, Dlamini-Zuma 
was instrumental in appointing a Special Envoy for Africa in January 2014 with the major 
aims to address: protection of women, SGBV, women’s participation in governance and 
peacebuilding, among others (African Union Commission, 2016:35). Executing of the 
Special Envoy role centres on the UNSC resolution 1325 (Hendricks, 2017:94). The 
Envoy thus, works closely with the AU PSC and with the UNSC. Based on interviews, it 
is believed that Dlamini-Zuma did not push hard enough for effective tangible 
programmes to be implemented by Africa’s gender ministries and organisations; or her 
role in peace and conflict in dealing with despots. More critically, major gender-based 
violence in conflict areas such as CAR, Great Lakes Region (Burundi), South Sudan, 
among others, is ongoing as are the murder and rape of women and children as weapons 
of war (see UN - reports on these countries). Though, Dlamini-Zuma conducted several 
collaboration efforts with gender ministries and women’s organisations in Africa, she 
turned a blind eye to gender-based violence in war-torn countries when it mattered the 
most (Nagar, Personal interview: 2020). 
Similarly, gender-based violence is also prevalent in states not in the throes of war. South 
Africa is a conflict-free state, but shows the worst statistics of gender-based violence – 
33 women are murdered daily in the country – and the country’s statistics of gender-
based violence was as concerning during Dlamini-Zuma’s tenure (Nagar, Personal 
interview: 2020). During her AU Chair tenure, Dlamini-Zuma made extensive speeches 
on gender equality, gender-based violence, on women and their role in land and 
agriculture inputs and outputs, and similarly tackled gender issues within the AUC. 
Although she was consistent in assigning women to AU peacekeeping missions across 




and security. Where, and when it mattered the most, Dlamini-Zuma was silent or did not 
act accordingly. Under her tenure, mass atrocities were, and still are being committed, 
and violence with impunity is still the mainstay and being committed against women, in 
conflict-ridden states, and elsewhere (African Union Commission, 2016:37).   
From a leadership perspective, it is evident that women’s liberation is a consistent feature 
of Dlamini-Zuma’s political belief system and career. Moreover, the fight for the 
recognition of human rights and women’s rights specifically, together with the goal of 
gender equality, falls within the realm of positive peace. This proves that not only is an IO 
executive able to shape the organisation’s agenda and dictate the priorities of that 
institution, but that leadership can be used to pursue and achieve outcomes of peace. 
Within IOs, one must appreciate the role of advocacy and awareness raising as a product 
of thought and visionary leadership and valuable intangible outcomes. 
5.4.4 Women’s inclusion in peace processes 
Versi (2016:27) notes that during Dlamini-Zuma’s AUC leadership, the AU had the highest 
number of women in peacekeeping forces as well as the highest number of women in 
political decision-making positions globally. More pointedly, Dr Aisha Abdullam as head 
of the AUC department of Political Affairs announced that of the “30 per cent of women 
represented in parliament, 16 countries are African” (African Union Commission, 
2016:16). It is necessary to view such seemingly minor achievements through the lens of 
how far women have come from being denied the franchise, being oppressed by culture, 
custom and religion.  
 According to those who worked in close proximity to the Chair, including AU Chief of 
Staff, Febe Potgieter-Gqubule, Dlamini-Zuma’s priorities in a conflict were women and 
civil society (Du Plessis, 2017:78). As such, Dlamini-Zuma favoured the narrative that 
peacekeeping specifically should not be approached from a power perspective. She 
elaborated that “we need to bring women in, because they are the ones dying, getting 
abused and left caring for the children” (Dlamini-Zuma, 2015). It became apparent that 
conflict resolution had to make provision for the inclusion of women if it were to be 
successful. She goes on to add that men and women have distinctively different 




by a speech in which Dlamini-Zuma stated: “we see men sitting among themselves, 
talking about power sharing and then after a year decide on who is going to take what” 
(Du Plessis, 2017:82). As opposed to the power-sharing approach to conflict resolution 
on the continent, the former female AUC Chair claimed that if women were included in 
these processes more attention would be given to the people and how any action taken 
prioritised the welfare of all peoples.  
Dlamini-Zuma held the unwavering belief that pursuing peace was by no means an easy 
and simple endeavour but came at a cost that would only be experienced long after the 
peacemakers have left. One may see that women’s representation and inclusion in peace 
processes was deemed important to Dlamini-Zuma which further prompted her to 
actualise the AU’s commitment to UN Resolution 1325 among other AU protocols on 
gender (African Union Commission, 2016:6). In monitoring the impact of gender on 
women’s roles as actors able to facilitate peaceful negotiations and make impartial 
decisions as it relates to the maintenance of peace, is often hampered by the uncontested 
gendered assumptions about leadership and their ability to lead within the male-
dominated international system. Rukato (Personal interview: 2020) notes that Dlamini-
Zuma highlighted issues of gender parity in recruiting staff at the AUC and placed great 
emphasis on the role of women in peace processes on the continent.  However, in the 
field, there continued to be mostly males representing the Chairperson of the AU in the 
Peace and Security Department (PSD) regional offices that deal mostly with peace and 
security issues. On the whole, the case of Dlamini-Zuma’s AUC leadership reveals that 
liberation in all its forms, especially that of women; is deemed an important variable 
against which to measure positive peace on the continent.  
5.4.5 AU campaign launch to end child marriage 
“We must do away with child marriage. Girls who end up as brides at a tender age are 
coerced into having children while they are children themselves” (Dr Nkosazana Dlamini-
Zuma, Chairperson, AUC at the International Conference on Family Planning, Addis 
Ababa, November 2013). 
Political leaders have the ability of raising the importance of the issues they advocate for 




viewpoint. Political discourse analysis presents variables such as lexicon and syntax to 
understand how a leader views a particular problem, articulates that problem and is able 
to communicate their response (Paltridge, 2012:12). Therefore, it is important to 
investigate the strategy behind political text and talk. The words Dlamini-Zuma used to 
communicate her understanding of a particular problem and the severity of the issue 
made use of principles of inclusion and exclusion. This means that she employed 
personal pronouns to indicate the closeness of the issue to her own political beliefs and 
priorities. Demonstrations of this include statements beginning with ‘We as Africans must 
….’ inclusive terms such as “we” show that she is reconciliatory in her demeanour which 
has certain implications for her political positions on certain issues. 
It was during Dlamini-Zuma’s term that the first AU envoy on ending child marriages was 
appointed, thereby demonstrating her prioritisation of the issue (Rukato, Personal 
interview: 2020). The AU makes provision for this issue in Article 21(2) of the African 
Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, that child marriage and the betrothal of 
girls and boys shall be prohibited, and effective action, including legislation, shall be taken 
to specify the minimum age of marriage to be 18 years and to make registration of all 
marriages in an official registry compulsory. Child marriage as a human rights violation 
has been included in a number of legal instruments at the continental and international 
levels. The African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC) defines a 
child as a person under the age of 18 years, and the African Youth Charter defines a 
minor as a person from the ages of 15-17. It is clear that the AU recognises the depth of 
this phenomenon; however, now effective political leadership and member state 
commitment is needed to concretise this commitment. 
 To consolidate her position on the matter of child marriage, she made sure that the AU 
collaborated with UNICEF in a campaign to sway governments in favour of law 
enforcement which combats child marriages.  The campaign was formally launched on 
29 May 2014 during the fourth AU Conference of Ministers of Social Development. In fact, 
2016 witnessed UNICEF present the estimated statistic that 125 million girls under the 
age of 18 were married and this would rapidly escalate if the situation was deprived of 




marriage phenomenon, girls are robbed of a quality education which impacts their sexual 
health and leaves them vulnerable to abuse (Budoo, and Ramnauth, 2018:34). A positive 
consequence of the AU’s campaign was thus being able to report that the number of child 
marriages was declining and that some countries even outlawed the practice.  In terms 
of member state compliance, 22 countries had taken up the campaign domestically when 
her term at the AU ended. Dlamini-Zuma was thus one of the first Chairs to make a point 
to “persuade governments to enforce legislation and international agreements on 
combatting child marriages” (Louw-Vaudran, 2017). 
Dlamini-Zuma succeeded in raising the profile of the issue within the AU. This is 
significant because child marriage is referred to as a ‘soft issue’ and is thus an overlooked 
item on the security agenda. As a result of this ongoing campaign, it has been brought to 
the attention of AU institutions and most importantly the AU PSC. Moreover, the findings 
of UNICEF’s report suggest that the AUC’s campaign lacks conceptual clarity in terms of 
advocacy gains versus achievable and implementable outcomes on the part of member 
states (UNICEF, 2018:2). To address this issue, it is necessary for the AUC in particular 
to ensure that the performance indices of the campaign’s primary objective of enhancing 
continental awareness of the disturbing effects of child marriage is clearly in focus. 
Another problematic matter concerning the campaign is its target market of 55 AU 
member states which is perceived to promote a ‘one-size-fits-all’ solution instead of 
locating high-risk countries first. Although the campaign is able to enhance awareness 
and galvanise support by member states, measurable success will only be achieved 
through targeted actions in specific member states where there can be regular monitoring 
and accountability mechanisms put in place (UNICEF, 2018:3). 
Dlamini-Zuma went on to state that a true measure of a prosperous society is one that 
values and treats its children well (Dlamini-Zuma, 2015: Youtube). Moreover, in the 
opinion of Dlamini-Zuma, child marriage undermines the rights of girl children and stunts 
their education. Child marriage lowers the prospects of girl children in terms of their health 
and education. The AU recognises this and therefore has partnered with communities, 
faith-based organisations, traditional leaders and international development partners to 




therefore the year in which issues such as child marriage was treated with more durable 
and urgent solutions. 
Based on the analysis in chapter four, child marriage can be understood as gender-based 
discrimination as it largely affects girls (Budoo and Ramnauth, 2018:37). Moreover, its 
consequences are long-term in nature. The dominant reasons for this phenomenon are 
motivated by gender inequality and economic and material benefit. Most of the time, the 
relationships are abusive and girls suffer gender-based violence. However, Dlamini-Zuma 
made a point to address this issue and ensure that it gains the necessary attention and 
resource attraction. Because child marriage refuses to recognise the rights of girls and 
women, it entangles them in cycles of economic dependence and violence. This serves 
as a persistent hindrance to positive peace in African states and if not treated with policy 
and legal action at a national and continental level, these pressing issues prolong their 
stay within African states. As a result of Dlamini-Zuma’s leadership, the issue of child 
marriages continues to receive major attention, attesting to her having established a 
strong foundation and Ambassadors for it. However, the issue of child marriage 
transcends any one Chairperson, or term. 
5.4.6 Unconstitutional change of government  
The pervasiveness of coup d’etats on the continent was a security challenge Dlamini-
Zuma was repeatedly required to address. It is useful to consider the impact of contested 
government transitions as one of the chief reasons for political conflict which manifests 
as armed violence (Gebrehiwot and De Waal, 2016:14). In addition, security situations 
where violence persists have been as a result of constitutional amendments which allow 
for the third termism phenomena to take effect. For instance, certain cases result in 
protest action whereas others provide the breeding ground for opposition groups and 
terrorism to manifest. This practice devalues democracy in African states. However, AU 
principles are clear in that these actions constitute a security threat and are thus 
punishable by the invocation of AU institutional instruments. In particular, 2013 saw a 
coup in CAR take place in April 2013 and even though Article 3 was not implemented, the 
AU was unable to construct a solution because of ongoing political instability.  Hengari 




CAR; France was quick to offer assistance in the form of military personnel to quell the 
crisis. Nagar and Nganje (2016:12) elaborate that when governments refuse to give up 
or share power there is conflict and insurgency as in Somalia, Liberia and the DRC. One 
could even go so far as to say that poor governance practices gave rise to the Arab Spring 
in North Africa. The AU introduced the ACDEG which was adopted by African leaders in 
January 2007 and came into effect five years later. 
The AU takes seriously the issue of UCG. For one, this practice devalues the quality of 
democracy in African states. Therefore, AU principles were specifically crafted to address 
this issue. The Constitutive Act (2000, Article 4:7) in particular rejects the practice of UCG. 
Moreover, the ACDEG (African Union, 2007) specifies which actions constitute the 
violation of UCG. Among the list of actions are coups; intervention by mercenaries; 
replacements by armed dissidents or rebels; refusal by an incumbent government to 
relinquish power to a winning candidate after free and fair elections; and constitutional 
amendments.  Excluded in the abovementioned list of provisions then, is democratic 
uprisings which in the case of the Arab Spring proved a challenge to address on the part 
of the AU (Jordaan, 2016:175). 
The ousting of president Mohammed Morsi and the violence that preceded and followed 
it was also Egypt who dragged down the region’s scores significantly; in fact, the Middle 
East and North Africa were the only regions in the world not to see an improvement in at 
least one of the five of the indicators that comprise the domestic and international conflict 
dimension (it worsened in four) (GPI, 2014:4). 
Dlamini-Zuma took an active stance when she suspended Egypt, CAR, Burkina Faso 
because of UCG. Further, she also led various interventions to ensure the return to 
constitutional order (Gebrehiwot and De Waal, 2016:22). Du Plessis (2017:80) argues 
that when convenient, Dlamini-Zuma maintained a strong view against dominant males 
within the AU, but even in the face of her critical points it had no impact on political crises. 
She goes on to add that Dlamini-Zuma, even though she acted in defence of the AU’s 
Constitutive Act, she only suspended Egypt temporarily, despite her awareness of the 
specificities concerning Article 4(p). What stands out in particular is the timeous response 




on the eve of the resignation of former President Blaise Compaore, occasioned by the 
annual governance gathering – DGTrends − which remains a highlight of her tenure. A 
useful tool to combat this issue is a greater appreciation of APSA instruments which need 
to be better integrated with those of the AGA. This will have positive implications for AU 
policies and practices: for example, constitutional changes are a domestic political issue 
but may have peace and security consequences, and currently UCG − a political issue − 
normally invokes an AU response utilising peace and security tools (Gebrehiwot and De 
Waal, 2016:81).  
In sum, Dlamini-Zuma is a politician, and tended to engage from the perspective of the 
government of the day. However, she is also a constitutionalist, and would always 
encourage governance processes that are aligned to a country’s constitution (Rukato, 
Personal interview: 2020). 
5.4.7 Leadership and the promotion of dialogue: partnership building as a key to 
AU peace operations: challenges and opportunities 
Van Dijk (1997:21) elaborates that in reviewing the lexical items used to inform a leader’s 
viewpoint, they possess the ability to “emphasise or de-emphasise political attitudes and 
opinions, garner support, manipulate public opinion, manufacture political consent, or 
legitimate political power”. 
In Dlamini-Zuma’s speech at the 2015 Africa Peace Awards, hosted by the African Centre 
for the Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD), she emphasised that “tolerance 
of differences, dialogue and compromise” will be key in spearheading the agenda for 
peace on the continent (Dlamini-Zuma cited in Braude, 2015). Moreover, she contends 
that the peaceful and non-violent resolution of conflict is rendered useless if it does not 
include the practice of the abovementioned principles. The now-former Chair of the AU 
suggests that any constructive dialogue among warring factions must be conducted in a 
manner which inculcates a culture of valuing the proper management of diversity within 
countries. Dlamini-Zuma holds steadfast to the view that the mismanagement of diversity 
in Africa is the reason why peace is elusive to many African countries (Du Plessis, 2017: 
80). Factors which enhance the success of dialogue between parties is based on mutual 




as being superior. According to Africa’s one-term Chair, this is where political leadership 
is needed so as to empathise with its people regardless of their religion, race, or values. 
 According to the WPF Report (2016:44), to effectively address the challenge of conflict 
on the continent requires avoidance of security arrangements crafted on the basis of an 
incorrect assumption that peace exists merely in the absence of war. Because the AU 
does not own the monopoly of its peace operations, it is necessary for the Chair to 
cultivate good working relationships with internal and external actors to experience the 
full benefit of collective engagement in the pursuit of peace. Key partners include RECs, 
the UN, EU as well as other bilateral entities such as China and the US. To inform the 
analysis below, Dlamini-Zuma’s relationship with RECs and the UN will be explained. 
Based on interviews conducted for this study, it is suggested that effective coalition 
building among AU strategic partners and donors is of importance to the success of the 
revered body in seeing its peace and security goals actualised. On this account, Dlamini-
Zuma struggled to maintain cordial relations with the above partners owing to reasons 
listed below. Du Plessis (2017:15) argues that Dlamini-Zuma’s anti-colonial attitude and 
restrictions imposed on AU Summit meetings hampered trust with external partners which 
did not serve her well. Nagar (Personal interview: 2020) notes that “Dlamini-Zuma also 
had the UN at her disposal, but she did not use the world body effectively when it 
mattered”.  
Owing to the peace and security focus of this study, attention will be given to identifying 
how Dlamini-Zuma utilised strategic partnerships in aid of creating conditions for peace 
on the African continent. This type of leadership is required within the office of the 
Commission Chair as the position demands that the occupant has a clear grasp of 
continental challenges and is able to craft alliances to assist in solution-finding in this 
regard (Naidu and Nagar, Personal interview: 2020). Transactional leaders are also 
known for taking ownership of the organisation’s agenda which needs to be a permanent 
and visible feature when evaluating the tenure of someone in the position of the 
Chairperson of the Commission. Various strategic partnerships held by the AU will be 
subject to analysis to determine how Dlamini-Zuma used these relationships for the 




5.4.8 AU and RECs 
An overlooked relationship is that between RECs and the AU. This partnership has vital 
implications in the peace and security sector as contestation arises concerning who 
should be the first responder to security crises on the continent. De Waal (2016:32) 
expands that RECs should lead the response to conflict and crises as their proximity to 
neighbouring states incentivises their intervention and by consequence their political, 
economic and social security. In this way, it is necessary that the Commission 
Chairperson is able to facilitate constructive engagements with RECs and must be able 
to navigate through this avenue in a collegial manner which attempts to keep all 
stakeholders satisfied while not compromising AU values and principles.  
 Hengari (2013: para.8) clarifies  the AU’s efforts to resolve peace and security issues 
must be compounded by RECs who need to better collaborate to address issues at 
regional level before they overflow into continental spaces. There exists confusion as to 
who are the first responders to crises and thus constructive engagement between these 
partners will enhance the AU’s effectiveness in mitigation of threats to peace and security. 
Even though not all RECs are designed to address peace and security issues, those 
which possess a peace and security architecture should better coordinate efforts with the 
AUC to address shortcomings and enhance the prospect of successful joint peace 
operations. Despite the presence of RECs at the AUC offices, they remain hampered by 
human resource obstacles such as under-staffing and thus rarely make notable 
contributions to policy innovation (Hengari, 2013: para.8). One of the pertinent matters 
Dlamini-Zuma had to deal with involves moving the continent towards deeper levels of 
integration. This can only be done by fostering dialogue between the AUC and RECs. To 
this end, Landsberg (2016a:238) describes Dlamini-Zuma’s greatest achievement as 
succeeding in engaging RECs in high-level talks with the AUC. The AU and RECs must 
work together for the operationalisation of APSA and maintenance of peace and stability 
on the continent based on principles of complementarity, comparative advantage and 
subsidiarity (Nagar and Nganje, 2016:28). One of the avenues which should be 
addressed first is improving the coordination and information sharing between the AU 
PSC and the decision-making organs of RECs. Thus, the RECs’ liaison offices at the AU 




maintain peace and security to avoid divergent responses to the same crisis. The ultimate 
goal of this partnership is to ensure that the policies and activities of the RECs are aligned 
with the principles and objectives of the AU. In accordance with this requirement, a 
Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation in the area of peace and security was 
signed in January 2008 between the AU, RECs and the Coordinating Mechanisms of the 
Regional Standby Brigades of Eastern and Northern Africa. 
Assumed under the functions of the AUC Chair is the promotion of cooperation with other 
organisations for the furtherance of the objectives of the Union (Rukato, 2018:130). 
Dlamini-Zuma then, had an important role to play in coordinating and promoting the 
programmes and policies of the Union with those of RECs. 
5.4.9 AU and UN 
Many factors are involved before one is able to strategise the most effective means to 
resolve a conflict in Africa. African conflicts are not as clear-cut as they seem, this is linked 
to the non-linear causality issue at play. Seeing as the UN holds the monopoly on 
international peace and security, it has an important role to play in peace processes in 
African states (Badmus, 2015:4). Unlike the UN, the AU has a more diverse 
understanding of peacebuilding as the driving vision and goal as opposed to the 
procedural articulation which contends that it flows from peacekeeping until the 
transformation from conflict to peace (Zondi, 2017:108). 
Dlamini-Zuma struggled to enlist the help of external actors who continue to play a large 
role in terms of peace processes on the continent (Adebajo, Personal interview: 2020). 
Among key external partners are the UN and the EU who play different roles, to varying 
degrees of importance as it relates to the maintenance of peace and security on the 
continent. This is particularly evident in the realm of negative peace which speaks to 
activities of peacekeeping on the continent. A good example of this is Libya. The political 
instability still unfolding today forms part of the role external actors’ play in shaping the 
peace and security landscape in Africa (Van Niewkerk, Personal interview: 2020). It is 
thus difficult to propagate the notion of “African solutions to African problems” and be held 
accountable as the custodian of AU principles and institutional instruments when the EU 




continent. One is then prompted to ask the question: who owns Africa’s peace and 
security agenda? 
Simply put, the AU was created in hopes that it would speak for Africans on the global 
stage. The AU is thus required to create conditions for Africa to engage collectively with 
external actors. Nagar and Nganje (2016:37) concur that even after a decade, the AU 
struggles to project an influential voice in global politics. In the book, Woman in the Wings, 
author Carien Du Plessis notes that Dlamini-Zuma criticised the UN for being outdated in 
the manner in which it addresses conflict. Her critical stance is motivated by the belief 
that even though the nature of conflict has changed, the UN has failed to adopt alternative 
tools and methods to deal with these changes. She thus urges the UN to revisit how it 
conducts peacekeeping so as to adapt to the contemporary threats to peace and security 
of today. In sum, she observed that the UN’s approach utilised a blanket approach where 
a one-size-fits-all solution is employed across the board, which has failed to yield lasting 
and tangible results. Williams and Boutellis (2014: 254-278) state that the AU needs the 
global legitimacy of the UN to act, and financial and material backing to deal effectively 
with African conflicts. One may see how the abovementioned statement complicates 
effective collaboration between parties because of the unequal power and resource 
nexus.  
Notably, 60 per cent of UN peacekeeping operations are occurring in Africa and these 
numbers will persist until AU member states finance their own agenda unhindered by 
competing interests of parochial powers. 2015-2016 saw nine UN deployed missions in 
Africa out of 16 globally at a cost of US$6 billion (Nagar and Nganje, 2016:37). Moreover, 
in April 2016 there were 101 270 UN peacekeepers deployed in Africa (UN Fact sheet, 
2016). All of the above bear’s testimony to the tumultuous nature of the AU and UN’s 
burden-sharing to bring peace. Too often, UN interventions medicate the visible 
manifestation of violence which although necessary at the time, is unsuccessful in 
delivering plausible long-term solutions. For this reason, more analysis must concentrate 
on the root causes of these conflicts as informed by peace studies and the foundation of 




attempted to address the co-dependent relationship between the AU and UN in the 
context of successful peace operations. 
 Dlamini-Zuma was an avid supporter and champion of non-military methods of dealing 
with conflict and terrorism in particular. She stated that “it is about the root cause, we 
need to steer people from extremism towards inclusion” (Dlamini-Zuma cited in Braude, 
2015). Thus, her strategy for conflict prevention on the continent involved elements such 
as the prioritisation of governance and the exchange of information. It is evident that 
Dlamini-Zuma was of the opinion that the root causes to conflict must be addressed in 
order for Africa to see meaningful progress and this involves empowering every citizen to 
be economically active in their respective economies.  A respondent (Personal interview: 
2020) commented that the challenge is in creating a close relationship of trust between 
the Chair of the Assembly, the PSC, as well as UN and development partners so that the 
Chairperson of the Commission is not just seen as being neutral, but actually 
demonstrates it. The fact that she is a South African may have placed limitations on her 
role, specifically, since South Africa has so much vested interests in both AU and UN 
peace and security ambitions, she may have been seen as advancing the South African 
position, instead of what may have been generically good for the continent (Personal 
interview: 2020).The AU’s peace and security mandate is one which enjoyed much 
attention during the campaign of Dlamini-Zuma; however, whether she successfully 
delivered on her promises is debatable as factors such as her nationality and regular visits 
to South Africa impacted her performance. 
A political leadership assessment of Dlamini-Zuma indicates that her preferred strategies 
in actualising the AUC’s peace and security mandate involves dialogue and the inclusion 
of marginalised groups. Because the AU is dependent on the RECs and UN to varying 
degrees for both human and financial resources, the AUC Chair plays an understudied 
role in utilising these partnerships to achieve peaceful outcomes to its most pressing 
security concerns. The AU also assumes the role as mouthpiece of its member states not 
only at the UN but within the international community, thus the difficult task of presenting 
a unified position amid sovereignty’s endowed self-interest. Notably, the AU’s burden 




operations. Additionally, Dlamini-Zuma was quite vocal concerning the UN’s peace 
strategies which she criticised for instilling a fragile peace. The peacebuilding work 
composed by Zondi (2017:113), shares that any peace which does not seek to 
fundamentally alter the inherited neocolonial state in Africa will be deprived of any form 
of sustainable peace.  
Section five 
5.5 Summary of Dlamini-Zuma’s performance as AUC Chair in the context of 
peace and security 
Trends in the security issues listed below include links to gender and conflict; economic 
participation; human security versus state security; and positive versus negative peace. 
Dlamini-Zuma’s AUC campaign promise included speedy response to conflict prevention, 
management and resolution on the continent.  The AU is explicit in its mission to be a 
people-orientated organisation; this implies the premise of human security issues as 
opposed to state security (considering the state as the primary referent of security). Norm 
change alone is unprofitable if it ceases to escape its inscribed presence to manifest in 
practical outcomes. Therefore, Table 2 provides a visual demonstration of the 
interconnected nature of these challenges to positive peace. Similarities in root causes 
support the validity of this statement. Moreover, it illustrates that the AUC Chair was 
empowered to create peace in terms of AU protocol and principles which enabled her to 
take policy action in response to these threats to peace on the continent. 
Table 2: Examining Dlamini-Zuma’s response to selected challenges of positive 
peace in her capacity as AUC Chairperson 
Contemporary 
challenge to peace 
and security  
Root causes  AUC Chair and PSC 
joint powers in 
ensuring peace and 
security (Article 7 of 
the Constitutive Act) 
Outcomes of positive peace 









Abuse of political 
power, and political 
leadership 
Article 7: Follow-up 
promotion of 
democratic practices, 
good governance, the 
rule of law, protection of 
human rights and 
Dlamini-Zuma suspended 
Egypt 
Advocated for democracy  
Dlamini-Zuma did not act 
accordingly in the case of 













of government takes 
place in a member state 
(inconsistent in her 






norms, religious and 
cultural norms 
 
The AU Constitutive Act 
prioritises the promotion 
and protection of 
human and peoples’ 
rights, in accordance 
with the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights 
Dlamini-Zuma launched a 
campaign in 2014 to end child 
marriage.  
She made AU structures more 
aware of the severity of the 
issue and its impact not only on 






Traced back to the 








Article 3: Accelerate the 
political and socio-
economic integration of 
the 
Continent 
Dlamini-Zuma says the solution 
is self-production, skills 
revolution; women inclusion; 
youth empowerment. Her 
verbal statements materialise 
into the practical Agenda 2063 
Vision for continental 
development and peace 
Women’s rights 
and Women’s 











gender in all 
programmes and 
activities of the Union. 
Article 3 objectives -
Promote peace, 
security, and stability on 
the continent 
Dlamini-Zuma’s implementation 
of the WPS agenda. Inclusion 
of women in all peace 
operations.  
Case study - appointment of 
Bineta Diop. 












Promote and protect 
human and peoples’ 
rights in accordance 
with the African Charter 
on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights. Support and 
facilitate humanitarian 
action in situations of 
armed conflicts or major 
natural disasters (AU 
Constitutive Act: 2000: 
Article 7). 
Increase women’s 
representation and participation 
in all peace processes on the 
continent. Empower women of 
all ages, recognising that child 
marriage is among the leading 
causes of gender-based 
violence on the continent 
today. 
 





Sources: Global Peace Index Report (2012-2016) 
               Centre for Human Rights (2018) 
               Amnesty International Report (2014) 
               World Peace Foundation Report (2016) 
                AU Constitutive Act 2000 
                AU Compendium (2016) 
5.6 Conclusion 
Section one made a point to consider Dlamini-Zuma’s political upbringing and political 
beliefs before studying the recruitment process which resulted in her victory at the 
Commission. It was revealed that her political beliefs centre on the importance of 
liberation and can be seen in the priorities she pursued in previously held leadership 
positions. Now that one better understood Dlamini-Zuma as a leader, the impact of South 
Africa’s political manoeuvring on her election was assessed. Her election was divisive 
and it happened at a time when the continent itself was divided and suffering the effects 
of Libya’s deteriorating security condition. Taking this into consideration, section two 
moved to assess the impact of gender on the political leadership of Dlamini-Zuma, the 
AU’s first woman Chair. This analysis showed that gender exposes unrealistic 
expectations of women’s formal leadership. To bear testimony to gendered understanding 
of women’s political leadership, the impact of gender was discussed in Dlamini-Zuma’s 
election, performance in terms of organisational (administrative) effectiveness, as well as 
her propensity to address peace and security challenges.  Section three explained how 
Dlamini-Zuma shaped the AU’s peace and security agenda owing to insights into Dlamini-
Zuma’s political beliefs introduced in section one. The peace and security challenges she 
prioritised in her capacity as AUC Chair were in line with her favouritism of liberation, 
respect for human rights and women’s rights in particular. Dlamini-Zuma took seriously 
positive peace challenges which seldom feature on the security agenda. Moreover, her 
championing of issues concerning women’s rights; women’s inclusion in peace processes 




Rights and women’s Rights in particular. Then, section four set out to answer to what 
extent Dlamini-Zuma’s political leadership led to outcomes of positive peace.  
The challenges to peace and security in Africa present a unique opportunity for the 
continent’s leadership to assume a more proactive stance in redefining the challenges it 
faces. This means long-standing durable solutions which consider sustainable peace, 
economic participation for all, the protection and maintenance of African values and 
culture, the promotion of transparent and accountable governance and the protection of 
human rights (Gebrehiwot and De Waal, 2016: 27). The above-mentioned issues echo 
the significance of positive peace and prioritisation of issues which threaten peace even 
in the absence of armed conflict. To achieve this requires the intellectual leadership of an 
AUC Chairperson who is managerially and politically astute and able to deliver on the 
expectations and given mandate via effective political leadership. Intellectual leadership 
refers to setting the political norms and principles which dictate how Africa governs itself 
and how the continent associates with the international community. In addition, the study 
of leadership also looks into assuming ownership of articulating the prescribed norms and 
principles in the realms of both policy and practical political action. Moreover, it involves 
ensuring that political goals and strategies remain in focus, not obscured by short-term 
imperatives. In light of this, one may see that Dlamini-Zuma did succeed in setting the 
political norms and owning the AU’s vision of a peaceful and secure continent. More 
pointedly, she addressed lack of respect for human rights and human life through 
prioritising women’s rights, gender-based violence against women in armed conflict as 
well as child marriage. Much of her accomplishments in this area were traced back to her 
political belief system and normative inclination towards a peace which considered the 
importance of human rights, gender equality and justice.  
Table 2 enabled an understanding of the powers of the AUC Chair in advancing the 
Union’s peace architecture. The AUC Chair acts as a depositary of all Union and OAU 
treaties and other legal instruments of the Union and performs depository functions 
thereof (AU Constitutive Act, 2000). Adoption of the Act provides a better context for 
realising the objective of having peace and stability in Africa through addressing the 




leaders soon realised that conflicts associated with armed violence were obstacles to the 
continent’s socio-economic development (Badmus, 2015:5). Moreover, Table 2 makes a 
point of showing similarities in terms of the root causes responsible for impeding the 
realisation of the AU’s goal of a peaceful Africa. From UCGs to poverty and inclusive 
development; child marriage; lack of respect for human rights and human life; women’s 
rights; gender-based violence; and lack of women’s inclusion in peace processes; it 
























6.0 Introduction  
 In the end, Dlamini-Zuma’s leadership did not radically transform the nature of the AU 
and its important institutions. Nonetheless, she made important and significant and 
unprecedented contributions in the following areas: women peace and security, gender 
mainstreaming, child marriage, poverty and inclusive development. More importantly, she 
drew attention to issues that, heretofore, had not been the focus of the previous male 
leadership. Of importance to this analysis was locating the factors which impacted and or 
guided her priorities in terms of peace and security. 
Chapter five presented the findings of the study. Interview responses concerning Dlamini-
Zuma’s election to office proved extremely useful in understanding the divisive impact of 
the recruitment process which won her and South Africa the victory at the Commission in 
2012. Moreover, seeing as she was the first female Chair of Africa’s premier continental 
body, it provided the opportune moment to study women’s political leadership in the 
context of the AU. Not only this, but women leaders in the peace and security space. 
Women leaders are seldom studied from the perspective of political leadership in order 
to understand actions taken in response to challenges emanating from the continent’s 
security environment. Semi-structured interviews, together with secondary sources 
helped to constitute the findings of this study. The findings of the study were then 
thematically categorised in order to determine a leader’s propensity to produce outcomes 
of peace in response to challenges appearing in chapter four. In answering this question, 
the political leadership analysis considered the following variables: recruitment process; 
biographic information and political beliefs; context; and the nature of the leader and 
follower relations. Secondary to that, the study aimed to capture the effect of gender on 
political leadership in the case of Dlamini-Zuma’s AUC tenure.  
The introductory line in chapter one stated that “Africa needs peace”. If peace is the goal 
(outcome), it is necessary to determine which actions need to be taken in fulfillment of 
that objective from a political leadership perspective. Mbeki and Brahimi (2016:12) notes 




includes the organisation’s normative arsenal, vision, objectives, principles and protocol. 
It must be noted that the AU has an impressive normative arsenal which includes any 
threat to peace and security on a human and state security level. What then, is preventing 
the AU from implementing its said objectives to address the threats to peace on the 
continent today? Is a political leadership analysis the answer to explaining an individual 
leader’s propensity to shape organisational outcomes (response to peace and security 
related challenges)? Whether political leadership be used to provide supplementary 
understanding of how a leader manages crises, chooses among available strategies to 
ensure that the organisation acts in defence of its mandate; deserves critical scholarly 
inquiry. 
In the literature review the researcher found limited information concerning political 
leadership and peace and how the former can be used to build the latter. Based on the 
available literature on the AU, the dominant argument presented is that the body lacks 
effective political leadership. Effectiveness in this case is regarded as the propensity to 
ensure implementation capacity despite organisational constraints. Much blame was 
attributed to individual political leaders for the failures and/or challenges experienced by 
the AU. Often, people criticise leaders without understanding the spaces in which they 
act as well as the constraints imposed in certain institutional environments. Or is the 
broader question the passivity of African leaders in response to challenges plaguing 
them? Hence, what was lacking was an assessment of political leadership which values 
variables such as the recruitment process, context in which leadership is occurring and 
nature of the relationship between leaders and followers as a means to assess individual 
heads of IOs’ capability and capacity to act in defence of their mandate. Another pressing 
issue when studying the heads of IOs is focusing too heavily on organisational constraints 
which absolve IO executives of their responsibilities in achieving organisational 
outcomes. Any performance analysis as it relates to political leadership must transcend 
labels of bad/poor leadership to actually explain how and why leaders make the decisions 
they do.  Dlamini-Zuma’s AUC Chairpersonship thus allowed the researcher to study the 
impact of political leadership on organisational outcomes of peace. Because she was the 




to explore the effects of gender on women in political leadership as well as how gender 
affects how women are perceived to make decisions in the field of peace and security.  
To put it plainly, leadership is necessary for the effective functioning of any organisation. 
Notably, the stakes become increasingly higher when considering the question of 
leadership beyond individual state borders. This is especially true in the case of Africa, a 
continent laden with carefully constructed colonially crafted borders which, among other 
factors, has disallowed the continent from progressively moving towards a ‘Union 
Government’ as informed by its Pan-African advocates. Landsberg (2016b: 288) makes 
the claim that despite the AU potentially considering transforming the AUC, with its 
headquarters in Addis Ababa, into “an authority on par with that of independent African 
states” in practice this seems a far-fetched reality. Therefore, the closest association 
Africa has to a continental government able to speak with one voice on behalf of all its 
members is the AU.  It is clear why more studies need to be devoted towards identifying 
how continental leadership in the form of the Commission Chair could serve as a variable 
against which to measure the success of the organisation in seeing decisions 
implemented and objectives actualised. 
The study of political leadership is located within the confines of an IO. As the continental 
custodian of peace and security, the AU represents African leaders, assuming not only a 
participative but leading role in advancing continental affairs. Contained in the AU’s 
mandate are principles and protocols which are both expansive yet ambitious. Presently, 
55 states belong to the AU, which to some extent must mean that these states deem their 
membership beneficial for a variety of reasons. Chapter three of this study contemplated 
the transition from the OAU to the AU, it is necessary to determine the relevance of the 
AU today in 2020. Has the peace and security context changed since the rebirth of Africa’s 
premier continental body? Chapter four answers this question by assessing Africa’s 
relationship with peace before endeavouring to provide criteria for measuring peace. 
When measuring peace, there has always been an emphasis on fewer wars in place of 
indices which measure consolidation of democracy and progress on poverty alleviation; 
for instance, as determinants of peace in society. Unlike negative peace, its counterpart 




conventionally appear on the security agenda; however, can be used to measure peace 
in society. The main research question was: To what extent did Dlamini-Zuma’s 
political leadership of the AUC lead to outcomes of positive peace in Africa? 
6.1 Reflecting on the research problem  
This study was designed to demonstrate how a political leadership analysis could explain 
how IO executives make decisions, choose among available policy strategies and are 
able to shape the agenda of the organisations in which they operate. There is simply not 
enough literature on women political leaders who operate in IOs, as seen in the case of 
Dlamini-Zuma.  
Chapter one commenced by outlining the supreme purpose of this dissertation. It then 
proceeded to highlight lack of effective leadership within the AU as a pressing issue. 
Political leadership within organisational contexts remains a field of inquiry starved of 
sufficient theoretical and conceptual scrutiny. Further, there is even less published 
literature on the study of African political leaders and the subsequent manifestations of 
effective political leadership. It is important to source where the problems concerning 
political leadership in Africa stem from as it not only cripples effective national leadership 
but effective continental leadership as well. When considering the structure of all human 
groupings, it became clear that there is a leader present and this individual is at the top 
of the pyramid (Versi, 2016: 27). This principle of leadership is universally applicable as 
it is evident in sports teams, political organisations, faith-based organisations and national 
leadership. Of particular importance here is national leadership as the decisions taken in 
this context impact millions of people. Therefore, this is even more important when 
considering continental leadership as decisions taken and implemented at this level have 
consequences at both regional and national levels.   
In assessing the value of effective leadership of IOs, it is necessary to distinguish between 
what makes a good leader or a bad one. African leaders have been branded as the worst 
batch of leaders the world has ever seen, with little to no acknowledgement of effective 
leaders who have pioneered the field of visionary and ideational leadership. When 
reviewing African political leaders, one cannot deny that some political leaders have 




suffering to their own populations. However, it is important to give credence to leaders 
who have made considerable effort to advance the lives of African citizens and continental 
interests via the path of effective political leadership. 
The chapter concluded by stating that the continental organisation is deprived of the 
leadership it needs to be effective, relevant and capable of addressing challenges on the 
continent. From the literature review, lack of political leadership was singled out as a 
major hindrance to the effectiveness of the continent’s premier organisation, the AU. Even 
less research has been conducted on its Commission and the role of its Chairperson in 
continental affairs. What makes the case of Dlamini-Zuma a fascinating study is that not 
only was she the first female Commission Chair of the AU but she was also diplomatically 
and practically involved in the transition from the OAU to the AU. Her close ties to the 
organisation, its guiding vision, new normative goals, and the operationalisation of a more 
proactive peace and security regime proved important as this had significant implications 
for how the continental organisation conducted its affairs especially in the peace and 
security sector. Unlike previous political leadership assessments which chiefly sought to 
establish the purpose of political leadership as organisational effectiveness, this study 
sought to investigate the purpose of political leadership as peace.  In chapter one, the 
researcher sought to prove that studying IO executives was important as IOs play an 
important role in global politics and peace and security especially.  
Chapter two, for instance, made a point to systematically trace the progression of thought 
as it related to the development of leadership theories in political science today. As such, 
the chapter started by acknowledging the Great Man Theory and its sole occupation with 
the inherent characteristics and/or traits an individual was born with which inevitably 
separated not only leaders from non-leaders but effective leaders from ineffective ones 
(Carlyle, 2013). Then, trait theory emerged not long after where the focus was still on who 
the leader was instead of the manner in which they executed their role and tasks. Elgie 
(2015:54) made the case that trait theories attribute leadership outcomes to the agency 
of human actors. It was later stated that inherent traits alone, no longer suffice as an 
adequate measuring instrument used to assess leadership effectiveness and this was 




Grint (2000) noted that there exists a vast range of approaches to the study of leadership. 
It was important to acknowledge this fact before singling out the most suitable approach 
as employed by this dissertation. On the one hand was the approach which concentrated 
on the study of personal traits, skills and qualities a leader possesses. Normally, this type 
of assessment would take cognisance of biographic information so as to trace how an 
individual’s background, inherent skills and political upbringing later influences their 
decision-making as leaders. Although a useful means to study leadership effectiveness, 
this method neglects the influence of external and internal contextual dynamics which 
affects leadership behaviour and effectiveness and cannot be relied upon exclusively as 
a determinant (Fiedler, 1975). Alternatively, the positional/contingent approach to the 
study of leadership considered the position of a leader within a given environment which 
links the individual to the context in which they operate. Thus, unlike the trait theories of 
leadership, the contingency approach mitigates against the exclusive reliance on 
inherited traits and abilities without apportioning study to other factors such as the context 
and/or setting in which leadership is occurring. Context is important as settings differ in 
magnitude and flexibility.  
The analysis of Dlamini-Zuma, in her capacity as AUC Chair required that factors such 
as context be taken into account in order to provide both an accurate and holistic account 
of her ability to act within the confines of an IO. Behavioural theories are also important 
as they offer insight into analysing the political behaviour of leaders within given 
leadership roles by studying their ability to execute their roles and responsibilities. There 
exists another school of thought which examines the relationship between leaders and 
followers and is thus broadly referred to as Relational theory. What is significant among 
advocates of this theory is the dual process of influence where emphasis is placed on 
how both parties influence one another and in turn dictates the tone of the relationship 
between them (Yukl, 2002:185). Taking all of this into account, it becomes evident that 
newer theories of leadership, although they do not dismiss the influence of trait theories, 
instead places a greater impact on leadership competencies and capabilities which is 
known to develop over time. For this study, analytical elements were borrowed from trait, 
behavioural and contingency theories to inform the political leadership assessment of 




6.2 Implications  
The findings of this study resulted in the following implications:  
6.2.1 A critical focus on women and political leadership in peace and security 
Critical to this study is that insofar as political leadership is an under-researched field of 
inquiry, the role of gender and women in political leadership deserves further scholarly 
attention. The secondary research question of this study was: What impact did gender 
have on the political leadership assessment of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma as AUC 
Chairperson and did it influence her priorities in terms of peace and security? So 
often, Dlamini-Zuma has been portrayed as an effective institutional leader, a strong 
leader and one who gets things done, a leader whose effectiveness and efficiency was 
incomparable. Minimal study looked at the impact of political leadership on organisational 
outcomes of peace. Therefore, this study went beyond to study women and political 
leadership in the context of peace and security as well. In this way, the study aimed to 
de-stigmatise women as credible actors able to take necessary action in an effort to 
maintain peace and security on the continent. 
The peace and security sector is numerically occupied by male leadership. Thus, the 
examination provided for a more nuanced perspective concerning how gender affects the 
ascension of women to prominent leadership positions on a global scale and in Africa 
especially. Moreover, chapter two went on to discuss how gendered understandings of 
leadership to a certain extent adversely affects the performance rating and/or 
effectiveness of a leader.  Terms of reference include femininity and masculinity which 
play a defining role in women’s participation in the peace and security sector in Africa.  In 
all of this, the scope given to evaluate political leadership remains limited in the 
occupations of the aforementioned positions. What makes this study of Dlamini-Zuma so 
relevant is that she broke the glass ceiling with her involvement in peace and security 
operations. In South Africa she was the first woman elected to serve as Foreign Affairs 
Minister where she was actively involved in peace operations in Africa especially and then 
she later went on to assume the Chairpersonship of the AUC where again, she had to 
play a prominent role in terms of implementing and advancing the AU’s peace and 




security challenges within a national context is substantially different from conducting 
peace operations within the confines of IOs such as the AU. Factors such as magnitude, 
manoeuvrability, membership, resources, international, continental and regional political 
climate; all, to some degree, complicate the ability of an IO such as the AU to act. 
Often, the narrative of women’s roles in conflict barely looks at women at the forefront of 
leadership but focuses on their roles as vulnerable groups during conflict. O’Reilly et al. 
(2015:2) reaffirms the idea that both women and men take on different roles during and 
after conflict which extends to include peacemakers, perpetrators and victims. Because 
women are less likely to be the frontrunners in armed conflict, they suffer the indirect 
effects more drastically. Recognition of the differential impact could be what informs the 
different priorities women raise during peace operations. This study by no means 
diminished the importance of the gendered impact of conflict and war on women 
specifically, which has different implications for both women and men, however, this 
dissertation aimed to enlarge the scope through which we view the roles of women in 
peace and security from the perspective of political leadership.  
In the analysis present in chapter two, it is made clear that the concepts masculinity and 
femininity and their interpretation as it relates to political leadership has implications for 
whether individuals, women in particular, are elected to leadership positions especially in 
the peace and security sector. Masculinity makes reference to the superiority of traits 
supposedly akin to males such as assertiveness. Femininity on the other hand speaks to 
meekness and humility as commonly associated with women. From this representation, 
it is evident that most of the values and/or traits which fall into the feminine bracket are 
discouraged within positions where decisions have to be made regarding the 
maintenance of peace and security. Subsequently, many women failed to see themselves 
as capable and prominent decision-makers able to make important decisions and 
strategise ways to address issues of direct and indirect violence, armed conflict as well 
as structural violence.  
 The fault could be traced to the initial obsession with traits in early leadership theories 
which neglected the input gender could have provided to address the problematic 




Although evolutionary psychology yields useful universal insights concerning men and 
women, the impact of cultural forces must also be considered. Sjoberg (2014:3) puts it 
this way, to attain certain positions women are well aware their femininity disqualifies 
them from, they emphasise their “masculine side” by being assertive, aggressive and firm.   
So, to assume that all female leaders are inherently meek and/or inclined to be peaceful 
has the potential to reflect an inaccurate biased analysis of a leader in office because of 
the gendered expectation regarding how women leaders should behave and in turn what 
their priorities should be. It is for this reason that biological and sociological elements 
should be considered when looking at individual identity. Although colleagues and 
subordinates expressed the same view of Dlamini-Zuma as being assertive which is 
commonly exemplified by males and masculinity, the question should be asked whether 
expectations of the first female candidate entering office were informed by feminine 
prescriptions of behaviour?  Importantly, this study did not seek to synonymise women 
with peace; however, attempts to establish correlation between political leadership and 
outcomes of peace by studying Dlamini-Zuma’s response to peace and security 
challenges were highlighted in chapter four. 
6.2.2 Locating the impact of gender on political leadership in the case of Dlamini-
Zuma’s AUC leadership  
The findings of this study as it relates to secondary research question three revealed that 
gender did impact the political leadership assessment of Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma. 
Therefore, chapter two made a point to study how gendered assumptions of political 
leadership create unrealistic expectations regarding the supposed inherent effectiveness 
and peacefulness of women leaders as opposed to their male counterparts. 
As alluded to in chapter two, gendered understanding of leadership refers to stereotyped 
representations coupled with preconceived ideas of an individual leader’s behaviour and 
effectiveness on the basis of their gender. A useful starting point for this analysis was 
thus how Dlamini-Zuma was portrayed in the media both nationally and internationally as 
this had a significant bearing on not only public opinion but tended to adversely shape 
how scholars measured her success and/or failure as Chairperson. Furthermore, an 




interactions with her could have indeed been impacted by gendered expectations of how 
the first female candidate should act, behave and/or respond to crises. Therefore, 
debunking myths concerning how women think, act and make decisions in high level 
decision-making positions was of key interest to this study. Thus, section three of chapter 
five set out to determine how Dlamini-Zuma’s beliefs and priorities shaped the AU’s peace 
and security agenda. Based on the analysis of her speeches, it became abundantly clear 
that she advocated for peace and development as her preferred approach to 
understanding Africa’s complex security environment. It also became clear that Dlamini-
Zuma’s political beliefs tended to dictate her priorities and actions in office.  
Nagar and Nganje (2016:31) unanimously conclude that Dlamini-Zuma’s performance as 
Chairwoman did not succeed in radically transforming the Commission and make it more 
efficient. It must be noted that expectations concerning her election set the bar quite high 
in terms of her ability to revolutionise the AU into an effective and credible actor on the 
continent able to defend the integrity of its Pan-African agenda. Upon assuming office, 
although she managed to institute changes at the AU; she soon became acquainted with 
political and financial constraints. Louw-Vaudran (2017: para. 3) notes that the 
Commission was plagued by bureaucratic inefficiency and lack of implementation 
capacity. Looking at the Commission itself, Dlamini-Zuma ensured that at Summit 
meetings, ministers’ speeches would not exceed designated time slots, improved AU 
responsiveness and online presence by ensuring websites were regularly updated and 
that emails were responded to. She also directed much effort to ensuring a decline in 
donor dependency by advocating for member states to pay their dues. Evidence abounds 
concerning administrative reform; however, it must be noted that Dlamini-Zuma’s 
achievements as a one-term Chair were not enough to dent a decade’s worth of 
implementation issues and win her favour in the sight of scholars and critics alike.   
The expectations concerning who the AUC Chair should be, revealed that political leaders 
were selected based on the qualities needed to carry out the institutional mandate of the 
AU. Dlamini-Zuma’s election was successful as she was branded as an extremely 
effective leader immune to failure and able to render the most under-performing 




Caution must be exercised in branding political leaders as being able to operate 
effectively despite institutional constraints. What the public and international community 
expects from women political leaders is that they should be more thoughtful than men 
and therefore able to champion more progressive issues. If women political leaders do 
not live up to these gendered understandings of what their leadership should look like, 
one is more inclined to ask the question: what is the point of including women’s 
representation in these political spaces if they continue the same policies and decision-
making as male political leaders? 
Mainstream literature on political leadership has propagated the idea that women leaders 
are inherently more peaceful than male leaders. Magadla and Makhunga (2014: para. 3) 
make a point to highlight the danger of using the saint versus sinner narrative when 
evaluating women in political leadership. What this narrative exposed was that women 
leaders are put on a pedestal which makes their fall that much easier to discredit. By 
expecting women leaders to “bring something different to the table” one suggests that 
women leaders champion different priorities because of their gender. However, we saw 
the interplay of these gendered understandings of political leadership in Dlamini-Zuma’s 
election and performance critiques of her AUC Chairpersonship. As a result, chapter two 
made a point to emphasise the importance of gender as an additional lens to make sense 
of political leadership.  
Women leaders as seen in the case of Dlamini-Zuma, are cited as highly efficient, 
peaceful, maternal and almost impermeable to corruption. These depictions of women 
leaders reinforce the belief that women are not suited to operate in the political space, 
especially in the field of peace and security where rationality is highly valued (Magadla, 
Personal interview: 2020). The AU’s implementation crises and years of not seeing its 
policies yielding fruit could not be fixed by one leader’s efforts alone. Importantly, when 
evaluating IO executives, one must understand the organisational culture as well as the 
power available to institutional heads before attributing all the blame to individual political 
leaders. When addressing women’s roles in peace and security and the management 
and/or resolution of conflict, numerous factors must be considered. For one, to drive the 




security and making sure more women are key role players in peace processes; requires 
a mental shift in social norms and the debunking of gendered understanding concerning 
women in political leadership. 
Which prospects did Dlamini-Zuma’s leadership promise the AU and continent at large? 
What was important to explore was the purpose of political leadership beyond just 
organisational effectiveness towards leadership for the purpose of peace. Which is the 
more significant priority IO executive leaders should pursue within organisational 
settings? Based on the findings presented in chapter five, one may see that Dlamini-
Zuma’s election campaign was motivated by the belief in her institutional leadership 
abilities to transform weak institutions. Moreover, she made a point to state her 
commitment to the peace and security issues plaguing the continent today. However, 
similar to her predecessor she suffered the same criticism of not acting decisively and 
with greater urgency to humanitarian suffering on the continent. 
Aside from examining the effects of her appointment process, Dlamini-Zuma’s political 
life was interrogated to identify political beliefs which could shed insight into her priorities 
and decision-making. Her childhood stories bear testimony to her preference for peace 
and non-violence. To illustrate this, Dlamini-Zuma shared a story of how she always 
shared resources with her siblings and that because she was the eldest, she would 
sacrifice her portion to make sure that they did not go without (Somnizi, 2012).  As a 
young woman, she was involved in the struggle against apartheid and became an 
ambassador of the Black Consciousness movement before joining the ANC. Moreover, 
she served as Health Minister under Nelson Mandela, Foreign Affairs Minister under 
Thabo Mbeki, Home Affairs Minister under Jacob Zuma and now occupies the position 
Minister of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs.  Although more can be said 
of her political career, section two of chapter five pondered the interplay of women and 
political leadership in the context of Dlamini-Zuma’s tenure as AUC Chair. 
6.3 Explaining the AU’s peace security regime: locating the AUC Chair’s role in 
advancing peace 
From the onset, the dominant narrative made it plain that Africa needs peace. Leaning on 




Therefore, reference was made to peace studies to locate exactly what it meant in theory 
and applicability in practice. What peace studies offered is a normative inclination of a 
peaceful and non-violent approach to conflict resolution and management strategies. Its 
favouritism of this non-violent approach to dealing with armed conflict and violence on the 
continent was not a popular response to deal with security-related issues according to the 
drastic resurgence of realist responses to security on a global scale. In short, peace 
studies called for the reduction and eventual eradication of armed conflict and then the 
peaceful resolution of existing conflict. Put in the words of Galtung (1996), the key 
takeaway point is “the realization of peace by peaceful means”. This study steered clear 
of conventional studies which viewed peace studies as the consequence of a systematic 
analysis of war. Alternatively, it looked at challenges which did not necessarily 
immediately manifest as armed violence and warfare; however were persistent threats to 
a peaceful and secure Africa. 
It was important to spend sufficient time explaining peace, the origin of peace studies and 
the dual definitions and manifestation of peace. Specifically, positive peace was 
highlighted as an invaluable component of this research project. There were scarcely any 
links between leadership and peace which this study aimed to establish. Positive peace 
advocates for a broader understanding of peace which not only seeks to address 
manifestations of armed violence and conflict (negative peace) but working towards goals 
in the absence of conflict and addressing structural issues upon which injustice and 
inequality fester. Available content seemed to be more preoccupied with dealing with 
direct violence which appears as armed conflict in today’s international system instead of 
curbing problems at the structural level which deny African people’s development, 
economic participation, democracy, inclusion, access to good governance, etc. 
Secondary research question two read: Was Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, in her capacity 
as AUC Chair, empowered to not only make peace but ensure the implementation 
of AU objectives of peace and security? In answering this question, chapter three 
studied the AU to determine the principles and protocols available to Dlamini-Zuma 




In section one of chapter three, the analysis revolved around the revamping project of the 
OAU because of the organisation’s self-imposed limitations in addressing complex 
humanitarian emergencies and war occurring within member states and the continent at 
large. Moreover, reference was made to its close ties to the UN and its various organs. 
Murithi (2006a:22) notes that the creation of the AU is itself a testament to a vibrant 
political leadership able to see beyond Africa’s current problems. The AU now had a new 
role as the custodian of Africa’s collective security regime. Unlike its predecessor, the AU 
updated its policies in terms of affording the organisation greater leeway in dealing with 
peace and security on the continent. The stability brought by AU protocol and the 
establishment of organs each driven by their own objectives but ultimately tasked to live 
up to the prescriptions indicated in the Constitutive Act, stands in sharp contrast to the 
OAU’s ad hoc practices which inhibited its ability to not only address security threats but 
create conditions for peace. The comparative analysis between the OAU and AU security 
make-up clearly shows the institutional weakness of the OAU and the urgent need to 
revisit policy. Section two in chapter three went on to discuss the rise of IOs and the 
reasons for their formation. Additionally, Dlamini-Zuma’s personal political involvement in 
the institutionalisation of the Pan-African inspired AU was mentioned. Section three on 
the other hand specified the AU principles available to deal with various threats to peace 
and security on the continent. Of these, all AU articles which address challenges 
incorporated under the CADSP framework were mentioned and explained. 
Broadly, chapter three focused on the AU and the APSA specifically. The chief intent of 
this chapter was to determine the role and capacity of the AUC Chairperson in attending 
to the peace and security agenda of Africa’s continental organisation. Much time was 
allocated to explaining AU objectives and principles under the renovated AU so as to bear 
testimony to the AU’s normative arsenal and sufficiency in terms of policy propositions 
and prescriptions.  It must be noted that despite the AU’s impressive and expansive 
mandate, the implementation of the already existing plans and protocol has long since 
evaded the Union. Issues such as AU member states’ loyalty to their sovereignty as 
opposed to continental interests hampers the organisation’s ability to take timely and 
decisive action. Before studying the Commission more closely, the APSA and its relevant 




Commission Chair, it was decided to study the extent of her role as a key role player in 
creating conditions for peace in Africa. In this regard, her role as Chair was delineated as 
well as her role within the Commission at large and within the PSC. It became clear that 
the AUC Chair was able to use her Chairpersonship to actively deal with peace and 
security threats and not just focus on the logistical, accounting and executive role as 
stipulated under the Constitutive Act’s functions and objectives. What makes this study 
unique is that the study aimed to locate the powers, flexibility and relationships of the 
AUC Chair with APSA organs, most notably the PSC and their joint powers in fulfilling the 
AU’s mandate to achieve a peaceful Africa. Contrary to this, it must be noted that the AU 
was burdened by inefficiency and conflict before Dlamini-Zuma even entered AU 
headquarters. So, a healthy appreciation of institutional constraints had to be factored in 
before examining the extent to which the Chair was able to exercise her mandate with 
necessary and timely action. With these factors in mind, chapter four discussed 
contemporary challenges to peace and security in Africa under Dlamini-Zuma’s 
leadership. 
6.4 Measuring peace under Dlamini-Zuma’s AUC leadership 
Chapter four commenced by first and foremost covering a historically informed position 
on the current peace and security trajectory in Africa. It attributed the prevalence of 
conflict in Africa to the combination of many factors; however, it maintained that it was the 
continent’s weak position in the international system which reduced the continent’s 
readiness and responsiveness to address security threats and challenges. Lack of 
Western and European interventions in Africa after the Cold War left the continent and its 
leadership to resolve a new way forward in terms of assuming responsibility to threats 
and challenges occurring on African soil. Thus, Pax Africana, a peace that is endorsed, 
protected, instituted and managed by Africa herself. Africa’s security problems existed 
before Dlamini-Zuma’s ascension to the AUC Chair position, they existed during her 
tenure and are still there after her tenure. These security issues are a blend of human 
and state security challenges. Even though the abovementioned statement is true, it 
remained important to establish whether she made an effort to address these challenges 




The AUC’s adoption of the CADSP framework indicated the seriousness with which the 
Commission treated issues of negative and positive peace. Because negative peace 
dominates the peace and security space, provision was made to assess Dlamini-Zuma’s 
response and prioritisation of positive peace. Challenges discussed in chapter four 
included: consolidating democracy; UCG; poverty and inclusive development; lack of 
respect for human rights and human life; women’s rights and inclusion in peace 
processes; and child marriage. Therefore, the AU must have a grasp of the root causes 
of these challenges and then a comprehensive idea of what makes for lasting peace. And 
it is this very understanding which must guide Africa’s peace operations from prevention, 
management, resolution, transformation and post-conflict reconstruction and 
development.  
6.5 Unpacking the role of political leadership in producing outcomes of positive 
peace 
Research objective two sought to investigate the extent to which a political leadership 
assessment informed Dlamini-Zuma’s response to peace and security challenges on the 
continent. Before being able to assess whether she used her position as Chair to promote, 
build and maintain peace on the continent, the analysis had to start by analysing the 
recruitment process which resulted in her election.  
Chapter five ultimately intended to find out whether Dlamini-Zuma used her leadership 
position as AUC Chair to pursue peace on the continent during her tenure. To do so 
effectively, this study looked at which challenges featured on the AU’s security agenda in 
an effort to determine which of these she prioritised and responded to. Important here is 
why a political leadership analysis was necessary to understand organisational outcomes 
of positive peace. The benefit of a political leadership analysis of Dlamini-Zuma revealed 
that her political beliefs affect her political priorities as seen in the case of her AUC 
leadership.  Hall and Woods (2014:6) argue that effective leadership in international 
agencies is crucial as the world relies on these organisations to establish conditions and 
incentives for cooperation; whether in ensuring pandemics are constrained or that citizens 




To be effective, agencies need leaders who can identify and deliver on organisational 
goals without the constraint of undue influence by individual members or other 
stakeholders. Yet, some IOs have not even defined the leader’s role, let alone recruited 
or managed that person on the basis of particular knowledge, competence and 
experience required to effectively lead the organisation. On the score of her being the first 
woman Chairperson of the Commission also holds significance as this study found that 
her gender impacted which issues were deemed important enough to feature on the AU’s 
security agenda. Magadla and Cornell (2019: 36) describe that the dominant legacy of 
Dlamini-Zuma as observed in national and continental leadership roles point towards her 
“reconfiguring of institutional agendas towards a pan-African and feminist vision”. 
When scholars, politicians and the larger public speak of peace, the common association 
is the end of violence and/or armed conflict. Seldom is this derivative understanding of 
peace complemented by a broader appreciation of other factors which could result in its 
fulfilment. For this reason, the focal point of this thesis is to enlarge our understanding of 
peace and recognising the platform for the creation of peaceful conditions through the 
avenue of political leadership. The leadership of the AUC Chair is an important and very 
complex role which demands a host of skills, abilities, resources and member state 
confidence if the Chair is to be an effective steward of the AU’s vision and mission. 
As stated in the Audit Report of 2007, it was made clear that the AUC and Chair position 
itself is too convoluted for the organ to address all of its designated priority areas. There 
are more than 20 functions of the Commission together with 26 functions associated with 
the Chairperson alone which serves to contribute to the difficulty in attending to all of them 
with adequate human, financial and policy resources (Rukato, 2018:118). To be clear, 
this study recognized the various objectives absorbed under her Chairpersonship of the 
AUC but focused on Dlamini-Zuma’s personal leadership effectiveness in addressing 
security issues on the continent during her term there while recognising her contribution 
to a broader more nuanced perspective on peace. On numerous occasions, Dlamini-
Zuma stressed the importance of peace and how in her opinion, peace and development 




spoke of one without mentioning the other, thus cementing her ideological and conceptual 
articulation of positive peace. 
6.5.1 The recruitment process 
 Section one in chapter five began by understanding the recruitment process which 
resulted in Dlamini-Zuma’s victory at the Commission. Before resorting to an assessment 
of the former Chair’s political and leadership credentials, it was useful to examine all the 
reasons including both internal and external rationale which helped South Africa and 
SADC to successfully promote the candidacy of Dlamini-Zuma. Although there was not 
an in-depth look into the voting and/or election processes of the AU itself, what this section 
highlighted was that the Republic together with SADC aggressively pursued this prized 
position even in contravention of the AU’s unspoken and unwritten rule of African 
diplomacy which discouraged the powerful states of the AU to contest important 
leadership positions. Another key takeaway point was that Dlamini-Zuma herself was not 
completely comfortable to avail herself for this esteemed position within the Commission 
as she had her own reservations of the decision fracturing the already fragile state of 
African unity owing to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) sanctioned 
intervention in Libya, for one. However, the literature makes it plain that Dlamini-Zuma 
was first and foremost a party person, meaning that when summoned to Luthuli house 
and asked to contest for this position, Landsberg and Orderson (2017:3) described her 
as the “reluctant redeemer”. Pretoria together with SADC then marshalled forces to begin 
her campaign which focused on her being branded as an effective institutional leader, 
one who possessed the skills and leadership needed to deliver the Commission and AU 
at large from its implementation crises and continuity of ineffective practices. 
South Africa’s lobbying for Dlamini-Zuma was by no means illegal, but was deemed a 
controversial move which was not widely accepted among AU member states. Varying 
rationales were put forward so as to give substance to why the Republic pursued this 
course of action even in the face of unspoken values sacred to African diplomacy. At the 
most basic level the reasoning advanced by Pretoria included self-interest, South Africa’s 
continental aspirations, as well as the Republic’s commitment to concretising protocol on 




push for the candidacy of Dlamini-Zuma which coincided with the centenary celebrations 
of the ANC. Why the ANC government, which was renowned for unity and solidarity, 
would embark on such a divisive course of action by fielding one of their own for such an 
important role within the AU merited further exploration.  Despite consensus among the 
big five members of the AU who agreed not to stand for such important leadership roles 
so as to give other African countries a stake in the continent’s affairs and in turn cultivate 
a culture of inclusiveness, South Africa on the other hand, saw nothing wrong. The 
implications for such a decision were that the continent was now divided on geopolitical, 
regional and personal lines at the highest levels of government in Africa (Akokpari, 2016b: 
40).  
It must be noted that it took four rounds of voting, and in the final round 37 out of 51 
countries voted for her, demonstrating the extent to which this decision was a catalyst for 
division on the continent. Dlamini-Zuma’s candidacy indeed posed a threat to unity. This 
decision resulted in a damaging election campaign between Dlamini-Zuma of South 
Africa and Ping of Gabon, and served to deeply divide the continent at a time when Africa 
had to navigate the balance of forces in the context of a battle for Africa’s resources. 
When Dlamini-Zuma was victorious at the AU Commission in 2012, she was well aware 
that she needed to work towards rebuilding confidence and trust among AU member 
states. She had to make a point of restoring damaged relations with countries like Nigeria, 
Algeria, Ethiopia and others. Further, she would have to reach out to staff within the 
Commission and reassure them that she had no secret agenda to get rid of them. It was 
necessary that she maintained distance from her political home, South Africa and express 
total commitment to the AUs agenda as her priority. The main point here was to 
understand that Dlamini-Zuma entered as a compromised individual who had to mend 
fences which limited her prospects of radically transforming the AU. 
The chapter then moved to discuss expectations for what the Chairperson of the AUC 
should be like. From this, it was evident that the normative prescriptions centred on 
Dlamini-Zuma being a chain manager, networker, and charismatic diplomat. A 
compilation of elements from trait and behavioural theories were borrowed from to inform 




who she is, her political beliefs and political history. Her impressive political pedigree 
revealed that in addition to being an apartheid activist she is also a medical doctor and 
four times minister in the South African governance architecture. On the score of political 
beliefs, Dlamini-Zuma started as a Black Consciousness member which profoundly 
shaped her outlook on the convergence of race, identity, the economy and societal 
welfare. She then went on to become vice president of SASO and later joined the ANC 
ranks. Her intimate association with the abovementioned institutions shaped her as a 
Pan-Africanist in her own right.  
6.6 Outcomes of positive peace 
In answering the main research question of this study, chapter four played an instrumental 
role in highlighting how positive peace allows for the measurement of peace in Africa. The 
reason why these challenges were selected is because they do not conventionally feature 
on the security agenda. Moreover, what these challenges reveal is the interconnected 
nature of the pillars of peace. Decline in one of the variables automatically constitutes an 
impact in another. However, one must be careful of assuming an over-simplification of 
causal relationships which exist among the pillars of peace as derived from the AUC’s 
CADSP framework to measure peace under Dlamini-Zuma’s AUC leadership. The 
political leadership assessment revealed Dlamini-Zuma’s prioritisation of and response 
to positive peace issues. 
6.6.1 Poverty and inclusive development  
 
Root cause  AU Protocol NDZ’s actions /outcomes of 
positive peace 
Unviable nation-states in 
Africa; SAPs and IMF 
conditionalities; lack of 
self-production. 
Custodian of the AU 
Constitutive Act of 2000  
Executive, Legal and 
Accounting Officer as 
AUC Chair 
Informed by her belief in 
positive peace and the intimate 
relationship between peace and 







The CADSP framework adopted by the AUC recognised poverty and inclusive 
development as a pressing security issue. Chapter four made a point to explain how 
Africa’s security environment suffers the effect of poverty and lack of inclusive 
development. Leadership and development specialist, Myles Munroe contends that 
poverty is the absence of self-production. This rings true when surveying African states 
still suffering from similar problems democracy and other remedies were prescribed to 
deliver the continent from. It is acknowledged that one leader alone cannot be held 
accountable for the pervasiveness of poverty on the continent; however, a political 
leadership assessment of IO executives provided an opportunity to study how a leader 
makes decisions and views problems based on their political beliefs and priorities. Earlier 
in chapter two, it was revealed that to assess political leadership one must consider 
whether a leader is able to understand the nature and complexity of the problems the 
continent is faced with and then conceptualise solutions in an effort to address them. 
Chilton (2004: 31) describes political action as language action. Moreover, when looking 
at Dlamini-Zuma’s response to peace, it is clear that she regarded peace and 
development as inseparable variables. This cements the understanding of her 
developmental approach to peace on the continent proving her ideological favouritism of 
positive peace.  
Further study into Dlamini-Zuma’s political beliefs echo the importance of liberation in all 
its forms. Her closeness to Black Consciousness, African Renaissance and Pan-
Africanism indicates the seriousness with which Dlamini-Zuma reveres the political, 
economic and social liberation of all African peoples. In response to poverty and inclusive 
development, Dlamini-Zuma was intimately involved in the creation of Agenda 2063. The 
establishment of a continental blueprint in the form of a new guiding document for the 
continent’s development was met with more criticism than appraisal and it remains a 
product of ideational and visionary leadership. 
6.6.2 Women’s rights  
          Gender-based violence 




Root causes AU Protocol NDZ’s actions/outcomes 
of positive peace  
Gender inequality; poverty; 
cultural and religious norms 
of exclusion. 
“Support and facilitate 
humanitarian action in 
situations of armed conflicts 
or major natural disasters” 
(AU Constitutive Act: 2000: 
Article 7).  
Implementation of the 
WPS agenda. Inclusion of 
women in all peace 
operations.  
Appointment of Bineta 
Diop. 
Gender parity in the AU 
 
The Constitutive Act of 2000 makes explicit reference to gender equality as a guiding 
principle of the AU. Lack of respect for human rights and human life was discussed as an 
important component in measuring peace in Africa, hence its inclusion in the CADSP 
framework. Informed by her feminist beliefs of women’s inclusion and representation, 
Dlamini-Zuma took seriously women’s rights in her capacity as AUC Chair.  A consistent 
priority which features in all of the leadership positions held by Dlamini-Zuma is the issue 
of women’s rights. An assessment of her political leadership indicated that feminism has 
played a particularly important role in defining her advocacy of women in all spheres of 
life. From serving her term as Health Minister in the South African government to her 
assuming the Chairpersonship of the Commission, women’s inclusion in not only AU 
affairs but economic and political participation around the continent has featured on the 
institutional agenda of the AU.  
As indicated earlier, the CADSP framework shows that when measuring peace, one must 
understand the interrelationships which exist. Poverty and inclusive development 
adversely affect women’s rights, not only in Africa but globally. Not only have women 
been oppressed based on their sex, but their gender and race has affected their access 
to political office. Dlamini-Zuma expresses that her advocacy of women’s issues is not 
because she is anti-men. She goes on to add that it is simply because men have always 
been relied upon in society since women were deprived of certain rights and privileges in 




actions as AUC Chair made a concerted effort to uphold AU principles in line with the 
advancement of positive peace on the continent.  
As AUC Chairperson, for two consecutive years, the theme focused on women’s rights. 
This is unheard of and a testament to the priority of the issue to the former Chair. 
Moreover, this reveals that in her capacity as AUC Chair, Dlamini-Zuma was able to 
shape the peace and security agenda of the AU. Dlamini-Zuma took seriously the need 
to ensure gender mainstreaming within the AU during her tenure. The Constitutive Act is 
explicit in explaining the Commission Chair’s role in peace and security. Furthermore, she 
made a point to ensure that women occupied decision- making positions not only within 
the AU but across the continent. 
The issue of gender-based violence is a persistent hindrance to peace and security on 
the continent. Moreover, this issue is also being weaponised as a tool of warfare in African 
states. This issue is uniquely destructive in that gender-based violence can occur in states 
not undergoing armed conflict yet possesses the ability to deteriorate and diminish 
conditions for peace.  
Political leaders are able to dictate the level of importance of a particular subject matter. 
This becomes increasingly evident when evaluating the talk and text used by political 
leaders to communicate a particular message (Van Dijk: 2006). Again, we see the 
principle of exclusion and inclusion at play as a tool to help sway attention towards a 
leader’s preferred political position. On the score of women’s rights then, gender equality, 
women’s representation and inclusion has been a constant feature in Dlamini-Zuma’s 
career as an international public servant. In her articulation of most challenges to positive 
peace, the exclusion of women from participating in all spheres of life is highlighted as a 
major hindrance to development in many African states. On the peace and security front, 
she believed that women must be included in all peace processes. In elaboration of this 
perspective, Dlamini-Zuma stated that women pursue different priorities in these political 
processes which tend to value human rights instead of contesting political power. At all 
costs, one must avoid categorising women as being inherently peaceful and championing 




of women’s rights spans across her political career history, it is clear that women’s 
liberation and representation remained a goal firmly in focus during her AUC tenure. 
6.6.3 Child marriage  
 
Root causes  AU Protocol  NDZ’s actions/outcomes of 
positive peace  
Poverty; gender inequality; 
cultural and religious norms; 
sexual violence; lack of 
access to education. 
Article 6 of the Protocol to 
the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights 
on the Rights of Women in 
Africa (2003) which prohibits 
child marriage. Article 21(2) 
of the African Charter on the 
Rights and Welfare of the 
Child 
 
Raised the profile of the 
issue. Solution: Legal 
enforcement to ban this 
practice.  
AU and UNICEF campaigns 
for awareness raising and 
lobbying.  
 
Although child marriage is not named as a security issue under the CADSP framework, it 
is discussed under the issue of lack of respect for human rights and human life. The AUC 
in collaboration with UNICEF made a point to address the scourge of child marriage. This 
issue is one which has been deprived of study and attention in terms of solutions and 
resources to address its impact in African states. Moreover, this phenomenon 
concentrates on the girl child in particular and proves to be destructive to children’s health, 
access to education opportunities and maternal death. The AU makes provision for this 
issue in Article 21(2) of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, that 
child marriage and the betrothal of girls and boys shall be prohibited, and effective action, 
including legislation, shall be taken to specify the minimum age of marriage to be 18 years 
and to make registration of all marriages in an official registry compulsory. 
Child marriage can be traced to a variety of reasons of which poverty is regarded as one 
of the chief motivations and enablers of this problem. Because this phenomenon 




reinforce the idea of women’s exclusion, lack of rights, lack of economic and political 
participation in national and continental affairs. Moreover, early marriage as a result of 
economic transactions renders girls more prone to gender-based violence. Again, the 
identification of the root issues responsible for measuring peace showcase the 
interconnected nature of issues of positive peace which are deprived of the human and 
technical resources needed to address them.  
In Dlamini-Zuma’s capacity as AUC Chair, she ensured that child marriage was treated 
with greater seriousness and resource mobilisation. It became apparent that the best 
means to target this issue was to campaign for the domestication of its legal abolishment. 
Even though the continent of Africa has made significant progress in terms of the rights 
afforded to women and girls, girls are still privy to the same challenges which subjected 
all women to inferior education, lack of access to education and their family’s way out of 
poverty. Rukato (Personal interview: 2020) notes that Dlamini-Zuma made a point to 
establish strong ambassadors for it. 
6.6.5 Unconstitutional changes of government  
 
Root causes  AU Protocol  NDZ’s actions/outcomes of 
positive peace 
Contestation of what the state 
should look like; political 
leadership; competing political 
and military interests; resource 
scarcity.  
Ensure the promotion of 
peace, democracy and 
stability. 
Article 7- Follow-up 
promotion of democratic 
practices, good governance, 
the rule of law. 
Economic sanctions and 
suspension from the Union 
pending the affected party 
meeting AU demands. 
 
The CADSP framework acknowledges the pervasiveness of UCG to peace in African 
states and the continent at large. The abovementioned issue reveals the dichotomy of 
positional versus behavioural leadership. Since the inception of the AU, this issue has 




stability the same can be said of its ability to be utilised as a tool of oppression to harm 
and deprive people of their human rights. It is also one of the major sources of political 
violence in Africa. As a disservice to the quality of democracy in Africa, political leaders 
have amended their national constitutions to maintain unhealthy power regimes.    
The CADSP framework acknowledges the pervasiveness of UCG to peace in African 
states and the continent at large. More importantly, Dlamini-Zuma believed in democracy, 
and the history of her home country made this a fundamental priority for her (Rukato, 
2018: Personal interview). 
Akokpari (2016a:31) argues that UCG can be traced to poor and weak governance on 
the continent. The issue of poor governance has enabled a culture of authoritarian 
leadership which results in abusive leadership and governance practices under which 
human rights issues are violated. Those political leaders who did not enact violence 
against their own populations instead became lifetime presidents which further 
compromised the quality of democracy in Africa. Under the OAU, member states were 
bystanders to these atrocities, however, under the guidance of the AU measures were 
put in place to punish the offence of coups on the continent. The AUC Chairperson in 
particular has the right to institute sanctions against states which contravene this 
principle. A clear demonstration of this was seen in her suspension of Egypt in 2013 
despite its gravitas on the continent and within the AU. During Dlamini-Zuma’s tenure, 
she addressed this issue. Owing to South Africa’s oppressive political past, democracy 
was an ideal which Dlamini-Zuma valued and advocated for during her tenure.  
6.6.6 Partnership building: Dlamini-Zuma’s relations with the UN and RECs 
Dlamini-Zuma also had the UN at her disposal, but she did not use the world body 
effectively when it mattered. The AU and the UN have committed themselves to 
developing capacities for conflict prevention, mediation, peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding, through joint activities, including periodic consultations between the senior 
officials of both organisations. The UN and the AU have also committed themselves to 
more collaboration that include: peace and security; crime prevention; institution-building; 
political and electoral matters; peacekeeping operations; governance; human rights and 




environment. For the AU to successfully deliver on its peace and security mandate, the 
Commission Chair must establish a good working relationship with its external partners 
such as the UN. 
The AUC Chair must take seriously the AU’s relations with RECs who have an important 
role to play in advancing the continent’s peace mandate. Dlamini-Zuma believed in a 
prosperous Africa, whose solutions and aspirations are determined by Africans 
themselves.  Because of this, Agenda 2063 was developed.  She also pushed the idea 
of an AU that is not dependent on donor funding.  Her mantra was that “There is no 
country or continent that has ever developed on the basis of aid”. She believed in a 
results-based Commission, RECs, and national institutions. She prioritised issues of 
RECs’ coordination in order to bring regional perspectives to the continental level. 
6.7 Limitations of the study  
This research focused on Dlamini-Zuma's contribution to the peace and security sector 
in Africa. It must be noted that the AU and AUC's mandate is wide-ranging and includes 
several variables that were utilised to measure the success of her term. This study sought 
to locate the role of women in leadership as they pursue peace in Africa, specifically. 
There is not much published literature on the leadership contribution of women in creating 
peace in Africa. Dlamini-Zuma was the first female AUC candidate from SADC to assume 
the highest office at Addis Ababa.  
To illustrate the relationship between political leadership and peace, this study employed 
a single- case research; therefore, the findings of this type of study are usually only 
relevant to the immediate context. This is known to complicate the process of deriving 
generalisations as the findings presented could be regarded as unique to the AU only. 
Contrastingly, many heads of IOs are understudied and face similar problems because 
they champion common goals.  Also women political leaders are confronted with similar 
challenges to their competency and performance when they enter political office. 
The researcher’s inability to contact key personnel at the AU, especially those who 
occupied key positions within the Peace and Security Department together with the 




a challenge to the study. Lack of access to information concerning decisions taken, the 
prioritisation of one conflict above another; disadvantaged the researcher’s analysis to 
comprehensively measure peace under Dlamini-Zuma’s AUC leadership. Because the 
AUC adopted the CADSP framework, these issues were the subject of analysis to 
measure peace. However, this is a limitation as issues outside this scope were not 
included in this analysis and therefore did not contribute to the findings of this study. 
Limited access to AU staffers and other continental diplomats meant that other 
interactions and experiences with Dlamini-Zuma’s leadership were excluded. 
6.8 Concluding remarks 
This study makes the claim that a political leadership analysis must be conducted on an 
individual basis using a consistent criterion. By extension, this means that an 
overestimation of left leaning ideological arguments such as those derived from 
intersectionality and identity politics, at times, focus to exclusively on group identity as 
opposed to individual identity. When group identity takes precedence over individual 
identity, the likelihood of misdiagnosing a leader’s performance is higher. While it remains 
a useful tool to examine claims from feminism and the impact of gender on leadership 
and peace, group identity should occupy a secondary role in assessing individual leaders. 
The addition of gender to Dlamini-Zuma’s leadership assessment provided a platform to 
examine the influence of sex and gender on her priorities of peace. Recognition of the 
multivariate forces which determines whether a political leader pursues peace then, 
prompted the researcher’s decision to consider the impact of a political leadership 
assessment on three levels. The three areas which proved to deepen the understanding 
of Dlamini-Zuma’s leadership behaviour include the individual level, institutional level and 
the level of gender.  
The individual unit of analysis allowed for the study of political beliefs, values, and the 
recruitment process responsible for her election. Identification and analysis of her political 
beliefs demonstrated the extent to which they impacted her policy response to issues of 
positive peace. Language action can be equated to political action. What is talked about, 




concern to a leader. Often, a leader’s personal convictions, values and political beliefs 
drive their decision-making as witnessed during Dlamini-Zuma’s term.  
Next, the institutional level of analysis allowed for the examination of the AU, AUC, peace 
and security related policies used to determine institutional empowerment. Normative and 
technical capacities of any organisation are a precursor to pursuing outcomes of peace. 
Then, analysis of whether gender impacted Dlamini-Zuma’s political priorities, 
performance assessments and the pursuit of outcomes of peace was subject to inquiry. 
The consequences of exclusively focusing on gender as an indicator of successful 
leadership produces a differential assessment criteria which is problematic. If we assess 
leadership performance on the basis of gender, there is a greater risk that the analysis 
will be compromised by bias and subjectivity. An important question arises: should how 
we analyse a political leader change depending on their gender? Both sex and gender 
should be considered when determining how an individual leader makes decisions and 
takes certain actions. 
On the issue of gender, Dlamini-Zuma’s entire political life can be summed up as a fight 
to be recognised on merit and decisions taken in alignment with her mandated role. There 
tends to be an obsessive focus on her former husband and other associations which 
seem to overshadow the need to objectively assess her performance as a political leader. 
A closer look into the recruitment process responsible for her election as AUC Chair 
suggested that she has been protected by “Big Men” having served under three South 
African Presidents. This invalidates her own political achievements and adversely 
influences her ability to take independent decisions. Women political leaders must be 
assessed on merit and mandate not because they are described as unsmiling and 
aggressive. 
Healthy caution must be exercised when performing a political leadership assessment so 
as to avoid making judgments based on external factors such as gender and race. The 
current trend in assessing a political leader’s eligibility and performance is largely 
motivated by these identifiers. This probes whether gender has now replaced race as the 
primary determinant of whether a political leader should be elected. Through exhausting 




a substantial impact on a leader’s priorities and decision-making abilities. The analysis 
revealed that several factors be considered before a determination is made regarding the 
effectiveness of a political leader. 
Proverbs (29:13) states that “without vision, the people perish”. An individual leader who 
has visionary foresight is necessary as leaders must be able to see beyond present crises 
toward solution oriented thinking. Leadership is an important activity. Leaders do not only 
lead entities, they lead people. The word “lead” itself implies movement and to move you 
need insight, vision, direction and a plan. In light of the threats to positive peace in Africa, 
one must begin to cultivate an appreciation of leadership for the purpose of peace.  
South Africa’s influence and push for the AUC victory did erode the credibility of Dlamini-
Zuma’s leadership before she entered Addis Ababa. In any leadership analysis, it is 
imperative to acknowledge blind spots, for instance, the magnitude and severity of 
external political and economic pressures on the AU and Dlamini-Zuma. Financial and 
technical resources affect a leader’s ability to fulfil their mandate. Positive peace issues 
are the real threats to peace and security on the continent. The AU together with its 
member states must bear greater responsibility for implementing its peace mandate. 
Actionable steps taken in this regard should include selecting leaders based on their 
philosophy and track record of producing outcomes of peace.  
Current trends in popular culture include the “future is female” tagline. This probes 
whether we should elect leaders on the score of their gender identity as the benchmark 
of eligibility? If not, what should be the primary factors which determine a leader’s 
electability? The reason for including such an extensive record of the AU as an institution 
is to locate the requirements of the job of the AUC. Moreover, the review of Africa’s 
relationship with peace and the front running indicators of positive peace in society, mean 
that its organisational leadership must understand continental security dynamics. To this 
effect, Dlamini-Zuma was more than qualified to assume the AUC position irrespective of 
South Africa’s national and continental ambitions.  
The extent to which any leader and in this case, a female leader pursues peace is a 
cumulative sum of their political beliefs, career history and institutional context. The idea 




international organisations equally deserves further study. This implies that leaders even 
possess the potential to steer resources and action in the direction of issues which are of 
personal priority as opposed to institutional.  
6.9 Political leadership and the prospect of peace in Africa 
It is no longer sufficient to elect leaders who do not share the philosophy of peace 
congruent with the AU’s vision to ensure a peaceful and prosperous Africa. 
Notwithstanding unique leadership challenges which accompany high-level diplomatic 
roles, consistent standards of measurement should be employed in analysing leadership 
performance. The leadership assessment of Dlamini-Zuma thus revealed interesting 
trends concerning the value, success and shortcomings of women’s leadership and the 
prospect of peace. The most pressing trends are highlighted below. 
Personality versus policy. Restraint must be exercised against the idea that a leader’s 
personality is more significant than his/her policy positions. In studying Dlamini-Zuma as 
a political leader, it is evident that there has been a deliberate and even obsessive focus 
on her personality as opposed to her policy preferences. This is a threat to an objective 
leadership assessment. 
Equal opportunity versus equal outcome. Does hiring more women automatically 
constitute a more peaceful organisation? Are the women qualified and competent to fulfil 
professional demands? The national and international call “the future is female” demands 
that female leaders be treated no differently to male leaders for his/her conduct, 
successes and shortcomings while in office. One cannot suddenly be expected to lower 
standards of accountability of female leaders on account of gender sensitivity.The tension 
between equal opportunity and equal outcome for women in political leadership ultimately 
hinges on human individuality. The outcome of an interaction of genes and their 
environment determine human individuality (Tooby and Cosmides, 1992). Individual 
capacity and competence should be among the chief criteria used to elect political 
leaders. 
Socialization versus sexual differences. Which of the two forces shape human behaviour 




can socialization determine or even explain human behaviour? This study has found that 
an unhealthy attachment to the claims and findings of one and intentional exclusion of the 
other both threaten the integrity of an objective leadership analysis. 
Draw attention to media bias in the leadership analysis of women political leaders. A 
healthy balance of character and credentials must guide the selection and assessment of 
political leaders. The extent to which any leader and in this case, a female leader pursues 
peace is a cumulative sum of their political beliefs, career history and the institutional 
context. 
It is important to acknowledge the limitations of feminism in understanding human 
behaviour. In understanding women’s leadership and the prospect of peace in Africa, a 
balanced argument should consult sex differences, biological realities and socialisation 
forces in influencing women’s decision-making. Social constructivist claims are not 
sufficient to make substantive judgements on a leader’s performance. Therefore, it 
remains key to examine feminist claims about leadership in congruence with biological 
realities. A leadership performance analysis must evolve beyond its current application 
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